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CHAPTER ONE – FORMALLY INTRODUCING THE (CASE) STUDY 
1.1 Setting the Scene: Introduction, Inspiration, Backdrop and Problem Statement 
[In] [t]he one [inner city building] across the road, the caretaker was thrown in the lift shaft, and 
he’s in a wheelchair today.(Martin New as cited in Lipietz 2004; added emphasis) 
Joburg building managers gunned down in CBD… in Hillbrow, allegedly by building hijackers. (Cox 
2005; emphasis on headline)  
Hillbrow caretaker shot dead... after he allegedly had an argument with a tenant about noise. 
(SAPA 2008; emphasis on title) 
Criminals slay Hillbrow police officer... in Joubert Park. (Boyce 2012; emphasis on headline) 
Three guys have been murdered in the Florence building, one in the Dolphin Square building and 
another four during a fight for the control of Remington Court. (CoJ’s William Pudikabekwaas cited 
in Witbooi 2012: 45) 
Hijacked building trustee murdered... One man’s battle to evict hijackers from a Hillbrow building 
came to a bloody end when suspected building hijackers stabbed him to death.(Cox and Ndlovu 
2013; emphasis on headline) 
Ishmael said, “Josie, take a break from the squatter camps and come to Hillbrow”. After 6 months 
of working in Hillbrow, I said to him, “Ish, you’ve put me in the biggest squatter camp I’ve been in 
and it goes up 10 floors!” (JHC’s Josie Adler 2013) 
Consider the interview excerpts and newspaper headlines cited above; and then reflect on their 
commonality as well as the frequent themes they share/project. Firstly, the article extracts are 
about Johannesburg’s urban neighbourhoods, particularly Hillbrow. Johannesburg’s culturally 
vibrant and “resilient port of entry neighbourhood for many residents” (Winkler 2013: 309); 
Hillbrow happens to be “the most densely populated neighbourhood in South Africa” (CoJ 2011: 
54; see Figure 1B below for Hillbrow’s location). The aforementioned citations portray Hillbrow as 
a high storey neighbourhood characterised by social divisions - conflict not only between 
residents/ordinary citizenry and state agents; but also between/among the diverse inhabitants 
themselves, such as landlord-caretaker-tenant tensions (Morris 1994; Morris 1997; Morris 1999; 
Seekings 2003; Adler 2013). The quotes depict Hillbrow’s public and private realm negatively. 
They – along with Figure 1A below - suggest that Hillbrow’s public and internal spaces are ridden 
with failed management; which gives way to grime and illicit activities such as theft, scams, 
property hijacking-related murders, drug lording, slum lording, prostitution and human trafficking 
(Sachs 2010: 10; CoJ 2011; Morris 1999; Winkler 2013; Gossman and Premo 2012). The 
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aforementioned connotations of Hillbrow solidify the locality’s negative reputation as a no-go 
area and “crime capital of the world” (Jerusalema 2008). As well, the nuances contribute 
significantly to the ongoing discourse of Hillbrow as a “chaotic, hyper-fluid and ‘dysfunctional’” 
(Winkler 2013: 311) mixed-use area with “a qualitative intangible distance from the state” 
(Gossman and Premo 2012: 4). Additionally, the assassinations of trustees, caretakers and police 
officers in their lines of duty – as brought about by the aforementioned quotes – give us the 
impression that those who try to effect and enforce constructive change in Hillbrow are in 
danger and should thus fear for their lives. This then makes us wonder how ‘chaotic’ 
neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow can be managed, and how the lives of citizens/residents of 
such neighbourhoods can be improved. 
 
Figure 1A: ‘Grimy Spaces’ – Failed internal and external management in inner city neighbourhoods like 
Hillbrow is portrayed by the filth of public and private spaces such as lanes and internal parking lots 
respectively  
Using the case of Hillbrow, Winkler (2013) argues that the Johannesburg inner city will never 
‘regenerate’ due to a number of factors. According to Winkler (2013), interventions done at the 
top to create change in Hillbrow – for instance regeneration initiatives such as Constitution Hill – 
do little-to-nothing to effect change in Hillbrow due, among other things, to the fact that 
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Neighbourhood change in Hillbrow is not concomitant with the linear processes of urban decline 
and economic resurgence. Instead, neighbourhood change is shaped by situated histories, politics 
and economics, in addition to the activities of diverse local actors. (Winkler 2013: 309) 
With this realisation, Winkler (2013) appears to be suggesting that if change is to be successfully 
effected in a neighbourhood like Hillbrow; different stakeholders have to work together in 
initiatives that are sensitive to Hillbrow’s socio-politico-economic context (also see Seekings 
2003). 
Yet this appears to be the case in light of the eKhaya Neighbourhood Improvement Programme, 
a voluntary Residential City Improvement District (hereafter RCID) that is “reclaiming the streets 
and buildings of Hillbrow, one step at a time” (CoJ 2012) with the broad objective of “[m]aking 
Hillbrow a neighbourhood” (CoJ 2012). Initiated in 2004 by Johannesburg Housing Company 
(hereafter JHC) housing consultant and community organiser - Hillbrow native Josie Adler - in 
collaboration with Hillbrow property owners, their building managers/caretakers, residents and 
the CoJ’s agencies; the eKhaya RCID appears to be effecting change in Hillbrow in more ways 
than one. Its transformation of Hillbrow into “a neighbourhood” (CoJ 2011) appears to be taking 
many forms, among them physical change/urban revitalisation - the upgrading of sidewalks with 
paving and lighting, the installation of surveillance cameras on public space, and the cleaning 
up of lanes in Hillbrow (see Figures 1C, 1D and 2B). The success of the ‘original’ eKhaya 
Neighbourhood CID – also referred to as eKhaya Neighbourhood CID Hillbrow South – has 
prompted the organisation members who also own property in Hillbrow’s northern parts to 
advocate for eKhaya North; which has then translated into the significant extension of the 
precinct (see Figure 1G).  
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Figure 1B: ‘Hillbrow relative to inner city Johannesburg UDZ’ – Arguably Johannesburg’s premier port-of-
entry neighbourhood and the RSA’s most populous locality, Hillbrow always surfaces in any discussion of 
management challenges plaguing inner city Johannesburg (SOURCE: Docstoc 2013) 
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Figure 1C: ‘Before and After eKhaya’ – Prior to the materialisation of the eKhaya RCID, filthy lanes were the 
order of the day in most – if not all – of Hillbrow’s buildings (SOURCE: CoJ 2011: 58) 
 
Figure 1D: ‘Spot the Difference’ – It is not very hard to tell a building comprising eKhaya RCID from one that 
is not due, in large part, to the divergent public spaces. Buildings constituting eKhaya are characterised by 
upgraded public amenities such as sanitary lanes and pavements  
Indeed, the concept of CIDs at neighbourhood/residential level is a relatively new phenomenon 
in RSA cities (Peyroux 2007); and eKhaya is hailed as “the first of its kind in a high-density, 
predominantly residential, inner-city neighbourhood” (JHC 2010). Declaring itself as “more than 
a CID” (CoJ 2012), eKhaya asserts that unlike many CIDs in Johannesburg’s inner city and/or 
retail areas, it involves more than just regeneration. In light of the fact that “[t]he inner city is a 
domain that few want to belong to or establish roots in” (Simone 2004: 425); we are told that 
eKhaya – a Nguni equivalent for ‘[at] home’ – is interestingly named thus to encourage the 
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Hillbrow resident to have a sense of ownership of Hillbrow and other inner city areas which the 
initiative is extending towards. States Adler (2013), “I pushed for it to be called eKhaya because 
it was looking at the person, because that person is not thinking about Hillbrow as home.” 
Hence, although Hillbrow is seen by many as “a temporary place of abode: A place to ‘land’, 
find your feet, strengthen your networks and, ultimately, move from” (Winkler 2013: 316); eKhaya 
RCID is  
…about people finding a home in the city… accepting a place and thereby [having] a reciprocal 
relationship with their environment for which they start to take responsibility. It is therefore this 
process which over a period of time starts to impact on the environment. (Savage and Dodd 
Architects 2012: 1) 
Against the backdrop of CIDs and RCIDs being a manifestation of urban management tools that 
are said to be increasingly becoming at once participatory/inclusive and exclusionary/top-
down – co-opting private sector actors and shutting out the urban poor (Nelson 2006; Miraftab 
2009; also see Chapter Five) – eKhaya asserts that it is a “collaborative project” (Savage Dodd 
and Architects 2012: 1) working from the ground up with the aim of building relationships among 
different stakeholders (ibid; Adler 2013; CoJ 2013). We are told that:  
Compared to existing CIDs, eKhaya uses a more bottom-up approach. Initially this has involved 
organising local stakeholders on a voluntary basis and then involving them in defining priorities and 
making and implementing the plans to deal with these. (HDA 2012: 13)  
Given that in inner city neighbourhoods, “attempts to engage with ‘civil society’ in order to 
devise more inclusive neighbourhood-based approaches to dealing with the urban 
environment, have shown to be highly frustrating more often than not, leading to numerous 
dead-ends” (Lipietz 2004: 11); we are given the impression that the eKhaya Neighbourhood 
Association is a ‘civil society organisation’1 that has somehow successfully managed to forge 
relationships with different City institutions. We then wonder how private and community 
                                                          
1The term ‘civil society organisation’ – as applied to the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association - is conceived of quite 
broadly here. First, ‘civil society organisation’ is understood as “the space of uncoerced human association and also the 
set of relational networks – formed for the sake of faith, family, interest and ideology – that fill this space” (Walzer 1992: 
89). The researcher conceives of the association thus by virtue of its philosophy of coming together and working 
communally towards the goals of urban regeneration and property value increase. The researcher also comprehends 
eKhaya as civil society in Chatterjee-an terms (refer to Chapter Two’s Section 2.3 for Partha Chatterjie’s conception of 
civil society) – the association is comprised of ratepayers/taxpayers and property owners who more or less abide by ‘the 
city government laws’ and who are thus justified for making claims to the City and/or “petition[ing] for new initiatives 
which will further improve the [eKhaya/Hillbrow] area” (Urban Genesis 2012). 
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relationships with the local state have come about in eKhaya and Hillbrow; as well as how these 
relationships work ‘on the ground’.  
Adler (2013) also argues that at the core of the relationships forged by eKhaya are the building 
managers, who are the glue keeping the landlord-tenant relationships together. The essence of 
this argument is emphasised in the quote below: 
[T]he asset for the Residential Improvement District is in the housing supervisors. They have become 
a proud asset; they know each other strong; they are good for their management and internal 
governance in the buildings because they’ve been given the confidence. They’re a part of a 
group; they know each other. I can’t tell you the excitement for me to see human life behaving 
the way it can. It really thrills me! (Adler 2013) 
 
Figure 1E: ‘Tribute to a Pioneering Spirit’ – The departed John Gololo was one of eKhaya’s founding 
members; initiated the street soccer concept; is said to have set a precedent for JHC and eKhaya building 
managers; and is one of the inspirations for the study  (SOURCE: Josie Adler courtesy of JHC) 
Adler (2013), who evidently speaks highly of the eKhaya building managers and ostensibly holds 
them in high regard, frequently makes reference to one particular building manager in her 
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speech about eKhaya – the late John Gololo (see Figure 1E above). Gololo – partly an 
inspiration for this study - may have passed on but his contribution, commitment and dedication 
to eKhaya have allegedly left a lasting legacy for the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association; and 
have set the bar for eKhaya building managers (Adler 2013; Mkhize 2013; see Figure 1E above). 
Like Adler (2013), Bafikile Mkhize (2013) – Adler’s successor - makes frequent reference to Gololo 
in her speech about the change building managers are enforcing in eKhaya and/or how they 
are working “To make Hillbrow Your Home” (Savage Dodd and Architects 2012: 2):  
Yes, the housing supervisors are very actively involved in eKhaya because they are the ones who 
have to walk around the Neighbourhood. OK! We had one guy, John Gololo, he passed away just 
recently. He was from JHC. He introduced the street soccer idea; he organised 32 teams of street 
soccer. So from that organisation that he did, all other organisations were born out of that; that’s 
where all other ‘soccers’ were born out of that. It was a continuation after his organising of 32 
soccer teams out of kids who were playing in the street, not anywhere else. Josie just phoned the 
ambulance and it was there. He said, “Close this road, close that road” and then the kids started 
playing. So it was his initiative with other caretakers. (Mkhize 2013) 
Adler’s (2013) and Mkhize’s (2013) understandings of building management in eKhaya suggest 
that caretakers have positively impacted on both the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ governance in 
some Hillbrow buildings. Indeed, the HDA informs us that:  
The eKhaya approach [...] has concentrated on building a key leadership structure among the 
building managers that evokes real ownership of the activities and supports them in spreading this 
engagement with the tenants of their buildings with whom they have strong day-to-day contact. 
At the same time, they are participating and feeding into the decision-making forums that have a 
strong locus with the direct interests of the owners of the buildings. (HDA 2012: 19) 
The notification above not only sheds more light on the building manager as a broker and/or 
intermediary; it also insinuates that eKhaya has impacted – or is impacting – on the ‘inside’ of 
the residential buildings comprising it via building managers. This becomes a contradiction in 
terms when we take into consideration Adler’s (2013) contention that, “The eKhaya CID has got 
very little to do with the inside of the flat [and] Neighbourhood management doesn’t have 
anything to do with the internal governance in each building”. Seeing as one of eKhaya’s key 
target outputs is “[i]mproved quality of housing and internal management of buildings” (HDA 
2012: 15); does the implementation of eKhaya RCID automatically translate to proper 
management and social cohesion within the residential buildings comprising the precinct? It 
would be interesting to uncover whether eKhaya as a RCID has impacted on internal 
management and/or governance within the Hillbrow buildings that comprise it. Not only that, it 
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would also be interesting to discover the ways in which internal governance/management 
reciprocally impacts on the public space in RCIDs. Given the precariousness of building 
management in a so-called dangerous and “derelict slum” (Schnehage 2012 as quoted in 
Winkler 2013: 309) as Hillbrow; it still remains to be seen to what extent caretakers – as 
‘transmission belts’ between the City, landlords/property owners, tenants, and sub-tenants – 
effect neighbourhood change in the public and private realms of the RCID. 
1.2 Rationale 
Most literature on R/CIDs constantly points to the management and dynamics of CIDs and 
RCIDs; as well as on their implications for public spaces in localities (see for instance Miraftab 
2007). This, to some extent, may suggest that CIDs and RCIDs impact only on public space. While 
the research looks into the impacts of eKhaya RCID on public space, it also - and mostly - 
explores a terrain that has not been looked much into before.  
Looking at CIDs and management from a different perspective – “middle up and down” (HDA 
2012: 19) and/or down below - the study uses eKhaya building managers as primary objects of 
investigation to understand management and urban change in inner city neighbourhoods such 
as Hillbrow. What is also new is that by focusing on caretakers and their role as brokers between 
RCID drivers (and property owners) and tenants - in managing both buildings and their 
immediate surroundings (for instance public spaces such as lanes and pavements) - we are 
contributing to an under-researched side of RCIDs - their everyday management, arrangements, 
practices. This may be requisite seeing as most of the literature and/or research adopts a top-
down approach looking mostly at property owners’ influence, and possibly collusion with 
government, in the management of CIDs (see for example, Schaller and Modan 2005). 
1.3 Aim of Study 
The purpose of the research study is to understand the political and management dynamics 
and mechanisms of RCIDs from the perspective of a particular group/community – that of the 
building caretakers. The study is aimed at exploring the extent to which the management of 
RCIDs such as eKhaya has impacted on the internal management of buildings constituting the 
RCIDs, and their immediate surroundings. The study aims to achieve this through exploration and 
description of caretakers’ daily practices and their role in enforcing building management in 
eKhaya RCID, as well as the type of management the caretakers embody and enforce in the 
RCID. 
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Furthermore, the research aims to uncover the role of caretakers in enforcing building rules, and 
how they negotiate rules with the different inhabitants of the buildings constituting eKhaya RCID. 
Not only that, the study is aimed at unpacking the role played by caretakers in effecting urban 
neighbourhood change and management of public space in eKhaya and Hillbrow. In a word, 
the study aims to uncover the extent to which management of public space impacts on internal 
management in eKhaya; as well as the extent to which the management and managers of 
internal space in RCID buildings impact(s) on urban change and management of public space 
(with)in the RCID. 
1.4 Research Questions 
To what extent can CID/RCID rules and norms penetrate the internal management of buildings 
and their surroundings? Investigating the daily practices of building caretakers in Hillbrow’s 
eKhaya RCID. 
The research sought to explore the dynamics, mechanisms and implications of RCID 
management for internal building space in inner city residential neighbourhoods; and used the 
case of building managers/caretakers in the context of eKhaya RCID. In exploring and 
describing the dynamics, politics, mechanisms and implications of (building) management in 
RCIDs; the following sub-questions were used by the researcher to guide and develop depth to 
the investigation. 
I. What norms and rules underpin eKhaya RCID? 
II. What roles are played by eKhaya caretakers in building management and effecting 
urban neighbourhood change? 
III. How are caretakers influenced by the RCID’s rules, norms and vision? How are they 
constituted as a ‘group’? 
IV. What are caretakers’ daily practices in their buildings and in the Neighbourhood? 
V. What challenges are they facing – both in the buildings and outside their buildings - and 
how can they respond to these challenges? 
VI. What norms and regulations are they constructing in collective or public management, 
and with what consistency and efficiency? 
1.5 Hypothesis 
Vested with the power to manage buildings; building managers in eKhaya have the authority to 
bend rules, mediate tensions among tenants, improve City-landlord relations and landlord-
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tenant relationships within eKhaya, protect some building residents, as well as influence 
management of public and private space within the RCID. This implies that eKhaya caretakers 
are brokers who play an active role in settling disputes and effecting urban neighbourhood 
change. Nevertheless, the building managers may use their power to push their own interests 
through suppression of some building residents, especially those without secure tenure. By so 
doing, the building managers implement their own sets of rules in their everyday practices. 
1.6 Research Site and Site Limitations - Single Case Study: eKhaya South as encapsulation of 
Urban Locality Change in Hillbrow and inner city Johannesburg 
The study used the case of eKhaya, a relatively new ‘community-driven’ voluntary RCID in 
Johannesburg’s Hillbrow, to explore and describe the extent to which the RCID rules – and the 
urban vision they embody – impacts on the internal governance of buildings within them; and 
vice versa (see Figure 1G below). The case of eKhaya helped the researcher to “explore and 
investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon” (Zainal 2007: 2) – building management and 
the public-private space interrelationships in RCIDs – “through detailed contextual analysis of a 
limited number of events or conditions, and their relationship” (ibid). This then provided the 
researcher with a specific backdrop against which to examine data generated by the research 
(see Chapter Three).  
In choosing the case of eKhaya; the researcher was very much aware of the actuality that 
eKhaya is not the first RCID and/or tool of urban management and urban regeneration in 
deprived inner city Johannesburg neighbourhoods – Legae la Rona RCID preceded it (CoJ 2008; 
Adler 2013). Nevertheless, the researcher still opted for the case of eKhaya – a relatively new 
form of urban management in urban residential areas – and did not look beyond eKhaya’s 
confines to understand the mechanisms, politics and implications of being a building manager 
in an inner city RCID. The case of eKhaya was chosen for a multitude of reasons; the chief 
reason being that eKhaya argues to have a ‘people-centred’ and ‘community-driven’ 
management approach. This argument captivated the researcher so much so that it made the 
researcher interested in noting how the people at the ‘top of the bottom’ – building managers – 
are incorporated in the management of RCIDs; as well as the degree to which the caretakers 
themselves supervise internal building space. 
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Figure 1F: ‘The ‘original’ eKhaya Neighbourhood CID’ – An eKhaya festive season greeting poster depicting 
the buildings and property management companies that form the area of focus: eKhaya South 
While the researcher was aware of the fact that eKhaya Neighbourhood CID has been 
extended to northern parts of Hillbrow (refer to Figure 1G below); he did not go beyond the 
confines of eKhaya South to understand building management in inner city Johannesburg’s 
RCIDs. Seeing as eKhaya South is relatively older – and presumably more established - than 
eKhaya North, the impacts of eKhaya on public space and building management hitherto 
would arguably be more visible in eKhaya South; hence the use of eKhaya South buildings 
and/or building managers for the study. Moreover, although the researcher is aware of the 
diversity of property management companies and/or building managers in eKhaya South; he 
still used four caretakers as an embodiment of everyday space management in the RCID. 
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Figure 1G: ‘eKhaya South relative to eKhaya Neighbourhood and Hillbrow’ – Since its establishment in 2004, 
eKhaya RCID has expanded to northern parts of Hillbrow as well as areas outside of Hillbrow 
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1.7 Outline of Chapters 
The study comprises six chapters. The six paragraphs below are a summary of each chapter’s 
core.  
Chapter One is the study’s introductory section. It presents the study by way of stating the 
research motivations and the backdrop against which the problem statement/issue -
management in inner city neighbourhoods or the lack thereof - emerges and arises. This lays the 
foundation for the research aims, justifications and questions; also presented in the chapter. As 
well, the chapter presents the case study and its limitations.  
Chapter Two incorporates and amalgamates different arguments pertaining to the study’s main 
themes, themes which stem from the reviewed pieces of literature. The second chapter reviews 
pieces of literature based on what has been written about the issue(s) under study, with the aim 
of drawing a conceptual framework diagram. The framework diagram integrates the different 
key theoretical concepts emanating from the literature, and in turn guides the researcher in 
such a way as to allow the researcher to have a theoretical context on which to base his 
findings and/or against which to validate his findings in the study’s subsequent chapters. 
Chapter Three is based on how the study was done. It looks into the methodology and/or 
research strategy that was adopted and/or used for the study. Emphasis in the chapter is 
placed on the data collection methods that the researcher used, the challenges that were 
faced, the researcher’s ‘tactics’ at overcoming obstacles, and the extent of their success. As 
well, the chapter – to a lesser extent – touches on the extent to which the researcher was 
personally challenged by the study; and the degree to which the researcher’s expectations 
were confirmed.    
Chapter Four is arguably the most important chapter in the study. The chapter zooms in on the 
area under study – eKhaya South – and does this via exploration of everyday life on RCID turf. 
The chapter brings to light the key unexpected themes that emanated from the fieldwork and 
ethnography. Heavily dependent on a triangulation of interview material, imagery, literature 
and thick descriptions emanating from fieldwork; the chapter presents everyday life in eKhaya 
South as a negotiation, and presents the building manager as an active participant in the 
negotiation. The different forms of life as negotiation in eKhaya South, eKhaya Neighbourhood 
CID and Hillbrow are presented by way of themes. As well, the chapter’s final section and/or 
conclusion depicts the relationship between internal and external space in eKhaya as 
deciphered by the researcher from his interactions with the eKhaya caretakers.  
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Chapter Five’s ambition is to locate the building managers of eKhaya South and the whole 
eKhaya RCID in ‘the bigger picture’. The chapter is based on the researcher’s reflection of who 
drives change in eKhaya, what type of change is being driven, and the building managers’ role 
in driving as well as managing change. The chapter does this by way of looking at how eKhaya 
fits into the City’s broad agendas as well as the ways in which the eKhaya building manager 
accesses and/or interacts with the local state.  
Chapter Six - the study’soverall conclusion - operationalizes the theoretical concepts uncovered 
in the whole study, most notably in the second chapter. The concluding chapter looks to bring 
the researcher’s findings/results together with the study’s critical theories. 
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CHAPTER TWO - MANAGING SPACES OF URBAN CHANGE AND ‘NEOLIBERAL 
GOVERNMENTALITY’: IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS’ PROPERTY CARETAKERS AS STREET-
LEVEL BUREAUCRATS? 
2.1 Introduction: Broad topics branching from assessed literature  
There is a multitude of arguments stemming from the different research topic-related pieces of 
literature reviewed by the researcher. These debates and arguments can quintessentially be 
categorised under three broad different-yet-interconnected themes: ‘Governmentality and its 
Core Concepts’; ‘CIDs/RCIDs as Spatial Manifestations of Urban Neighbourhood Change and 
Neoliberal Governmentality’; and ‘Housing Managers as Governors of Urban Neighbourhood 
Change’. These broad themes coalesce into a conceptual framework that brings out the main 
theoretical concepts relevant to the study (see Figure 2A below) and are discussed below under 
the six main sub-sections that outline the three broad themes. The first section is a diagrammatic 
illustration of the concepts deemed relevant for the study by the researcher. The second section 
discusses the Foucauldian notion of governmentality – which runs throughout the chapter and is 
thus this chapter’s central theme - by way of important sub-concepts relating to the concept 
and/or relevant to the framing of the whole study. It is the second section that lays the 
groundwork for the subsequent sections. One of these, the third section, integrates and 
synthesizes arguments for CIDs/RCIDs as spaces of urban neighbourhood change and 
urban/neoliberal governmentality. The third section unpacks BIDs/NIDs by way of looking into 
their origins, central features, participation dynamics and their treatment of both external and 
internal space. The fourth part ‘zooms in’ on the RCID’s ‘active individuals’ - the managers of 
neighbourhood change - and discusses their daily practices via Lipsky’s notion of ‘Street-level 
bureaucracy’. The fourth and fifth sections seek to argue for the housing manager as a ‘street-
level bureaucrat’ who also has the aptitude to enter into mutually beneficial relationships – for 
instance brokerage/clientelism/patronage - with local citizens. The sixth and last section 
attempts to articulate and interweave these three threads/themes for the research study.  
2.2 Conceptual Framework Diagram 
According to Johansson (1994: 231), “concepts can be seen as tools in the construction of 
organizational reality”. This section of the chapter brings forth the critical concepts pertaining to 
the study and extracted from the reviewed literature. The concepts are expressed 
diagrammatically in Figure 2A below. In the design, the concepts are embedded in a broad 
scope; and have been boldly highlighted so as for them to stand out. 
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Figure 2A: ‘Concepts’ – Diagrammatic illustration of study’s key concepts 
2.3 Understanding Government, Management and the State in the (Neo-)Liberal Age: The 
Concept of Governmentality 
How can citizens’ behaviour be modified to enhance their health, well-being and wider capacities in 
mostly rather mundane ways? 
(Jamieson 2012: 52) 
According to Michel Foucault – perhaps one of the most prominent critical thinkers of our time – 
for the reason that “governing has to do with how power relations are produced and 
maintained” (Jacobson 2009); it is “impossible to study the technologies of power without an 
analysis of the political rationality underpinning them” (Lemke 2000: 2). With this observation, 
Foucault appears to be suggesting that if we are to fully comprehend government, we also 
need to take into full account the “modes of thought” (ibid.) or “mentalities” (Huxley 2006: 771) 
shaping, ruling, justifying and manifesting themselves in practices and processes of government. 
This may be requisite especially seeing as “’practices’ do not exist without a certain regime of 
19 
 
rationality” (Foucault 1991a: 79). Coming from a Marxist perspective – but rejecting the Marxist 
notion that the State is a central institution in all political analyses - Foucault (1991a, b) invites us 
to think of government as something that is not confined to party, state and parliamentary 
politics but as something which “appears in myriad forms throughout the social fabric in 
institutions [such as households, families, neighbourhoods, communities, corporations and cities] 
and individuals” (Proudfoot 2006: 21). Lemke (2000: 2) accordingly notes that it is precisely “[f]or 
this reason... [that] Foucault defines government as conduct, or more precisely, as the ‘conduct 
of conduct’ and thus as a term which ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’”. 
Thus, Foucauldians analyse power and governing beyond the state because “governing is not 
only inside the state, [but] it is also inside society” (Curtis 2002: 506; Mills 2003; Marquadt, Füller, 
Glasze, and Pütz 2012).  
Foucault’s definition of government brings a ‘fresh’ perspective that broadens our conception of 
governing. It implies that we are not only governed by official institutions such as state 
organizations but we, by virtue of the way we carry ourselves and the activities we carry out 
collectively and individually in our day-to-day lives,  manage ourselves and each other. As well, 
Foucault’s conception of government implies that there are reasons for our respective conducts. 
This consequently makes us conceive of ourselves as individual entities and as (part of) a 
group/community; as institutions - albeit ‘mini-institutions’ - whose behaviours are informed 
and/or conditioned by our way(s) of thinking. In the context of the study, we become interested 
in uncovering the conduct of eKhaya RCID’s property managers as well as the reasons for their 
respective individual and collective demeanours. 
Yet how do we govern ourselves? To this question, Foucault (1991a: 79) readily replies, “[M]en 
govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth”. This quintessentially gives us the 
impression that we conduct/govern others via “constructed norms and values” (Flint 2002: 246) 
“through which ... [we] are [also] governed” (Street 2012: 2, 8). McKinlay, Carter and Pezet 
(2012: 4), quoting and paraphrasing Foucault, strengthen this notion by stating that “individuals 
actively construct their identity but within the constraints ‘imposed on [their] culture, [their] 
society and [their] social group’”. Upon looking into how (social) groups function on a day-to-
day basis, Info-Cult (2006) note that the ‘working’ of social groups is largely attributable to norms; 
which they define as “rules or behavioural models that are established and accepted by 
individuals ... belong[ing] to the same culture or group ... [Norms] serve to reflect groups’ 
values”. Argue Info-Cult (2006), one of the primary objectives of norms is the establishment of 
“acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in... group[s]”. Street (2012) and Foucault (1991a) 
argue that it is this knowledge of existence of societal norms regulating conduct of citizenry that 
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allows the state to reduce its direct intervention and govern citizenry ‘at a distance’. Yet how 
are these norms constructed and what norms are deemed acceptable for the guidance of 
community members’ conduct? In light of the fact that property caretakers constituting eKhaya 
RCID and/or Hillbrow are employed by different management companies with (presumably) 
different codes of conduct, what codes of conduct have been (re)constructed by the (social 
interaction of the) eKhaya caretaker community? Moreover, to what degree – if any – are the 
caretakers’ constructed norms in tandem or at loggerheads with those of eKhaya RCID and 
state institutions like CoJ?         
Informed by the realisations that “men [are capacitated to] govern (themselves and others)” 
(Foucault 1991a: 79) - and government is an exercise of power supported by reasoning - 
Foucault coins the concept of ‘governmentality’ and implores us to think of it as a neologism 
that “links rationales of government with practices of power” (Jamieson 2012: 74). Huxley (2006: 
771) considers governmentality as “the production and management of the conduct of others 
and of the self [...] the conduct of conducts – a general power of the government of others and 
of the self”. Foucault (1991b: 102) augments this definition by pointing out that governmentality is 
a broad concept with three comprehensive yet complex meanings, the most relevant for this 
study being the one outlined below: 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of... [a] very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its 
target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security. (Foucault 1991b: 102) 
In support of this definition, Torres (2013) – who looks at the relationship between community 
participation and governmentality in the neoliberal urban setting – likes to think of 
governmentality as  
a set of practices of government that ‘has the population as their object, the economy as their 
knowledge and the safety devices as their basic mechanisms’ ... a way of governing directed to 
create docile citizens and governable citizens and which uses various techniques to control, normalize 
and shape the individual’s behaviour. (Torres 2013: 3; added emphasis)  
Foucault’s (1991b) and Torres’s (2013) aforementioned descriptions of governmentality bring 
forth many ideas regarding the way we govern ourselves and others; as well as the backdrop 
against which this happens. For one, the descriptions portray populations as the “ultimate end of 
government” (Foucault 1991b: 100), technical safety instruments as means to this end, and 
knowledge as a very important resource in the accomplishment of government’s end. As well, 
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the assemblage of different institutions with the aim of achieving government’s end(s) – as 
suggested by the descriptions – not only shows us that “institutions are imagined” (McKinlay et al 
2012: 3) in governmentality; it also portrays governmentality as a powerful concept for 
“captur[ing] the particular logics in the relationship between multiple levels of government” 
(Jacobson 2009), including self-government. That noted, it would then seem that the notion of 
“neoliberal governance ... governance beyond the state” (Swyngedouw 2005: 1991) inevitably 
comes through in any discussion of governmentality.  
Nevertheless, the fact that governmentality is concerned with ways of governing aimed at 
making compliant citizens suggests that although we are ‘active self-regulators’ also governing 
others; we are still unquestioning “‘lower-level’ orders work[ing] ... to support the broad agendas 
of the State” (Jacobson 2009). Since governmentality is “at once internal and external to the 
state” (Foucault 1991b: 103) and “looks at administrative powers and knowledges that shape 
our everyday lives” (McKinlay et al 2012: 3); it is imperative for us to understand the extent to 
which the state is manifest and/or competent in our daily micro-practices. Given that the state’s 
competences/roles and technologies of governing are constantly being (re)defined and 
(re)configured to respond to our “changing socio-economic and cultural conditions” 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 1992), it is imperative to understand how power and knowledge used to 
govern us are generated; and how we influence the production and maintenance of this 
knowledge. In an era in which the “state has [allegedly] been decentred” (Curtis 2002) and the 
emphasis is on the market, where the boundaries between political/public and personal/private 
have become blurry (Hamann 2009); to what degree are we (being) controlled, constituted and 
conditioned by the state? “Where is the State ... [and] [h]ow is the State?” (Bawa 2011: 491) in 
an era and philosophy that stresses the need for us to be free, autonomous and ‘business-
minded’ individuals (Hamann 2009)? What are the neoliberal state’s broad agendas and how 
are individuals such as eKhaya RCID’s property managers supporting them? This section of the 
chapter is aimed at unpacking neoliberal governance by way of linking sub-concepts related to 
governmentality as made manifest in its definition – population, knowledge (political economy), 
and surveillance/security.  
2.3.1 From Sovereignty to Biopower/Biopolitics: The Centrality of Populations and Knowledge 
for Security in Neoliberal Governmentality 
Foucault (1991b: 103) argues that since the eighteenth century, we have been “liv[ing] in the 
era of... governmentality”; the only difference being that in modern governmentality, unlike in 
‘sovereign rule’, “power is no longer directly wielded through directly and overtly repressive 
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intervention” (Flint 2002: 248). Foucault (1991b) and Hamann (2009) assert that in as much as 
elements of sovereign rule and/or total domination are still very much manifest in government in 
contemporary ‘globalising’ societies; the primary production of power in modern government is 
through “’anatomo-power’ directed at bodies and [which] connects with ‘bio-power’ 
concerned with populations” (Huxley 2006: 772). Garland (1985: 136 as cited in Clapham 1997: 
171) corroborates these views by stating that in modern rational societies, 
...open physical force, the apparatus of violence and the ceremonies of might are more and more 
replaced by a mode of power based upon detailed knowledge, routine intervention and gentle 
correction. The idea is now to regulate thoroughly and at all times rather than to repress in fits and 
starts. (Garland 1985: 136 as quoted in Clapham 1997: 171) 
Garland’s (1985) observations, coupled with those of Foucault (1991a) and Huxley (2006), drive 
home the point that “liberal processes of governance increasingly involve the ‘conduct of 
conduct’” (Flint 2002: 248) with “individual conduct and comportment hav[ing] become more 
directly implicated in the operations of power” (Curtis 2002). It becomes somewhat clear from 
the aforementioned arguments that “the transformation of the technologies of government” 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 1991) has significantly reconfigured – and perhaps has also been 
significantly reconfigured by - the roles and identities of citizenry as well as the way power is 
exercised over citizenry in the neoliberal age (ibid; Mills 2003).  
As has been noted in this section, every society governs itself via its own set of constructed 
societal norms; which implies that every society has its own“regime[s] of truth” (Foucault 1988d 
as cited in Mills 2003: 74). Rejecting the Habermasian assertion that ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ are 
separate sub-societies within society, Foucault (as discussed in McKinlay et al 2012: 4) argues 
that the awareness that “[t]ruth lies embedded in the ordinary details of everyday life” 
rationalizes the invasion of the personal by the political via “knowledge-gathering systems” 
(Jamieson 2012: 52) and disciplines such as the census and planning respectively (ibid; Fenster 
2001). The realisation that population – “a group of living beings” (Elden 2007a: 32 as cited in 
Jamieson 2012: 51) that are dispersed through abstract space and time – can be ‘staticized’, 
measured/quantified, enumerated, classified, systematized, and deductions can be made from 
its behaviour; has meant that “the ‘everyday knowledge’ of ‘common people’” (Fenster 2001: 
79) is just as important as “political knowledge ... or the knowledge of the ‘elite’ 
[mapping/cartography]” (ibid; Paasche 2013; Simon 2005; Torres 2013; Schaller and Modan 
2005; Foucault 1991b). ”This understanding ... that collect[ed] statistical data on the population 
... [can be] used to enable urban growth” (Paasche 2013: 260) has meant that populations are 
important sources of knowledge whose behaviours – expressed as birth, death, infant mortality, 
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literacy, crime rates, to mention but a few – can be “used for the production of social order and 
social control” (Simon 2005: 1).  
The emphasis is on the ability to locate and to define the built environment, specific 
populations, and activities so that they can be registered. The prevailing wisdom is that 
once registered these phenomena can be better administered and their specific energies, 
disciplines, and resources extracted”. (Simone 2004: 426) 
Paasche (2013: 260) adds that this collection of numerical data on populations serves to 
“minimise threats to the populus”. Simon (2005: 1) refers to this “use of the body as a measure of 
identity” as “biometrics” whilst Jamieson (2012: 51) refers to it as “biopolitics”. Thus, knowledge of 
everyday lives can be used for “production of truth... [which is] not the production of true 
utterances, but the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and false can be 
made at once ordered and pertinent” (Foucault 1991a: 79). This truth may then be expressed in 
the form of “statements which can be made by authorised people” (Mills 2003: 74); “distributed 
throughout society” via policies and statutes; “deployed by the ‘little engineers of the human 
soul’” (Street 2012: 7); and then “internalised” (Johansson 1994: 246) and/or “accepted by 
society as a whole” (Mills 2003: 74). By reason of the fact that production of knowledge/truth is 
produced “in specific circumstances ... [that] shape it in some way” (Fenster 2001: 80) and 
includes the exclusion of some facts and inclusion of others; knowledge/truth is “not universal 
and neutral [but] it is reflexive and positioned” (ibid.). Thus, the knowledge which we use to 
govern ourselves and others – for example policies, laws and norms governing eKhaya RCID 
caretakers - could in this regard be argued to be a socio-political construct. An example of 
quantified human behaviour could be the crime statistics of Hillbrow and other inner city 
neighbourhoods as outlined in, for instance, Gossmann and Premo (2012). Yet, it is 
instantaneously ironic and interesting that Hillbrow’s population appears as non-quantifiable and 
as escaping census and/or statistical capture due to its high informal character – activities, 
documentations, living conditions (Simone 2004; Kihato 2011). Could RCIDs like eKhaya be about 
capturing data and creating categories to seize the fluid reality of the area? 
The realisation that “’society’ has its own laws, principles and forces which one cannot govern 
through total domination” (Jamieson 2012: 48) may have consequently resulted in neoliberalism 
- a “hegemonic political discourse that... provides us a set of ‘truths’ through which we govern 
ourselves and others” (Dean 1999 as paraphrased in Griggs and Roberts 2012: 202). Lemke 
(2001) and Jamieson (2012) ask us to think of neoliberalism not only as a policy framework or 
philosophical programme but also as “a mentality of rule ... [and] a rationality of government” 
(Jamieson 2012: 46) since it “represents a method of rationalising government, a rationalisation 
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that obeys the rule of maximum economy” (ibid.). Correspondingly, Griggs and Roberts (2012: 
201) argue that neoliberalism can thus be seen “as a form of ‘governmentality’”. This 
quintessentially means that we are living in an era of “neoliberal governmentality” (Hamann 
2009: 39) whose central truth and/or principal form of knowledge - political economy – is aimed 
at managing and shaping (the behaviour of) populations and citizens/subjects in accordance 
with the politico-economic rationality of government (ibid; Lemke 2000; Jamieson 2012; Paasche 
2013). Political economy, writes Jamieson (2012: 47 - 50), is to be understood as “any method of 
government that can procure the nation’s prosperity ... [and which] compels the sovereign to 
govern as little as possible” (also see Foucault 1991b). Just like any head of household 
concerned with the maximisation of socio-economic welfare of all his/her household members 
in the personal sphere; neoliberal governmentality has as its end an aggregately prosperous, 
well-ordered society characterised by “healthy individuals with compliant minds” (Huxley 2006: 
774) who optimise their respective potentials (ibid; Jamieson 2012; Foucault 1991b; Hamann 
2009). It calls for the “responsibilisation” (Flint 2002: 249) of citizens as “members of self-managing 
communities ... [who] must take greater responsibility for their own life outcomes, defined in 
terms of moral norms of behaviour and obligations for self-conduct, increasingly based on the 
identity of the productive consumer” (ibid.). Hamann (2009: 39) corroborates Flint’s (2002) 
realisation by indicating that neoliberal conduct of conduct has as its chief aim “the strategic 
creation of social conditions that encourage and necessitate the production of Homo 
economicus, a historically specific form of subjectivity constituted as a free and autonomous 
‘atom’ of self-interest”. Consequently, neoliberalism manifests itself as “everyday experience” 
(Hamann 2009: 41) in society’s life practices by blurring the margins between public and private; 
thus ensuring that “society becomes a political reality” (Jamieson 2012: 48; original emphasis) 
and “the personal is political” (Hamann 2009: 41). In the context of the study, we then wonder 
what the eKhaya building managers’ neoliberal (governmental) rationality would be. Could it 
be transformation of their respective tenants into ‘homo economicus’ and/or responsible, self-
interested individuals?  
Garland’s (1985: 136 as cited in Clapham 1997: 171) observation that individuals in modern 
societies are being “regulate[d] thoroughly and at all times”, gives the impression that citizens’ 
mannerisms – as sources of knowledge and targets/objects of government – are constantly 
under social control via scrutiny in neoliberal governmentality. Not only is this in line with 
Foucault’s identification of “surveillance, classification and disciplining of subjects in relation to 
constructed norms of conduct as the essential acts of government” (Flint 2003: 4); it also “evokes 
Foucault’s ... panopticon society” (Kihato 2011: 350). Foucault’s panopticon society is “one in 
which surveillance, or the idea that ... [one is] under surveillance ... makes populations visible to 
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the state ... [as well as] controls behaviour and interactions between them” (ibid; Lippert and 
Wood 2012). Surveillance is understood by Garland (1985: 145 as quoted in Clapham 1997: 771) 
and Dandeker 1990 (as discussed in Clapham 1997: 771) as   
Involv[ing]... a means of assessing the individual in relation to a desired standard of conduct: a 
means of knowing how the individual performs, watching his movements, assessing his behaviour, 
and measuring it against the rule. Surveillance arrangements and examination procedures provide 
this knowledge... [which then results in] ... information collection, storage ... retrieval [as well as] use 
of information co-ordination and control to monitor the behaviour of subject populations in order 
to secure their compliance on a routine basis. 
Not only does this description affirm that our mundane activities are important sources of 
information; it also brings into view the concept of “dataveillance (the collection, organization 
and storage of information about persons)” (Simon 2005: 1), which involves use of the 
information about individuals to control their conduct. The need for storage of citizens’ (pro)files 
not only highlights neoliberal governmentality’s emphasis on populations’ visibility; it also makes 
us wonder how this information is used to control us. In buildings such as those of eKhaya - where 
we as visitors have to sign up and give our identity documents/details before gaining entry - we 
wonder what happens to the information we supply as well as the role of the housing manager 
in the use and disposition of this information. Seeing as eKhaya RCID’s (public and private) 
spaces are increasingly characterized by surveillance technologies (see Figure 2B below); can 
eKhaya then be said to be a panopticon society? If that is the case, how are tenants and 
building visitors ‘kept in check’ by the information that eKhaya building managers have on them 
in the buildings? In Hillbrow, a neighbourhood whose buildings are home to invisible populations 
“running away” (Simone 2004: 423) and constantly evading state actors/institutions (ibid; Kihato 
2011); how efficient would the property managers’ technologies of visibility be in ensuring 
universal social control? As well, we wonder whether the knowledge produced by eKhaya 
building managers is of a statistical and/or categorical nature. 
The concept of governmentality as it relates to neoliberalism is perhaps best summed up in 
Street’s (2012) analysis of the ‘technologies of patient management and/or patient visibility’ in 
Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) Madang Hospital. Street (2012) notes that though incapacitated, 
the neoliberal PNG state “continues to exercise a ‘crucial presence’ as an object of desire” 
(ibid) with patients – most notably poor patients from the countryside - urged to take very good 
care of their “government health cards” (ibid: 2). The health cards are a prerequisite for 
patients’ entry into the (public) medical institution; and failure to produce them at the hospital 
gates may result in either patients being turned away by the hospital managers - thus failure to 
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secure an appointment/consultation with the doctor - or it can result in payment for a new 
health card by the ‘card losers’ (ibid). Those who neglect their health cards and thus fail to get 
treatment “have nothing and no one to blame but themselves [due to their] [...] failures of 
individual choice and responsibility” (Hamann 2009: 37, 50). Consequently, patients from the 
countryside know better than to lose, forget or leave their cards behind when making trips to the 
city hospital; and have thus taken it upon themselves to look after their cards ‘for their own 
good’, thus self-government, “self-monitoring and surveillance” (Street 2012: 10) as well as 
“technologies of the self” (ibid). By assuming responsibility for their cards, the patients indirectly 
feed into (neoliberal) government(ality)’s aspirations of ‘active citizenship’. By paying for lost 
health cards, the patients - to some extent - support political economy and the neoliberal 
objective of the citizen/subject as client/customer. By making patients produce their cards upon 
entry, the incapacitated PNG state – using hospital managers - achieves its objective of 
‘surveilling’ citizenry and producing “populations that are ... legible and administratively 
convenient” (Kihato 2012: 350). This then ensures that “patient-citizens” (Street 2012: 12) are 
“[s]een by the state” (ibid: 1). “Once this enhanced visibility is accomplished, urban spaces and 
activities [become] more capable of being retrieved and compared for analysis and plann ing” 
(Simone 2004: 426). In this instance, “[g]overnmental identities become tied to practices of self-
government, and implicating in terms of self-government to align self-regulating capacities with 
governmental aspirations” (Flint 2002: 248). As well, the identity of the neoliberal subject as “both 
governor and governed” (Flint 2002: 249) - and thus as a subject and an object of government 
(Kihato 2012) – becomes transparent in this illustration. Could the concept of neoliberal 
governmentality also be fully applicable to the context of (citizenry actively involved in) 
construction of RCIDs such as eKhaya? Could the eKhaya building managers – like the hospital 
managers in Madang Hospital –be argued to have “internalised state responsibilities” (Street 
2012: 8) via their everyday practices within their respective buildings?  
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Figure 2B: ‘Disciplinary Technologies for a Panopticon Society?’ – The ubiquity of surveillance technologies 
on eKhaya turf’s public and private spaces is very much evocative of Foucault’s panopticon society 
2.4 Urban Neighbourhood Change and (Construction of) Spaces of Neoliberal Governmentality: 
The Case of BIDs/CIDs and NIDs /RCIDs 
Space is fundamental in any exercise of power ... Planning in its control of space can be seen as 
part of ... ‘the normalization generated through the exercise of power’. It is true that plans control 
all citizens’ or community members’ ‘free will’.  
(Fenster 2001: 78 – 79; emphasis added on basis that it constitutes essence of section’s gist) 
Huxley (2006: 772 – 773) laments that studies on governmentality tend to overlook the productive 
role of space in exercises of power, when in reality  
[g]overnmentality entails the fabrication of ‘governable spaces’ in which questions of boundaries 
and territorial limits are implicated in determining domains of objects and types of subjects 
requiring government ... [and] ... space enters into the thought of government beyond the 
confines of the disciplinary institution. (Huxley 2006: 772 – 773) 
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Huxley is but one of the many scholars that are questioning and trying to apply Foucault and/or 
operationalize his concepts and extend them to space (cf. Roy 2009; Ellis 2012; Jamieson 2012). 
Similar to Huxley (2006), Jamieson (2012: 74) – who is very much aware of the significance of 
“spatiality ... in the practice of [government] intervention” - remarks that “governmental thought 
and action has penetrated and enclosed institutional spaces ... [as well as] ... neighbourhoods” 
(ibid: 68) with “appeals [having been made] to active citizens and responsible communities to 
engage in the governance of urban disorder” (Flint 2002: 246) in localities of metropolises such as 
UK cities. One sign that “minor spaces of government have emerged” (Jamieson 2012: 67) in 
European nation states is the nations’ government’s technique of re-implementing 
neighbourhood/area-based policies in, for instance, British cities (Meegan and Mitchell 2001; 
Marquadt et al 2012: 3). Meegan and Mitchell (2001: 2197) admire such policies on the basis of 
their propensity to depict the neighbourhood as “an appropriate spatial scale for understanding 
the operation of everyday life-worlds”. In support of this view of neighbourhoods, Lowndes and 
Sullivan (2008: 58 as quoted in Griggs and Roberts 2012: 187) indicate the “civic ... political ... 
social [and] ... economic rationale[s]” for looking into functioning of neighbourhoods, stating 
that the neighbourhood is “an appropriate arena for” (ibid.) the  
... promotion of citizen participation ... direct citizen engagement ... citizen responsive and joined-
up service delivery ... heightened accessibility for citizens ... increased responsiveness of services 
that accompany neighbourhood working [and] efficient use of resources that derive from ... the 
diverse needs of citizens. (ibid) 
With these conceptions of the neighbourhood, the scholars appear to be suggesting that 
“[n]eighbourhoods are an innovative strategy on the road back to prosperity for our [urban] 
communities” (Morgan 2011: iii); they also give the impression that ‘small is democratic’ and 
allows for more participation of citizens at a sub-local level. This, quintessentially, implies that 
small scale and ‘micro-space’ provide a lens for us to understand how different self-interested 
citizens, spread out across sub-municipal space, (co-)operate socio-politico-economically in 
counteracting challenges that jointly affect them and in search of prosperity.  
Nowhere is this ‘(co-)operation’ and active/responsible citizenship more evident than in 
American neighbourhood activism as discussed in Purcell’s (2004) piece of literature. In his 
analysis of neighbourhood activism among homeowners in American cities, Purcell (2001: 188) 
argues that homeowners in neighbourhoods – having purchased their homes – do not just rest 
on their laurels and “just fantasize about an ideal neighbourhood but take action to make that 
neighborhood a reality”. In so doing, argues Purcell (2001: 178, 188), the homeowners “think 
about their agenda in terms of a spatial vision [...] [and then] act on their agenda” (ibid; original 
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emphasis) and thus actively effect positive neighbourhood spatial change. In light of this 
realisation, Purcell (2001: 178) asks of us to think of space as an issue and variable that – like 
“class, race, gender, nature, sexuality, citizenship, regionalism” – is “embedded in the political 
project of homeowners” (ibid.). Space in this instance becomes “a social construct” (Proudfoot 
and McCann 2008: 350) and a powerful variable for understanding of the government and self-
government of “urban populations” (Marquadt et al 2012: 2).   
In as much as citizens at sub-local level are taking the initiative in transforming their spatial vision 
into action; it is still crucial to ask: is it wholly the community’s/property owners’ spatial vision or is 
it a vision that easily fits into the plan and agenda of state roll-back that is synonymous with 
neoliberal governmentality? A discussion of one of these urban spatial manifestations of quasi-
neighbourhood activism – BIDs/CIDs and NIDs/RCIDs – this section seeks to answer this question. 
Looking into the origins, characteristics, participation dynamics and spatial implications of 
BIDs/CIDs and NIDs/RCIDs; this section aims to answer the aforementioned question in the 
affirmative. It is argued in this section that notwithstanding structure – “perceived or ‘real’ state 
failure” (Swyngedouw 2005: 1992) - and perhaps even because of it – “urban subject[s]” 
(Jacobson 2009) express their agency by way of implementing BIDs and NIDs to respond to the 
individual and collective politico-socio-economic challenges that they face in their respective 
urban neighbourhoods. Naturally, the section also argues, the citizens’ agenda is both 
normalized and constrained by BID-related policies, statutes, systems and plans hatched by the 
neoliberal state; which translates into BIDs being “mundane and mutant devices of power” 
(Lippert 2010: 477 – 478; Jacobson 2009) whose powerful agents – the state – are made 
somewhat latent by private actors (Ward 2007). Moreover, the section critiques BIDs by way of 
integrating arguments relating to BIDs and public participation and empowerment. Additionally, 
the section integrates/amalgamates arguments on the management of BIDs/CIDs and 
NIDs/RCIDs, emphatically noting that there are gaps in the literature pertaining to the 
internal/external space management relationship in improvement districts. This is so because 
much literature not only tends to place more emphasis on public space management at the 
expense of internal space management in buildings comprising the improvement district; the 
literature also neglects how citizens governed by BID norms resist and bend norms governing 
them.  
2.4.1 A ‘Creative’Answer to Urban Management Issues? Origins and Features of BIDs/CIDs 
In most major metropolises the world over – North and South American to European and (South) 
African metropolises, to mention but a few - inner city neighbourhoods have been confronted 
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with countless political, economic and social challenges. The urban neighbourhoods are 
associated with dereliction/dilapidation in the form of “decaying housing” (Meegan and 
Mitchell 2001: 2194); poverty and “economic distress” (Porter 1995: ); criminal activities and/or 
social ills as well as strained state-citizen relationships (Porter 1995; Porter 1997; Nelson 2006; 
Peyroux 2006; Coyle 2006; Winkler 2013; Lloyd, McCarthy, McGreal and Berry 2003; Ellen, 
Schwartz, Voicu, Brooks and Hoyt 2007: 1 - 3). Urban neighbourhoods of post-apartheid South 
African cities such as Johannesburg – Africa’s commercial nerve centre – are no different 
(Winkler 2013). Academic literature portrays them as “derelict slum[s]” (Schnehage as cited in 
Winkler 2013: 309; Gossmann and Premo 2012) in a dire state of collapse, bedlam, and 
degeneration; experiencing “White flight” (Levy 2001: 129) and redlining/marginalisation by 
financial institutions (Winkler 2013). In fact, it may be argued that if anything, Johannesburg’s 
inner city neighbourhoods carry the ‘double burden’ by virtue of their complex contextual 
challenges. This may be the case especially in light of the fact that some – if not most – of these 
neighbourhoods’ buildings have been hijacked/overtaken by “space invaders” (Witbooi 2012: 
43) and/or illegal slumlords, and then “managed through intimidation and violence” (CoJ 2009: 
54; Lipietz 2004; Winkler 2013). Lipietz (2004), who gives an example of failed attempts at 
effecting inner city change – the Seven Buildings Project – also points to the ‘internal 
mismanagement’ and chaos within buildings such as those in Hillbrow; indicating that areas 
such as Hillbrow and Berea are “complex area[s] with complex problems” (CoJ 2009: 54).  
Ironically, while inner city neighbourhoods are associated with crime and are perceived as no-
go areas; their favourable location – close proximity to the CBD – and “competitive advantage” 
(Lloyd et al 2003: 296; Porter 1995) still ensure that they remain high on municipalities’ broad 
agendas of accomplishing “ordered, clean and safe” (Paasche 2013: 260) spaces conducive 
for economic investment (ibid; Becker and Muller 2012; CoJ 2009; Winkler 2013). There is a 
realisation that “healthy bodies and compliant minds would be sustained [in such areas], if only 
their surroundings could be made well-ordered, sanitary, pleasant ... beautiful” (Huxley 2006: 
774) and visible, because “’ungoverned spaces’ are increasingly perceived as potential 
incubators for terrorist activities” (Kihato 2011: 351). This justifies higher institutions’ practices of 
“inner city raids” (ibid: 355); urban renewal, slum eradication, eviction of informal trade, to 
mention but a few (ibid; Huxley 2006; Morange 2008; Paasche 2012). Marquadt et al (2012: 3) 
corroborate this view by stating that,  
[t]he current reworking of inner-city neighbourhoods has become an explicit goal of public policy 
... City governments are trying to provide a basis for creative industries as possible avenues to 
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urban prosperity ... aiming at the relocation of taxpayers ... or using gentrification as a strategy for 
establishing social order in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. (Marquadt et al 2012: 3)  
Sadly, notes Nelson (2006), “[t]he services provided by distant bureaucracies at city hall are 
often poorly suited to the needs of the residents”, and thus further exacerbate these areas’ 
residents’ already-profound problems. According to Winkler (2013), the same can be said of 
Johannesburg’s Hillbrow. Giving the example of lucrative LED projects like the Constitution Hill, 
Winkler (2013) laments that capital will always be poured into ‘large scale’ projects that 
contribute little to nothing to social, political and economic change/improvement. Winkler 
(2013) thus blames the difficulty of urban change on the City’s insensitivity to the history and 
context of Hillbrow and its residents; and argues that inner city Johannesburg will never 
‘regenerate’ due in large part to this insensitivity.  
“Since governing institutions with wider authority [are] fail[ing] to meet citizen needs” (Nelson 
2006) in inner city areas, there increasingly have been calls for “[g]overnment ... to shift its focus 
from direct [state] involvement and intervention to creating a favourable environment for 
business ... [and for] community activists, social service providers and government bureaucrats 
[to] ... support” (Porter 1995: 68). This appears to be happening in cities like Johannesburg, where 
– as noted by Lipietz (2004: 11) - the City of Johannesburg, in its quest to “put a halt to urban 
decay”, has allegedly been “forced to partner up with inner city constituents” (ibid.), thus the 
notion of neoliberal governance. What is more, citizens in such neighbourhoods “are 
increasingly taking matters into their own hands at the most decentralised levels possible” 
(Nelson 2006) and are thus showing their capability of “managing the social and economic 
burdens which neoliberalism has placed upon their shoulders” (Jamieson 2012: 47). One of the 
ways in which property owners have taken the initiative to change their neighbourhoods for the 
better - thus demonstrating their agency – has been through form(ul)ation of BIDs and NIDs in 
their respective neighbourhoods (Nelson 2006; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007). Against the 
backdrop of urban challenges such as crime, grime, and disinvestment to suburban areas; BIDs 
are argued to “bring wit, imagination, and entrepreneurial skills to the provision of public 
services” (Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007: 956) and are seen as a “creative response to 
suburbanisation” (Levy 2001: 124; Ellen et al 2007). Levy (2001: 124), who observes that there are 
currently more than 800 thriving BIDs in American cities’ downtown areas, praises BIDs for “riding 
the wave of national prosperity - ... helping to boost office, hotel, and retail occupancy to new 
heights while fostering a resurgence in downtown housing”; thus contributing to the 
aesthetics/”beautification” (ibid.) of downtown areas (ibid.). After looking into the impacts of 
BIDs on property values in New York City; Ellen et al (2007) observe that BIDs in that city have 
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more-often-than-not translated to a remarkable increase in the values of (retail and residential) 
buildings in that city’s downtown neighbourhoods. While all these praises provide us with much 
information on BIDs, they still leave us in the dark regarding what BIDs are. So what are BIDs?  
Hoyt and Gopal-Agge (2007: 946) like to think of BIDs as “privately directed and publicly 
sanctioned organisations that supplement public services within geographically defined 
boundaries by generating multiyear revenue through a compulsory assessment on local 
property owners and/or businesses”. BIDs – initiated in the 1970s in North American cities such as 
Toronto, New Orleans and New York – were formulated by property owners there largely as a 
response to the problem of urban decline, which implies that they developed as “urban 
regeneration tools” (Didier, Peyroux and Morange 2012: 915; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007; Lloyd, 
McCarthy, McGreal and Berry 2003; Ellen et al 2007; Levy 2001). Their formulation “is not in any 
way a random event” (Ellen et al 2007: 5) but it is informed by context and is normalised by 
disciplines and/or state apparatuses such as planning, politics and law (ibid; Marquadt et al 
2012; Lloyd et al 2003). Many scholars indicate that the success of BIDs in North American cities – 
coupled with globalisation and neoliberal forces - has prompted the spread of the BID model to 
cities in “Australia; ... European countries; ... Japan; ... New Zealand; ... [and] South Africa” (Hoyt 
and Gopal-Agge 2007: 947; Lippert 2010: 480; Briffault 2010; Miraftab 2007; Scott 2003; Ward 
2007; Lloyd 2003; Didier et al 2012). Peyroux, Putz and Glasze (2012: 111) also point out that the 
BID concept is “a travelling concept” that has been ‘internationalised’ as well as internalised, 
replicated, creolised, and appropriated by different nation states to suit their respective 
contexts. This creolisation is apparent in terminology, “designations and organisational and 
decision-making structures of BIDs [which] vary according to geographical contexts” (Didier et 
al 2012: 915; Peyroux et al 2012). For example, BIDs have different names in countries such as the 
RSA. Didier et al (2012) – who point out that neoliberal governance easily makes itself spatially 
manifest in RSA cities by way of BIDs – observe that BIDs are referred to as City Improvement 
Districts (CIDs) in the RSA. As well, CIDs in RSA are by law implemented only after 51% of the 
property owners within a designated area have given consent for CID approval; unlike for 
example in Germany where only 30% of the property owners have to give consent (CoJ 2008; 
Friesecke and Lockemann 2008).  
Although the concept of BIDs has been contextualised in different geographical settings, there 
are features common to all improvement districts. A central characteristic of BIDs is “a 
mandatory levy collected from all property owners in a targeted urban commercial space” 
(Lippert 2010: 480; Levy 2001). BIDs are “intended to add to or enhance municipal services” 
(Samson 2007: 128) such as waste collection, security, to mention but a few; which thus implies 
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private bodies’ “[p]aying for a privately provided service” (ibid.) and/or “[p]aying for the public 
life” (Levy 2001: 124). Paasche (2012: 260) argues that by so doing, “[t]hese private bodies 
pursue a neoliberal agenda that facilitates consumption, which is the goal of many urban 
renewal programmes” (cf. Chapter Five). Another main feature of improvement districts in 
different global contexts is the fact that only property owners participate in decision-making 
pertaining BID projects and issues (Schaller and Modan 2005; CoJ 2008; Friesecke and 
Lockemann 2008; Ward 2007). As well, BIDs all over the world are aimed at the attraction of 
investment to a geographically defined area. This is usually done via the marketing and 
branding of the geographically defined BID space, thus “creating a personality” (Ward 2000: 
781) – a particular image - for it (ibid; Schaller and Modan 2005; Levy 2001; Ellen et al 2007); 
making it stand out from its surrounds. The notion of space as a “cultural commodity” (Schaller 
and Modan 2005: 396) and/or entity with some form of “ambient power” (Lippert 2012: 261) 
comes through in this context.    
The global success of BIDs in different cities worldwide has allowed for the concept to be carried 
to the residential neighbourhood level, and BIDs in predominantly residential areas are referred 
to as Neighbourhood Improvement Districts (NIDs) in many countries (Schaller and Modan 2005; 
Friesecke and Lockemann 2008; CoJ 2008). Friesecke and Lockemann (2008) observe that NIDs 
in Germany – where NID formation is made possible by a 30% of property owners in favour of 
their formation - signal a transition from state domination in policy issues to inclusion of more 
(private) stakeholders. Friesecke and Lockemann (2008: 1) thus consider NIDs as “a new form of 
[u]rban [g]overnance for the improvement of residential areas” in Germany. In support of this, 
Nelson (2006) points out that the formation of NIDs in American cities, particularly in older and/or 
inner city neighbourhoods, extends the concept of “’sublocal governance’ already seen in 
many urban jurisdictions”. One such American neighbourhood is Mount Pleasant, an ethnically 
diverse neighbourhood in Washington DC, where NBIDs are on the increase (Schaller and 
Modan 2005). In South African cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, “initiatives have 
been taken to apply for ... Neighbourhood Improvement Districts” (Peyroux 2007: 8; CoJ 2008); 
and they are known as Residential City Improvement Districts (ibid.). Of the procedure for RCID 
formation in SA cities like Johannesburg, Peyroux (2007: 8) notes that although “the Gauteng CID 
Act does not consider applications for residential areas ... the Joburg City Council appears to be 
sympathetic to residential CIDs in inner city areas”. CoJ (2008) confirms its approval of RCID 
implementation in response to numerous applications by property owners in neighbourhoods 
and against the background of provincial CID law not considering applications for 
neighbourhoods. This approval by the CoJ may, to some extent, sheds light on the need for state 
institutions at local/metropolitan city level to extend the notion of neoliberal governance to new 
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territory and thus relieve themselves of some service delivery responsibilities in the process.  
Additionally, it may suggest that some values [as set out by statutes and/or policies] may be 
bent and negotiated by state institutions and lower-order institutions alike, which may then 
portray neoliberal governmentality as a concept that does not undermine agency (Griggs and 
Roberts 2012). 
What is interesting about the context of BIDs/NIDs and their formation by property owners is the 
fact that it not only portrays citizens (property owners) as clients who must ‘pay their way’; it also 
evokes Chatterjee’s (2004) ‘double conception of the post-colonial society. Drawing from the 
Indian state’s conception of its citizens; Chatterjee (2004) argues that society comprises two 
types of citizen groups - ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ – and a distinction is to be made 
between these. Civil society is comprised of a minority of rights-bearing, responsible, ‘good’ 
citizens (property owners, tax/rate payers) who are somewhat entitled to their claims (ibid.). 
Political society, on the other hand, comprises the majority of Indian citizens ‘breaking the law’ 
through informal practices; who can only make claims and only work through exerting 
democratic voting power and who – by virtue of the fact that they break laws and engage in 
informal practices – are not deemed as full citizens by the Indian state (ibid; Bawa 2011). We 
may conceive of eKhaya RCID property owners – by virtue of their willingness to ‘pay extra’ for 
public services - as citizens who have (indirectly) fed into the consumerist rationalities and 
aspirations of neoliberal governmentality. As such, they may be argued to be good citizens and 
governable subjects; thus civil society. The manifestation of neoliberal governmentality as 
“regulated freedom” (Flint 2002: 249) in property owners’ lives – by way of CIDs – also becomes 
apparent in this instance. As well, civil society is portrayed by Chatterjee (2004) as a construct of 
the elite; and society – just like (BID/NID) space - can also be argued to be a construct in this 
particular instance. As Hillbrow has a high number of tenants and a thriving informal economy 
(see Chapter Four); one cannot help but speculate about the fate of non-property owners such 
as those renters engaging in informal practices/business. Do they constitute political society? 
Could the broad aim of RCID/NID be the ‘civilisation’ of tenants and their transformation into 
‘law-abiding citizens’ who are enumerated and fitting into categories? 
2.4.2 NIDs and the Concepts of Public Participation and Empowerment: A Critique 
It has been noted that in BIDs/NIDs, participation in decision-making is an activity limited to 
property owners. Yet what really is participation? According to Cornwall (2008), participation is a 
very fluid concept with varying meaning for different actors; and there is a huge chasm 
between participation in theory and participation in practice (Pacione 1988). While “used to 
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evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people” (ibid.), the many ambiguous 
meanings and/or implications of participation leave one wondering “who is participating, in 
what, and for whose benefit” (ibid.). Cornwall (2008: 269) thus suggests that “[I]f the call for more 
participation is to realize its democratic promise”, there needs to be “clarity through specificity” 
(ibid.) as to what participation really means and entails. Participation as it relates to democracy 
is perhaps best summed up by Olivio Dutra (as quoted in Wainwright 2009: 179) who argues that 
“the purpose  ... of participatory democracy ... [is] to enable people ‘to become the subjects of 
policy rather than the object of policy’”. As the concept of participation has many meanings for 
different contexts, it can be used to uncover the nature and extent of citizen empowerment 
involvement in BID-related issues and policies, and this sub-section uncovers these by way of 
critiquing BIDs/NIDs. 
Power (2004), Swyngedouw (2005) point out the contradictions associated with the devolution of 
government/power and the ‘mutual empowerment’ of citizenry. Peters and Pierre (2000: 9) note 
that empowerment, just like participation, is a concept used “often used to mean exactly what 
each speaker or writer wants it to mean ... and as an ideology for promoting even more 
change” when in real fact “all groups cannot be empowered at once” (ibid.) because this 
would result in conflict of the mutually empowered groups.  Correspondingly, Swyngedouw 
(2005: 1991) finds that “new arrangements of governance have created new institutions and 
empowered new actors, while disempowering others”. One such institutional arrangement is the 
BID/NID which, argue Schaller and Modan (2005: 405), “concentrate[s] power in a narrow set of 
actors, primarily property owners and secondarily business owners ... [and thus] reinforce[s] 
political constellations that further exclude traditionally marginalised low-income residents and 
small businesses”. The same situation is particularly evident in German and South African 
NIDs/RCIDs where only property owners are allowed to vote and/or make decisions and 
“tenants have no right to vote” (Friesecke and Lockemann 2008; CoJ 2008). In this instance, BIDs 
and NIDs can be seen to be participatory/empowering and exclusionary/disempowering at the 
same time, as they tend to give power to those who own at the expense of those who do not 
and those who rent (ibid; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007). It is precisely for this reason that 
Swyngedouw (2005: 1991) finds new forms of devolved governance “Janus-faced” and 
hypocritical.  
Examining the extent to which North American and British urban neighbourhood residents have 
publicly participated in decision making and policies bent on effecting neighbourhood change; 
Pacione (1988: 229) finds that in as much as neighbourhood groups have the aptitude to 
drive/influence neighbourhood change, there exists a huge chasm between public 
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participation in theory and in practice. “In practice ... the extent of public participation ranges 
from situations in which the concept has been actively incorporated into the urban policy and 
planning process to those in which planners and decision-makers pay only lip-service to the 
ideal” (ibid.). Yet, in eKhaya we are told that property managers promote “community and an 
empowered citizenry” (Madulammoho 2010). Seeing as tenants do not have a ‘voice’ in 
decision-making in the NID/RCID; can property managers be seen as a means of increasing 
different residents’ participation in the management of their own internal environment(s)? CoJ 
(2010) suggests this to be the case by stating that “tenants are also empowered by the building 
managers” (CoJ 2008). One then wonders how property managers are empowering tenants, 
especially since the property managers themselves (presumably) do not own property just like 
the tenants they are purportedly empowering. Do property caretakers in eKhaya play a role in 
increasing residents’ participation in the management of their micro-local spaces, or are there 
imposed norms that they do not accept, influence, and cannot contest?  
2.4.3 The Public/Private Space Interplay on R/CID Territory: Example of Surveillance 
In a groundbreaking book published in the twentieth century – Defensible Space – architect and 
urban planner Newman (1972) touches on the role of the built environment and urban space in 
the prevention of crime and the fostering of social control and neighbourhood safety. Newman 
(1972: 109) notes that in modern societies, “the functioning of authority in crime prevention has 
been greatly curtailed by the new format of ... evolving residential areas”. With this realisation, 
Newman (1972) implies that residents are contributing to the fight against crime through 
configuration of their residential sites as well as via the notion of “natural surveillance” (ibid: ). 
Newman (1972) solidifies this notion by declaring that if a building faces a certain direction; it 
makes the space in that direction to be safe and viable in comparison to the areas that the 
building does not face due in large part to the ‘eyes on the street’ made possible by the 
building’s windowpanes. This, to some extent, shows “the importance that design and 
architectural technologies have gained in governing modern societies” (Marquadt et al 2012: 
5). Unfortunately, argues Newman (1972), while high rise urban neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow 
may promote high natural surveillance, the apartment block residents’ response to illicit activities 
happening on public space is impeded/prolonged by the high rise nature of buildings in which 
they reside. As well, Newman (1972) notes that one of the reasons for the prevalence of criminal 
activities in such densely populated neighbourhoods is the fact that the residents feel a little 
sense of control and/or responsibility for these areas as they are inhabited by many people.  
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In the twenty-first century, it appears that surveillance as ‘everyday practice’ has been taken to 
the extreme in such neighbourhoods, most notably those urban neighbourhoods that house 
“urban renewal efforts” (Paasche 2013: 260) such as BIDs/NIDs (ibid; Simon 2005; Lippert and 
Wood 2012; Mills 2003; Jamieson 2012). For instance, Simon (2005), writing from a North American 
viewpoint, notes that following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 worries about safety in American 
and Canadian cities have meant that surveillance is no longer “limited to the natural 
surveillance constituted through distinctively urban architecture, buildings and infrastructure” 
(Lippert and Wood 2012: 257). “Surveillance is [thus] becoming more concentrated, hidden, 
passive, functional, mobile, and varied” (ibid) with the emergence of technical/digital forms of 
policing such as CCTV cameras on BID/NID space (ibid; Simon 2005; Paasche 2003). 
Correspondingly, Mills (2003) notes the prevalent use of “closed circuit television cameras in 
Britain’s town centres ... [most notably] in the streets”, and argues that their presence is a 
contemporary manifestation of Foucault’s theoretical concept of panopticism. According to 
Mills (2003: 45 - 46), the cameras – like the panopticon – are a form of discipline meant for the 
‘camera-conscious’ subject/individual to “internalize the disciplinary gaze ... assume... 
responsibility ... [and] become... the principle of his own subjection”. Thus, the mere presence of 
the cameras in the public spaces of the town centres, “and the knowledge that the videos from 
these cameras can be viewed by the police is supposed to be enough to deter petty crime in 
these areas” (ibid.).  
Lippert and Wood (2012: 257) argue that these technical forms of surveillance, meant to 
regulate the behaviour of all individuals – property owners included – on “Privately Owned 
Public Open Spaces (POPOS) ... [such as] ...BIDs” are increasingly being appropriated by private 
actors and infiltrating private spaces (condominiums/buildings/property constituting the 
BIDs/NIDs) in British and North American cities (ibid; Mills 2003; Simon 2005). Lippert and Wood 
(2012: 258) observe that this infiltration of such codes of conduct as security is blurring the 
boundary between private and public space in Canadian BIDs, because 
[p]roperty managers are installing and using camera surveillance to watch conduct in common 
spaces, such as residents’ household garbage chutes and recreational area, to identify rule 
breaking residents and visitors; in other cases the equivalent of police informants (often called 
‘condo-commandos’) operate on behalf of condominium boards or property managers and 
engage in unmediated forms of surveillance (watching parking lots through their apartment 
windows, patrolling hallways, and taking meticulous notes). (Lippert and Wood 2012: 258; added 
emphasis) 
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This quote not only points to the penetration of private space by the norms governing public 
space in Canadian BIDs; it also sheds light on the criticality of the housing manager, as a human 
form of surveillance, in the channelling of these norms. According to Clapham (1997) and 
Saugeres and Clapham (1999), the same can be noted in UK cities. Clapham (1997: 769), who 
urges research on (the construction of) housing management in the UK to incorporate more 
critical social theories such as surveillance, argues that there has been mounting pressure on 
housing managers to “adopt a social role in ... dealings with increasingly poor and marginalised 
tenants”. Consequently, housing managers have inevitably been forced to broaden the scope 
of their duties beyond mediation of intra-resident and landlord-tenant conflicts and rent 
collection to “be[ing] increasingly concerned with individual behaviour” (ibid.). As such, “[g]ood 
management implies ... know[ing] who the tenants are and what activities are occurring in the 
block [...] and [...] poor security [has become] a recipe for deterioration” (Morris 1999: 521) of 
building blocks. This has resulted in the building managers closely watching all their tenants, 
looking out for “’anti-social’ or ‘problem’ tenants through dealing with neighbour disputes ... 
[and] ... criminal behaviour” (ibid: 770; Power 2003). Any irregularities they come across in their 
respective internal and external environs, notes Clapham (1997), are circulated to the police; 
thus “acting in partnership with the police” (ibid.). The notion of “[h]ousing [m]anagement as 
[s]urveillance” (ibid: 770) becomes apparent in this context. This also appears to be the case in 
Canadian cities, most notably on BID space, where complaints about “criminal or ‘nuisance’ 
behaviours” (Lippert 2012: 174) are relayed by housing officers – among other BID members – to 
BID co-ordinators; who then transmit the information/knowledge to city bureaucrats such as 
police officers, with whom they are close (ibid; Lippert and Wood 2012). The information is then 
used to “lobby the city or higher-level governments for greater public resources, including more 
police patrols” (ibid: 177; Peyroux et al 2012: 115); thus the effecting of urban neighbourhood 
change within the BID/NID. In this instance, housing managers and BID coordinators become 
“human conduits for members’ complaints and as ... knowledge broker[s] regarding crime and 
security and other issues” (ibid: 169; Power 2004; Peyroux et al 2012: 115). Additionally, the 
influence of internal housing management on public space management and public policy 
becomes apparent in this situation. As well, it becomes manifest that in spaces such as 
BIDs/NIDs, the state – by way of intervention of municipal bureaucrats – “is re-asserting a direct 
governing role, alongside private security and surveillance” (Flint 2002: 261); with “the local 
authority still keep[ing] its control function” (Friesecke and Lockemann 2008: 10). 
In a doctoral dissertation based on how modern governments connect with “populations of 
marginalised, excluded and awkward citizens” (Jamieson 2012: 1); Jamieson (2012) argues that 
modern liberal governmentality has always sought to find and work with such citizens because 
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they are not optimising their freedom, and as such they “share a range of behaviours” (ibid.) 
deemed unacceptable. Paasche’s (2013: 260) piece of literature on the securitisation of CIDs in 
Cape Town’s CBD reveals such citizens to be “the mentally ill, street people and the urban 
poor”. According to Paasche (2013: 260), the case of CIDs in Cape Town’s CBD shows that 
social control and surveillance have been extended “beyond actual criminals” to “informal 
traders, parking attendants, street kids and the homeless” (Miraftab 2007: 603), to mention but a 
prominent few; who are kept out of the city by CID-hired security guards (ibid.). “[T]hese groups 
are a ‘nuisance’ and are viewed as counterproductive to the circulation of wealth in urban 
renewal efforts” (ibid.) such as CIDs because “they fail to exercise their abilities to the detriment 
of themselves and the wider population” (Jamieson 2012: 51). ‘Loiterers’ on CID/BID territory are 
in most cases prohibited by management/security people – referred to as “ambassadors” (Hoyt 
and Gopal-Agge 2007: 947; Schaller and Modan 2005) - from lingering and plying trade on NBID 
territory (ibid; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007). As such, notes Paasche (2013: 260) of the example of 
Cape Town, ‘soft’ forms of policing aimed at “strategically control[ling]” such groups and 
keeping them out of the CBD/CID – for instance “social development” (ibid: 259) - have 
increasingly been on the rise in Cape Town. Given South Africa’s fascist history which, in essence, 
entailed exclusion of some racial groups from the city and a denial of their ‘right to the city’ in all 
its forms – participation, habitation and the oeuvre (Huchzermeyer 2010) - the CID model 
appears to be reifying the apartheid logic (Scott 2003; Miraftab 2007; Didier et al 2012). CIDs 
have thus been slammed for “perpetuat[ing] the apartheid spatiality, shifting the bases of urban 
exclusion from race to class” (Miraftab 2007: 603); the difference being that this time the 
“exclusionary socio-spatial relationship is [blurred and]... governed innovatively through a multi-
actor matrix that is not only flexible but permeable”. 
It appears that BIDs and CIDs adopt a “revanchist” (Paasche 2012: 260; Jamieson 2012) stance 
towards certain citizens not just in cities like Cape Town but also in ‘first world cities’ such as 
Washington DC. Using the examples of Neighbourhood Business Improvement Districts (NBIDs) in 
Washington’s Mount Pleasant area; Schaller and Modan (2005: 394) note that the overt 
surveillance of NBID space has “transform[ed] urban landscapes and [has] reconfigure[d] the 
meaning and uses of public space” by contributing to the construction of “‘pseudo-private 
spaces’ - ...– spaces that are formally owned by the state, by the public, but that are subject to 
control and regulation by private interests” (Ward 2007: 800; Lippert and Wood 2012). For 
instance, NBIDs in that city’s poor neighbourhoods have “spawn[ed] struggles over what it 
means to act like a ‘good citizen’ and use public space ‘appropriately’” (ibid.). Schaller and 
Modan (2005) thus note that BIDs at neighbourhood level have negatively altered the public 
sphere in such a way as for it to be heavily contested by different ethnicities in Mount Pleasant 
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which in turn has had negative implications for citizenship as well as democracy of city 
stakeholders such as the urban poor. In light of these realisations, Flint (2002: 261) would be 
justified for concluding that, “Citizens living in neighbourhoods experiencing high levels of 
disorder become increasingly governed rather than active governors”. 
Yet this ‘criminalisation of the poor’ does not seem apparent in the case of eKhaya. Numerous 
site visits to eKhaya bring to light informal traders plying their trade and loiterers lingering on NID 
space, just outside of buildings constituting the NID (refer to Figure 4A). Does this translate to 
eKhaya being more democratic and participatory? Could this mean that the eKhaya NID is 
‘weak’ in enforcing its own regulations and codes of conduct or does it signify the 
‘appropriation’ of NID public space management principles/norms by users of private building 
space? 
While the literature reviewed on the relationship between public space and internal space in 
BIDs/NIDs, especially with regard to the concept of surveillance, is important; there are numerous 
gaps in the literature. For one, the literature seems to portray the ‘criminalized urban subjects’ as 
uniformly docile and compliant individuals; when in real fact  
... conformity can be feigned to gain a reward or evade punishment ... [and] [t]he population of 
most urban streets is much more diverse than that imagined by the Panopticon. Their background 
knowledge varies along with their understanding of what counts as conformity and what is a 
recognisable sign of the supervisors’ presence. It follows ... [then] that the more citizens know about 
where the cameras are and what counts as appropriate behavioral norms the more they would 
be able to feign conformity in the camera’s field of vision ... The more one knows about how one is 
supposed to behave the more one is able to conform, but by the same token one is also more 
able to feign conformity. (Simon 2005: 8)  
With this important observation; Simon (2005) shows that citizens, especially those in multicultural 
settings like Hillbrow, have – by virtue of their varied backgrounds - different conceptions of what 
constitutes right and wrong behaviour. As such, these citizens may pretend to act in 
accordance with the codes of conduct in monitored areas and in front of the housing 
managers/supervisors; but act purely differently in hindsight. This suggests that norms can be 
bent, challenged and internally resisted by different citizens in their capacity as self-managers 
and managers of others. With that in mind, does the presence of the so-called undesirables on 
eKhaya RCID space signify the translation of these ‘internal resistances’ into action? Given that 
surveillance in eKhaya buildings appears controlled – with surveillance technologies and 
registrations of who can stay there, who can visit, for how long, how many people, sometimes 
even how old the children may be (refer to Figure 2B, 4D and Addendum C) - are the tenants 
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able to act differently in the privacy of their apartments and outside of the disciplinary gaze of 
the surveillance cameras. If so, it would then be fascinating to discover the role of the property 
supervisor in curbing/countering and/or promotion of these resistances; as well as the challenges 
they encounter.    
2.5 Governors of Urban Neighbourhood Change: Neighbourhood and Housing Managers as 
Street-Level Bureaucrats? 
“Bureaucracy” implies a set of rules and structures of authority; “street-level” implies a distance 
from the centre where authority presumably resides. 
(Lipsky 1980: xii; added emphasis)  
Since (neoliberal) governmentality is concerned with, among other things, the mundane 
practices of self-management and management of others – and governmental thought has 
‘tippy-toed’ its way to neighbourhoods and individuals, parenthetically – it calls our attention to 
the individual(s) actively partaking in practices such as “the management of urban 
neighbourhood change” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 348; Proudfoot 2006: 20; Griggs and 
Roberts 2012; Power 2003). Power (2004: 3) understands neighbourhood management to be  
The local organisation, delivery and coordination of civic and community services within a small, 
recognisable, built-up area [...] - direct responsibility and control of some specific services, co-
ordination of and liaison with other services, and responsibility for neighbourhood improvements. 
(Power 2004: 3, 16)  
Power’s (2004) understanding of neighbourhood management sheds little light on the processes 
at work in the functioning of neighbourhoods as well as the “micro-practices of ... enforcement” 
(Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 349) addressing “micro-level concerns” (ibid: 348) in the 
maintenance of urban neighbourhood change/order. Griggs and Robert (2012: 183) argue that 
since management of (change in) neighbourhoods is “a ‘roll-out strategy” for “devolved 
governance” (ibid.), “it can put in place new institutional logics that develop outside of the local 
authority, creating new ‘spaces’ within which to voice new grievances and demands” (ibid: 203; 
added emphasis). This more or less suggests that neoliberal “governance as ... governing-
beyond-the-state (but often with the explicit inclusion of parts of the state apparatus)” 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 1992) requires of us to look into the practices of governing via 
“neighbourhood managers” (Griggs and Roberts 2012: 203; Power 2003). While influential in the 
“production of truth and authority” (Proudfoot 2006: 20) and “able to hold their own in a political 
environment” (Griggs and Roberts 2012: 204); neighbourhood managers are more-often-than-
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not “overlooked in conventional political economy” (Proudfoot 2006: 20) and are thus 
somewhat “’anonymous’” (Griggs and Roberts 2012: 203). The concept of governmentality 
makes it possible for us to focus on these individuals, how they operate, the 
policies/values/norms governing them, the challenges they encounter in distributing 
neighbourhood goods and “in making sense of everyday problematic situations” (Griggs and 
Roberts 2012: 202), as well as how they are working to resolve their challenges on the ground. 
Governmentality and neighbourhood management thus call our attention to “the microphysics 
of power and anonymous strategies” (Lemke 2000: 3) adopted by neighbourhood managers, 
whom Griggs and Roberts (2012), Proudfoot (2006) and Proudfoot and McCann (2008) like to 
think of as “street-level bureaucrats”. Given that neighbourhood managers – according to 
Power (2004) – comprise “housing managers, super-caretakers and neighbourhood wardens”; 
can these neighbourhood actors be conceived of as ‘street-level bureaucrats’? In any case, 
what are street-level bureaucrats? 
Coming from a ‘Weberian’ perspective, Lipsky (2010) coins the concept of ‘Street-level 
bureaucracy’ and argues that the state makes itself manifest in localities and citizens’ everyday 
lives by way of “street-level bureaucrats” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 348). Street-level 
bureaucracies, according to Lipsky (2010: xi) are “public services ... [such as] ... schools, pol ice 
and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices, and other agencies whose workers 
interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of 
public sanctions”. This thus means that street-level bureaucrats comprise “teachers, social 
workers, police officers, and other public workers who regularly interact with citizens in the 
course of their jobs” (ibid: xiii). Street-level bureaucracy is thus a concept concerned with the 
lower reaches of the state and street-level bureaucrats are individuals who represent the frontier 
of government policy/values (ibid; Proudfoot 2006). To the aforementioned conventional list of 
street-level bureaucrats has been added “property use and liquor inspectors” (Proudfoot and 
McCann 2008: 348) as well as “house letting officers” (The African File undated). Canadian 
scholars Proudfoot and McCann (2008: 348) argue that these individuals are “state actors” who 
– while restrained by “the rules, regulations and directives from above, or by the norms and 
practices of their occupational group” (Lipsky 1987: 121) – have the discretion to shape urban 
neighbourhoods and manage neighbourhood change in their own ways. “Through their face-
to-face contact with the public” (ibid.) and their micro-practices, “minor bureaucrats” (ibid.: 
350) such as housing inspectors enforce change but may do this in ways that differ slightly from 
those prescribed by hegemonic policy of state agencies that they work for. Their direct 
encounters with diverse members of the public ensure that they establish relations on the 
ground/street, “employ their understandings” (ibid.) of difficult situations and exercise their levels 
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of discretion to negotiate/bend some rules in ways that they see appropriate (ibid; Proudfoot 
2006). By virtue of the fact that housing use inspectors – as minor bureaucrats – interweave “th[e] 
formal order of bureaucratic control ... with ... an informal order of discourses” (Lipsky 1980: ); 
they in effect “create public policy through their individual responses and routines to their jobs” 
(The African File undated; Lipsky 1987) and thus become public policy-makers (ibid.). Thus, it is 
through street-level bureaucrats’ behaviours that a state’s interactions with its citizens can be 
examined (ibid.; Proudfoot 2006: 20; Lipsky 1969; Lipsky 1980). This thus justifies Proudfoot and 
McCann’s (2008: 349) assertion that “policy is best studied where it is enacted, rather than where 
it is drafted”. In this regard, can minor bureaucrats like housing use inspectors be said to be rule-
breakers not adhering to municipal/state policy or are they just practising discretion within their 
respective jurisdictions? 
Lipsky (1969; 1980) declares that there are reasons for the bending and negotiation of policy 
values by street-level bureaucrats such as property use inspectors in their micro-practices. Street-
level bureaucrats’ “work experiences are relatively strongly influenced by ... relative 
unavailability of resources, both personal and organisational ... existence of clear physical 
and/or psychological threat; and ... ambiguous, contradictory and in some ways unattainable 
role expectations” (ibid 1969). These structural conditions, argues Lipsky (1980), ensure that 
street-level bureaucrats – who normally had entered their respective positions with aspirations to 
improve the lives of the public – compromise the “ideal conception of their job[s]” (Lipsky 1980: 
390). Consequently, “[m]ass processing of clients [becomes] the norm” (ibid: xii) of the 
overburdened minor bureaucrats in their practical exercise(s) of discretionary authority; as are 
categorization, ‘routinisation’ and simplification of clientele interactions and/or cases (Lipsky 
1969). These simplifications are made in terms of labels imposed on certain societal groups, for 
example “racial [and cultural/ethnic] stereotypes” (ibid: 24). For example, police officers may 
decide who to arrest and whose behaviour to overlook ... house letting officers [may decide] on 
who gets accommodation” (The African File undated) based on their awareness of stereotypes 
of all ethnic groups. An instance of this is evident in inner city areas like Hillbrow, where – notes 
Kihato (2011: 354) – documented migrant women encounter difficulty in securing rental 
accommodation; just for the mere reason that they are “non-nationals”. As a result of such 
stereotypes, “street-level bureaucratic behavior [becomes] ... bigoted and discriminatory, 
probably to a greater degree than the sum of individual discriminatory actions” (ibid; Lipsky 
1980; Proudfoot and McCann 2008; The African File undated); which ensues in minor 
bureaucrats’ agencies’ policy values – for example equality of citizens/clients – becoming 
‘distorted’ on the ground (ibid.). In a culturally diverse neighbourhood like Hillbrow – which is 
characterised by a huge number of foreign nationals and pronounced xenophobic tensions 
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(Kihato 2012; Gossmann and Premo 2012) - one wonders how bureaucrats in such a 
neighbourhood, particularly in the eKhaya precinct, deal with the area’s markedly different 
citizenry.  
This section unpacks the concept of neighbourhood (and housing) management using Lipsky’s 
notion of ‘Street-level Bureaucracy’, and special attention is placed on individuals such as 
housing managers as managers of urban neighbourhood change. This section is aimed at 
unpacking whether or not housing managers are street-level bureaucrats. The section also looks 
into (other) street-level bureaucrats that housing managers, as self-governors and governors of 
their buildings and their buildings’ vicinities, work with in managing residents/tenants. 
Furthermore, the section also looks into the policy values that guide housing managers, the 
extent to which they internalise these policy values as well as the level with which they “control 
themselves and coordinate professional and other institutional norms regarding what they 
should do” (Johansson 1994: 232) in the course of their everyday duties. 
2.5.1 Policy Values in Practice: Neighbourhood and Housing Managers as Street-level 
Bureaucrats 
Housing managers ... [as the] rational, objective and expert bureaucrats ... are supposed to be 
experts who, as gatekeepers of welfare resources, havethe knowledgeto decide what kind of 
services people should have or should not have [...][H]ousing officers are experts who as such know 
what is best for people.  
(Saugeres and Clapham 1997: 264, 273; added emphasis) 
... [M]anagers do know how bureaucratic power works and endeavour to adapt it to their own 
ends. 
(Street 2012: 15; added emphasis) 
Clapham (1997), Saugeres and Clapham (1999) and Johansson (1994) have looked at the 
evolution of housing management as a profession in European nations such as the UK and 
Sweden respectively. The scholars find that in so far as housing management has over the years 
been neglected and not taken seriously as an occupation in such countries; the materialisation 
of public housing management policies such as the UK’s “Housing Management Standards 
Manual [HMSA]” (Saugeres and Clapham 1999: 257) are redefining the occupation and giving it 
new prominence. This implies that “bureaucratic discourse” (ibid.) in countries such as Sweden, 
the UK, and Canada is increasingly reclassifying the role of the property manager; and 
empowering housing property governors in the process (ibid; Johansson 1994; Lippert 2012). For 
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instance, in the UK, municipal policies such as the HMSA appear to be granting housing 
managers the freedom to decide what resources are appropriate and which ones are not 
appropriate for their tenants, who they directly interact with on a daily basis; which 
consequently portrays the managers as bureaucrats of some sort (Saugeres and Clapham 1999; 
Clapham 1997). In agreement, Bengtsson (2012: 223) – having looked at the public policies 
governing housing managers in Britain – opines that “British housing managers are arguably the 
actors closest to Lipsky’s street-level bureaucrats we find in housing”. The same may be said of 
housing managers and caretakers in Sweden as brought out by Johansson’s (2012) empirical 
study of these actors. Johansson (1994) - who looks into the concept of responsibility as it applies 
to property caretaking/management in Sweden – finds that the concept has played a critical 
role in the reconfiguration of a certain local housing management; with property caretakers 
having been given “total responsibility” (ibid: 233) in the running of their respective rental 
housing units. Argues Johansson (1994: 233), whilst there are housing management norms that 
the caretakers have to adhere to, it still remains apparent in the Swedish case that, “In a sense, 
the caretakers manage themselves. No one gives them orders or tells them what to do” (ibid). 
The same appears to be the case in Canada, where “condominium property managers” 
(Lippert 2012: 263 – 264) are not just given authority by law and policy values but are also 
empowered by other policies such as the “annual condominium governance ... conference” 
(ibid.). Lippert (2012: 263) notes that this function enables the property managers to come into 
contact with “prominent condominium lawyers from across Canada” (ibid.) who empower them 
with “legal knowledge flows” that they need to govern tenants. Given that in the RSA, building 
management is predominantly the domain of private management bodies, can building 
managers such as those of eKhaya be argued to be street-level bureaucrats? In any case, what 
would be the ‘specific service[s]’ in the case of the [eKhaya] building managers? 
Having briefly touched on the policy provisions made for housing management in different 
countries; it is equally important to also touch on how these norms are applied by housing 
managers as minor bureaucrats, in their respective jurisdictions (buildings) and chores. After all, 
“[t]he interest is not in fixed black-letter legal texts themselves but rather in how these texts are 
taken up, reduced, elaborated, and repurposed as they move through various institutions” 
(Lippert 2012: 270). Johansson’s (1994) study of the concept of responsibility as spelt out by a 
certain Swedish public housing policy shows the concept to have been positively – albeit oddly - 
appropriated by the individual property caretakers. For instance, the activities of the property 
caretakers in Johansson’s (2012: 245 - 246) empirical study show that the caretakers associate 
responsibility with freedom to decide while simultaneously – and more importantly - “acting in 
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accordance with institutionalised behaviour ... as coordinating both personal and professional 
norms”. Johansson (1994: 245 - 246) finds that the property caretakers, as ‘responsible individuals’ 
with new responsibilities having been delegated to and/or imposed on them, increasingly find 
themselves  
...carry[ing] out actions on their own, in line with internalized norms [while] also partly governed by 
their surroundings, specifically by the demands of customers [tenants/residents] and of 
management, by general public debate, and by professional norms and criteria... The caretakers 
in the organization studied see what needs to be done and exercise self-governance.   
It is this blend of freedom/discretion and institutional control on the responsible caretakers’ part 
that Johansson (1994: 246) finds “paradoxical”. Johansson’s (1994) realisation of the 
predicament of the Swedish property caretaker takes us back to the individual who “both 
governs and is the one governed” (ibid: 245; Flint 2002) in neoliberal governmentality. 
It would appear that the caretaker as bureaucrat has limited authority in his/her daily practices 
and in the face of institutional authority. Saugere and Clapham (1999) however beg to differ 
from Johansson (1994) by arguing that housing managers in the UK appropriate policy discourse 
in the self-interest. Pointing to the “tensions and contradictions” (ibid: 273) that materialise in 
housing policies such as the UK’s HMSA; Saugeres and Clapham (1999) assert that housing 
managers as individuals are different, and thus have different interpretations of policy provisions, 
for example those relating to treatment of tenants. British housing policies, with their somewhat 
‘opaque’ provisions, add to this complexity because they have more-often-than-not resulted in 
housing managers’ adoption of paternalistic attitudes (ibid.) towards tenants. Perhaps a major 
inconsistency that emanates from the HMSA regarding the treatment of tenants is highlighted 
below: 
[O]n the one hand, tenants’ views and wishes should be listened to and tenants should be 
involved in making decisions about their houses and estates, but on the other hand, tenants are 
portrayed as being irresponsible, not being able themselves to decide what they want without 
being ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unrealistic’ [...] Tenants come across as irresponsible, potentially 
uncontrollable and thus, dangerous because they do not conform to socially acceptable codes of 
behaviour. As a result, housing officers are told to watch tenants and take on a policing role, 
taking punitive action or imposing on tenants socially acceptable norms with the help of other 
agencies of social control. (ibid: 266, 273; added emphasis)  
Saugeres and Clapham (1999: 266) argue that this contradiction, among others, empowers 
housing managers to “exert social control in order to maintain social order”, to ensure that 
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whatever organisations are formulated by tenants are compliant with the “prevalent social 
order” (ibid: 268); thus more repression of tenants. This situation is also particularly manifest in 
Canada where, Lippert (2012: 264, 284) argues, “the renter ... [is] ... the chief ‘other’” who has 
always been viewed with suspicion and has historically been ostracised from policies such as the 
yearly national conference. The legal knowledge of this fact “tends to flow through more 
mundane channels ... the accessible condominium manual ... the newspaper advice column ... 
the condo-law newsletter” (ibid: 273) and on to the property managers, who deal directly with 
renters, and who then use this information to their own self-interests (ibid.). The property 
managers may use this knowledge to ‘profit’ from the renter through imposition of exorbitant 
rents, thus disenfranchisement and exploitation of the renter. This is also true of renters in the inner 
city where “landlords ... take advantage of non-nationals’ vulnerability and charge them higher 
rental rates than South Africans” (CORMSA 2008: 8 as cited in Kihato 2011: 354). Not only does 
this portray rental property as a commodity to be used for exploitation of the tenant; it also 
depicts property managers as abusers of their power/discretion, ‘bad governors’ of others who 
act in ‘the economic self-interest’. As well, this leads us to the question: managing property for 
whom? In eKhaya buildings, one wonders what kind of power the renters have over the housing 
supervisor. Do the tenants have the authority to get ‘burdensome’ and ‘corrupt’ housing 
managers warned and, at best, fired? Also, in a neighbourhood characterised by “opportunists 
that racket naive or vulnerable residents [into false action] ... opportunists that simply do not 
pay” (Lipietz 2004: 11); how are these ‘ungovernable’ subjects brought to book by the eKhaya 
housing manager? 
In eKhaya RCID, property managers – while actively involved in the daily lives of the tenants of 
their buildings and presumably interested in the improvement of their residents’/tenants’ lives – 
are not employed by state agencies and thus may not be argued to be ‘state actors’ per se. 
Moreover, the buildings they work for are not municipal property. However, can they be referred 
to as street-level bureaucrats all the same, especially in light of their supposed commitment to 
improving tenants’ quality of life and their daily interactions with their tenants?  
2.6 Everyday Life as Mediation of Rules in Neoliberal Micro-spaces: Street Level Bureaucrats and 
Clientelism/Brokerage/Patronage 
Neighbourhood managers such as neighbourhood wardens and property caretakers/managers 
are credited for brokering knowledge and other resources; and as (street-level) bureaucrats and 
frontline service workers, they are in charge of the distribution of services (Griggs and Roberts 
2012; Power 2004; Lipsky 1987; Saugeres and Clapham 1999; Clapham 1997; Bengtsson 2012). As 
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well, it has been noted that these individuals work under stressful conditions such as inadequate 
services, ultimately leading to them making decisions regarding who to distribute the resources 
to; thus their power lies in their exercise of discretion (Lipsky 1969; 1980; 1987). Somewhat 
unexpectedly, the roles of neighbourhood managers and the conditions they work under are 
more or less in tandem with those under which clientelism as brokerage/patronage operates. 
According to Muno (2010), clientelism – the exchange of goods in exchange for (usually 
political) favours – is a “power relationship” (ibid.) that is pervasive and omnipresent in our day-
to-day lives (ibid.; Schmidt 1974). 
Yet, can minor/junior bureaucrats be conceived of as patrons and/or brokers? Mladenka (1980) 
disagrees. Based on his qualitative study of how public resources – parks, schools, fire protection 
and refuse collection - are distributed by municipal bureaucrats in Chicago; Mladenka (1980) 
refutes the notion that the allocation of such resources is informed by political reasons such as 
clientelism. While acknowledging the fact that bureaucrats are powerful and have the 
propensity to control the circulation of services/resources, Mladenka (1980) argues that the 
bureaucrats make their choice based on technical-rational principles/criteria rather than 
political reasons. By contrast, Schmidt’s (1974: 426) investigation of “modern bureaucrats” in 
Colombia “suggests that bureaucrats, much as political bosses or patrons, may be said to have 
clients or ‘constituencies’... [and] [t]hese clients are the beneficiaries or recipients of public 
services”. According to Schmidt (1974: 426), there of late has “frequently been an explicit 
overlapping of political and bureaucratic broker or patron rules” in Colombian society. Bawa 
(2011) – who looks into the presence of the state and the politics of accessing resources such as 
water in municipalities like Mumbai (India) and Johannesburg (RSA) - concurs with this 
realisation. Bawa (2011: 498) observes that “[t]he institutional and political context of service 
delivery is ... highly intricate because the boundaries between administration and politics are 
blurred and constantly shifting”. This overlap has more or less implied that “bureaucrats can also 
be brokers” (Schmidt 1974: 426) who establish useful/meaningful political and/or personal 
networks with individuals and masses on the ground “in order to achieve the technical plans 
[they] desire” (ibid; added emphasis).  This has meant that access to the state’s resources in 
cities of the developing world is a highly political affair (ibid; Bawa 2011).   
Kihato (2011) observes that clientelistic networks are very much at work in inner city 
neighbourhoods like Johannesburg’s Hillbrow and Yeoville. While Hillbrow is characterised by an 
“ephemeral police presence” (Gossman and Premo 2012: 2); the police occasionally patrol 
such neighbourhoods in search of rule-breakers and those who are not in compliance with the 
municipal by-laws (for instance, undocumented individuals and informal traders) (ibid.). Upon 
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being captured by state actors such as the police, undocumented and/or ‘foreign’ female 
informal traders have to “pay for protection” (ibid: 358) to the police officials; doing this via “a 
spokesperson ... who negotiates with the police ... a South African woman” (ibid: 357). By paying 
the police via the ‘local’ female trader, the migrant women become clients paying for respite; 
the woman a broker; and the police officers become patrons exchanging money for 
‘lessened/minimal raids’. The same appears to be happening in Mexico City “where the 
exponential growth informal street trading [is] facilitated by clientelistic networks between street 
vendor organizations and local state authorities” (Becker and Muller 2012: 6).   
Muno (2010) notes that clientelistic networks are “pyramidal networks” (ibid.) characterised by 
dyadic, asymmetrical, reciprocal, voluntary, personal and enduring relationships; usually 
between patrons (at the top) and clients (at the bottom). Although in most cases there may be 
a broker – or “several levels of brokers” (ibid; Auyero 2000) - in between, who mediates between 
the patron and the client; clientelism is a two-way power relationship based on an ‘I scratch my 
back, you scratch mine’ ideology (ibid.; Mladenka 1980). According to Muno (2000), in a 
clientelistic relationship characterised by several brokers, “[b]rokers of second, third, or higher 
order are theoretically brokers too. Practically, they perform as patrons and clients” in the sense 
that “[t]hey receive resources by the ... high patron, in that sense they are clients. But these 
resources are often managed and distributed quite independently, practically they control 
resources and become patrons for other clients” (ibid.; Auyero 2000). This is in accordance with 
the realisation made by Bawa (2011) of the complexity of mediation for utilities in Mumbai and 
Johannesburg. Bawa (2011: 498, 500) finds that in so far as junior bureaucrats play a pivotal role 
in mediating for access to state resources by political society, “they do not always have direct 
access to decision makers and implementers ... hence ... mediators ... have to work via other 
mediators when access to the state’s resources ... is constrained by by-laws and rules”. Given 
that housing managers in eKhaya RCID, as in most CIDs, presumably have to go through the CID 
coordinator in lobbying for public resources (Lippert 2012); how influential are they in addressing 
tenants’ grievances for resources and/or effecting positive change in management? If indeed it 
is true that they are not in direct contact with decision-makers; what kinds of brokers would they 
be in the ‘patronage ladder’?  
Seeing as eKhaya housing supervisors are mediators who do not own property, are in contact 
with clients, landlords and the City; they may be seen as at once brokers and clients. However, 
do they control and manage their buildings in ways they see fit; and would that make them 
patrons as well? Hillbrow is an inner city neighbourhood with buildings characterised by so-called 
‘illegal tenants’ or ‘illegal immigrants’ (CoJ 2011: 56); with police officials raiding/penetrating 
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buildings in search of so-called “illegal aliens” (Kihato 2011: ) to be deported (for instance 2003’s 
Operation Identify Yourself). In such instances, do property managers become brokers of a 
different sort? Do caretakers appropriate/bend building rules, negotiate with police officials in 
support of these “elusive groups” (Lipietz 2004: 7)? Lipietz (2004) argues that in some inner city 
neighbourhood buildings, residents living in fear will listen to the loudest mouths – any vocal 
people – because these command power. Since clientelistic networks are at work everywhere 
(Muno 2010) and power is ubiquitous (Mills 2003); it would be interesting to note what power is 
possessed by caretakers in Hillbrow’s eKhaya in the protection of the tenants they manage. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
The Foucauldian notion of governmentality (conduct of conduct) provides us a lens for seeing 
how we – as individuals and ‘mini-institutions’ - govern ourselves and others in as much as we are 
governed by other individuals and institutions, among them the state. In the neoliberal era of 
governmentality, we are encouraged to be autonomous and productive consumers and 
citizens governed by societal norms that are in line with neoliberal aspirations of government. 
Neoliberal governmentality thus urges us take total responsibility for our lives and thus play active 
roles in shaping our life outcomes. Those who lag behind have no one else to blame but 
themselves for failing to optimise their autonomy. As well, they are an impediment to 
others/society, and thus have to be identified (via knowledge-gathering/surveillance systems) 
and dealt with punitively. Neoliberalism as a political rationality of government has facilitated 
the penetration of governmental thought into our cities, neighbourhoods, households and 
mindsets. Against the background of a quasi-incapacitated/non-responsive state, citizens in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods are increasingly taking matters into their hands in changing 
their neighbourhoods for the better. One of the ways that this has been done has been the 
formulation of BIDs/NIDs, sub-municipal arrangements involving property owners’ payment of 
extra levies aimed at supplementing municipal services ‘beautifying’ their respective areas and 
making them attractive for investment. By so doing, citizens indirectly feed into neoliberal 
governmentality’s conception of the good citizen as ‘productive consumers’ and/or ‘paying 
individuals’. Governmentality also implores us to look into the mundane practices of ‘state 
actors’ working at neighbourhood level to manage change and distribute public services, the 
individuals referred to as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ by Lipsky. These individuals interact directly 
with citizens; and, overburdened by their workloads, may use their discretion and societal 
stereotypes in deciding who gets what, why, how, when. Housing managers, especially those in 
developed countries, may be regarded as street-level bureaucrats. Neighbourhood and/or 
housing managers as street-level bureaucrats, in their daily practices, may form clientelistic 
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networks to advance their agendas; and may thus bend and re-create new norms and values. 
The re-created norms may, in most instances, not be in tandem with the conventional norms 
and values prescribed by their respective formalised institutions.  
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CHAPTER THREE – THE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Spending some of his youth living in Johannesburg’s urban residential neighbourhoods helped 
familiarise the researcher with the ongoing negative informal discourse revolving around inner 
city Johannesburg’s building managers. Growing up in the inner city, the researcher was aware 
of the horrid stories about property managers from his former fellow building residents. Most of 
the stories hinted at building managers’ territoriality; their demands for bribes from tenants whose 
visitors slept over; their failure to rapidly respond to maintenance problems encountered in flats; 
and their terrorization of tenants. Indeed, most of the tales portrayed building managers as 
‘mean’ and authoritarian people to be viewed with suspicion. This suspicion of building 
managers was aggravated by media that the researcher was exposed to while growing up. For 
instance, small screen and cinema productions such as Yizo Yizo 3 and Jerusalema respectively 
depict(ed) building managers as ruthless, condescending individuals who either intimidate 
tenants or mobilise building residents into false action (Lipietz 2004; Jerusalema 2008). The 
researcher’s misgivings of inner city Johannesburg’s property caretakers were further 
augmented during the researcher’s undergraduate years of tertiary education, a period during 
which the researcher explored housing politics in a Yeoville building as part of a project. During 
the course of that study, the researcher’s efforts to speak to - and thus gain the perspective of - 
the manager of the residential property under study were hindered by the building manager’s 
refusal to talk to, let alone meet, the researcher. While the researcher became more and more 
mistrustful of building managers; he also grew increasingly interested in learning about their 
practices and exposing what they could possibly be hiding. In a word, prior to undertaking 
research on eKhaya building managers; the researcher had preconceived notions and 
somewhat biased views about them. This preconception of caretakers was nonetheless 
challenged by a quote in one of Harper Lee’s masterpieces. In To Kill a Mockingbird, Lee (1960) - 
via one of the novel’s characters - gives us a quick lesson in philosophy by briefly stating that:  
[I]f you can learn a simple trick, … you’ll get along with all kinds of folks … You never really 
understand a person until you consider things from his point of view […] until you climb into his skin 
and walk around in it. (Lee 1960: 85 – 87) 
This particular quote gave the researcher the impression that there may be a side to building 
managers that is unknown and that they may not be taken at face value because there are, 
after all, two sides to every story. As “data collection strategies and methods cannot be chosen 
in a vacuum” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 136); Lee’s (1960) advice also laid the groundwork 
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for the conceptualisation and determination of the research approach and methods for the 
study. The quote culminated in the researcher wanting to adopt an ‘emic’ research approach 
that would enable him to “see through the eyes of [eKhaya building managers] for research 
purposes” (McDonald 2005: 464), research methods that would yield composite data open to 
interpretation, and data which would result in the researcher not conforming to the status quo of 
inner city building managers (Sarantakos 2005). Consequently, the researcher reasoned that a 
qualitative approach would be the most rewarding in understanding the particularities, 
peculiarities, dynamics, mechanisms and implications of being a building manager in Hillbrow -
principally in eKhaya – as well as “picking up everyday actions and interactions about complex 
social structures” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 132) like the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association. 
According to Sarantakos (2005), a qualitative research approach conceives of reality as a social 
construct; and seeks to understand a phenomenon under study by critical and ‘inductive’ 
means. Phillip (1998: 267) substantiates this by stating that: 
Qualitative studies are typically intensive pieces of research in which everyday life experienced by 
all sorts of people and communities at different times and in different places is explored, and the 
position of the researchers, their perceptions, experiences, expectations, and prejudices are 
viewed as important. (Philip 1998: 267) 
As stated by Marshall and Rossman (2006), at the heart of a qualitative researcher’s inquiry are 
four data collection methods – participation in the chosen setting (site observation); direct 
observation and/or shadowing; in-depth interviewing; and analysis of documents and material 
culture. As will be noted in this chapter, these four data collection methods – coupled with 
secondary methods such as photography (ibid.) - formed the core of the researchers’ 
investigation of, among other issues, eKhaya building managers’ daily practices, the relationship 
between eKhaya’s public space management and private space management. Based in part 
on a chronological study of the methods that the researcher used, and the extent of their 
expediency; this chapter delves into how the study was done, with particular emphasis on the 
strategy that the researcher adopted. As Yin (1994) alludes to the fact that it is common for 
researchers to experience problems while conducting research; the chapter also makes 
mention of the difficulties and obstacles that the researcher encountered in collecting data for 
the study as well as the tactics that were devised along the way. Perhaps the chapter’s central 
gist is that the research methodology involved much negotiation and improvisation/make-do; 
due in large part to the conditions on the field. 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
Figure 3A: ‘Channels, Routes and Progression’ – A simplified diagrammatic illustration of the research 
methods and methodologies 
3.3 ‘Baby steps’: Aspirations, Anticipations and Initial Ideas of Access Points 
When the researcher decided to use the case of the eKhaya RCID as a microcosm of 
community-driven change in Johannesburg’s urban neighbourhoods, the initial plan had been 
to incorporate eKhaya building managers into the study rather than use them as the study’s 
primary objects. The eventual decision to centre the study on building managers was in part 
influenced by the initial review of written/published “data on the background and historical 
context” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 107) of eKhaya – old and recent online newspaper 
editorials, written policies, CoJ articles. This kind of data not only lent a historical perspective to 
the study; it also pointed to the criticality of the building manager in driving and managing 
change in the precinct and/or association. Yet, given the researcher’s experiences and/or prior 
reservations/suspicions of inner city building managers (see Section 3.1), the researcher still 
viewed the aforementioned information sources “with the skepticism [sic] that historians apply as 
they search for truth in old texts” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 108).  
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The decision to use the eKhaya building manager as the lens to understanding the dynamics 
and mechanisms of managing change in Hillbrow was also shaped by the interview with Adler 
(2013), which was organised by the researcher’s supervisor for the Community Participation 
(ARPL7044) course (see Figure 3A above). In the interview, Adler (2013) had provided a context 
of eKhaya’s ‘roots’, its direction and its prospects; and had spoken very highly of the building 
manager forum’s work/conduct in the organisation’s context (see Chapter One). It was perhaps 
the interview with Adler (2013) which increasingly sparked the researcher’s interest in uncovering 
the everyday individual and collective actions of building managers as well as how they are 
incorporated into eKhaya. From the array of data collection strategies associated with 
qualitative studies, the researcher proposed for a combination of direct observation, participant 
observation and in-depth interviewing. The researcher resolved to use, as his beginning point, 
direct observation of eKhaya South residents and users, particularly their behaviour on and 
relation to RCID space. The researcher opined that site observation would enable him to 
observe local everyday experiences unfold on eKhaya; make note of many “unusual [and 
unanticipated] aspects” (Creswell 2009: 179) on the field; gain some insight of the public-private 
space interrelation; as well as “gather data that would inform the interview process” (Marshall 
and Rossman 2006: 132). Some of the visual data, as initially conceptualised by the researcher, 
would be gathered via photography - a secondary data collection method whose power lies in 
its ability to capture attention and ‘everyday life’ visually (ibid; Creswell 2009). 
According to Mouton (2001: 148), participant observation studies “aim to provide an in-depth 
description of a group of people or community. Such descriptions are embedded in the life-
worlds of the actors being studied and produce insider perspectives of the actors and their 
practices”. “As a data collection strategy, shadowing is particularly suitable to answering 
research questions where the unit of analysis is not the individual but the social relation; positions 
are explored within a complex of inter-related processes” (Quinlan 2008: 1482). The qualitative 
researcher’s plan as a participant observer was to first use the eKhaya building manager 
community as a focus group and a lens through which to understand – among other issues – the 
overlap between internal management and public management in RCIDs/NIDs. The researcher 
resolved to first observe the building managers collectively via attendance of the eKhaya 
monthly caretaker meetings. In the housing managers’ meetings, the researcher had intended 
to directly observe and interpret the actions of the building managers, particularly their “social 
interaction [as this was expected to] shed light on the reality which has been constructed ... 
routinized social interactions which may serve to reproduce social norms and values” (Clapham 
1997: 762). As well, the researcher had planned to attend the meetings not only as a means to 
ascertaining Adler’s (2013) claim that building managers “know each other strong” but to also 
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gain a sense of their collective issues, their relation to each other as well as to the conveners of 
the meeting (Clapham 1997) and to establish topics that would be uncomfortable for (some of) 
them to discuss in the researcher’s presence (Creswell 2009: 179).  
In an attempt to add a more ethnographic component to his comprehension of building 
managers’ everyday practices, the researcher had intended to then meticulously pick out 4 to 5 
building managers2 from the monthly building managers’ meetings. The plan had been to use 
the selected building managers as interviewees and as the primary objects of the study that the 
researcher would “attempt to ‘shadow’ or engage in ‘ride-alongs’ with” (Proudfoot and 
McCann 2008: 353). The researcher’s decision to individually shadow the selected eKhaya 
building managers was partially influenced by the realisation by Weick (1974 as cited in 
McDonald 2005: 46) and McDonald (2005: 46) that: 
Shadowing is profoundly suited to investigation of the nature of managerial work [...] the manager 
works at an unrelenting pace with chronic interruptions; he prefers action over reflection and 
verbal media over written media. With its ability to record and juxtapose action and narrative, 
shadowing is uniquely able to capture the paradoxes that lie within the speed, brevity, variety and 
inter-related fragmentation of this kind of work. (McDonald 2005: 468) 
The researcher had conceptualised his shadowing technique in such a way as for it to be ‘a day 
in the life of’ kind of shadowing of the selected building managers for a day or two – following 
the building managers in and around the buildings they manage, to meetings they attend as 
well as to the offices they report to. The researcher understood that following the building 
managers would require his engagement in the “lives and daily activities of [the managers that 
he would be] studying” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 132); which would then most likely allow 
the researcher “to hear, to see, and to begin to experience reality as the [building managers] 
do... learning about daily life” (ibid: 100) in the buildings under study, if only for a brief while. Thus, 
                                                          
2The selection of the building managers to be interviewed and individually followed was anticipated to be based on a 
certain criteria:  
1. The number of years they have been in Hillbrow and/or assuming their duties (the more the better as it would 
have provided the researcher insight regarding the nature and extent of change that eKhaya as an institution 
has effected/is effecting in Hillbrow);  
2. The type[s] of buildings they supervise (hijacked, sectional title, individually owned, etc. – selected respondents 
were anticipated to be from different types of buildings/organisational levels/management companies); 
3. Their personalities and/or conducts (various personalities were anticipated to allow for more varied 
answers/findings as well as enable the researcher’s attainment of divergent perspectives on building 
management within eKhaya; 
4. Pro-activeness in the meetings (their ability and willingness to answer the researcher’s questions accurately and 
adequately). 
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shadowing was expected to provide an opportunity for the researcher to “investigate what 
[building managers] actually do in the course of their everyday lives, not what their roles dictate 
of them” (Quinlan 2008: 1480; Proudfoot and McCann 2008). As well, the researcher had hoped 
that following the selected caretakers would help him establish a rapport with them (Quinlan 
2008); discern their relations with the different tenants/inhabitants of the buildings they manage 
(Proudfoot and McCann 2008); as well as observe their non-verbal behaviour especially since 
‘actions speak louder than words’. 
The shadowing of the building managers was expected to run in sync with the in-depth 
interviewing of the RCID coordinator and the selected building managers because this would 
have provided an interesting comparison and contrast between what the interviewees say they 
do and what they actually do. According to Creswell (2009), face-to-face interviews are a 
powerful research and/or data collection method because they enable the researcher to 
directly observe the respondents paying particular attention to their bodily gestures and topics 
that may be uncomfortable for them to discuss. The researcher had hoped for interviews, in 
conjunction with observation, to “yield... data in quantity quickly [...] and ... allow the researcher 
to understand the meanings that everyday activities hold for [building managers and the 
eKhaya coordinator]” (Marshall and Rossman 2006: 101 - 2). Since “the participants’ 
perspectives – that is, the subjective view is what matters” (ibid: 102); the interviewing of the 
building managers was expected to shed light on eKhaya managers’ perceptions of eKhaya; 
their daily activities; what they say their duties in eKhaya are; as well as their perceptions of (their 
roles in driving) change in eKhaya. Thus, the researcher had planned for “open-ended 
structured interviews (using questionnaires) that would enable the exploration of many topics 
that could focus on cultural nuances, first-hand encounters, meanings and interpretations of” 
(Marshall and Roberts 2006: 136) urban change and the role of different stakeholders in driving 
and managing it. In addition, the researcher had planned to interview at least one tenant from 
each of the chosen buildings, to get a sense of their relations with their respective building 
managers.  
Information was also expected to be obtained from policy documents and archives on eKhaya 
and property management, with hopes that these would provide an understanding of eKhaya’s 
and other institutions’ expectations of building managers. The researcher had also hoped to 
keep a diary in which he would record/note down all the important issues arising from the site 
visits, meetings, ‘ride-alongs’ and interviews as they happen. Proceedings of the attended 
monthly caretaker meetings and the shadowing of chosen caretakers would havebeen noted 
down in the diary, triangulated with data emerging from the interviews and the relevant 
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literature. Similar data emerging from the different research methods would have been 
thematized - classified, filed and analysed at a later time – via a process known as ‘coding’ 
(Creswell 2009). 
3.4 Getting into the Groove of Things: Finding ‘Stepping Stones’, Negotiating for Access, Looking 
for eKhaya Formal Rules 
The interview with Adler (2013) – and the follow-up interview - gave the researcher leads of 
building managers to interview and work with. However, the researcher feared that the building 
managers he had been referred to would be told what to say and how to conduct themselves 
in the researcher’s presence – thus generate ‘fabricated findings’ - which then prompted the 
researcher to personally scout the building managers to be used for the study. Adler (2013) 
referred the researcher to the current eKhaya coordinator – Bafikile Mkhize – who was 
interviewed while the researcher was in the final stages of reviewing literature for the study. The 
literature itself was reviewed via a trial and error approach. It involved a discarding of 
theoretical perspectives emerging from literature that were deemed irrelevant, and an 
incorporation of those perceived to have “provide[d] complex and comprehensive conceptual 
understandings of things that [could not] be pinned down: how societies work, how 
organizations [like eKhaya] operate, why people [such as building managers] interact in certain 
ways” (Reeves, Kuper, Albert and Hodges 2008: 631). Needless to say, the process of reviewing 
literature was a painful, tedious and time-consuming one for the researcher; such that by the 
time the researcher wrapped this phase, time had flown. Yet the process paid off because the 
ultimately chosen writings helped locate the study in “the larger, ongoing dialogue in the 
literature, filling in the gaps and extending prior studies” (Creswell 2009: 25). From the literature, 
the researcher was able to detect, define and describe concepts, which he saw as relevant 
“tools for the construction of [eKhaya building managers’] reality” (Johansson 1994: 234). 
No sooner had the research completed reviewing the literature than he realised that the 
“literature review [was] a means to an end... not ... an end in itself” (Y in 1994: 9); which 
prompted him to get into the field and interact with the stakeholders affected by and 
concerned with management of eKhaya. After familiarising himself with eKhaya turf’s everyday 
activities, the researcher designed an interview questionnaire for eKhaya co-ordinator Mkhize. 
The interview explored the topic of Mkhize’s daily activities as coordinator, her connection to 
eKhaya building managers, and how closely she works with them on a daily basis. While the 
interview with Mkhize was relatively fruitful; the researcher somehow got a sense that she was 
holding back. This inhibition was made especially manifest when, upon being asked for eKhaya’s 
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policies and/or codes of conduct, Mkhize claimed to not have them; arguing that they are not 
“formalised”. The researcher found this odd especially considering that Adler had told the 
researcher that Mkhize – in her capacity as eKhaya coordinator - had everything pertaining to 
eKhaya that the researcher would need. After interviewing Mkhize, the researcher - on the day 
that he interviewed her - spent the whole afternoon conversing with her in her office. The 
researcher intently observed who came into Mkhize’s office, and how she interacted with them; 
listened to her phone conversations; and noted down any interesting observations. What the 
researcher found interesting was that Mkhize felt the need to introduce the researcher to each 
visitor; and seemed to find it necessary to explain to the researcher her relationship with each 
visitor after each visitor’s departure. The researcher interpreted this to be a sign that in as much 
as (he thought) he was shadowing Mkhize; the researcher’s presence still remained very 
noticeable – what Quinlan (2008: 1480) would refer to as “[c]onspicuous [i]nvisibility”.  
Upon getting into the field in October 2013, the researcher was unfortunate to find that the 
monthly eKhaya housing manager meetings had been put on hold for the year – because 
nothing much was happening in eKhaya at that moment - and that the only building managers’ 
meeting that the researcher would be able to attend would be the eKhayaKidz’ Day meeting. 
This implied that the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting would be the only ‘invited space’ which would 
sanction the researcher to meet the building managers as a collective. On the day of the 
meeting, the researcher shadowed Mkhize and used her as an entry point and/or stepping 
stone to the eKhaya building managers. Commenced late, poorly attended3 and characterised 
by many late comers; the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting was convened by Mkhize, who also 
introduced the researcher to the building managers before the meeting began. With Mkhize’s 
permission, the researcher tape-recorded the meeting’s proceedings and decided to treat it as 
a focus group discussion, making note of interesting unanticipated issues that arose (see 
Chapter Four and Five for a look at the issues). Due to most of the caretakers’ unpunctuality; the 
researcher was very conscious of the stares he got from the late building managers, most of 
whom seemed very anxious to know the researcher and his reason for “[b]eing there” (Gilliat-
Ray 2011: 469). Mkhize must have also noticed it because she kept introducing the researcher to 
the latecomers as they came. Yet even after having been introduced to the building managers, 
the researcher felt very scrutinised; and at once became an observer and “an observed 
participant” (ibid: 472). Another interesting issue that came through during and after the 
                                                          
3  The researcher discovered that poor attendance was largely attributable to the fact that JHC and 
Madulamohoproperty managers had gone for end of year lunches courtesy of their respective property management 
companies 
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meeting was the building managers’ astonishment at having someone interested in interviewing 
them and/or spending time with them; which somewhat gave the impression that they had 
never engaged thus with any researcher.  
The eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting made it possible for the researcher to collect some building 
managers’ phone numbers, even though some were hesitant and refused to give their contact 
details. As well, the meeting provided a platform for the researcher to observe and discern the 
eKhaya coordinator’s relationship with the eKhaya managers in attendance. The researcher 
deciphered the coordinator-building manager association as a power relationship because of 
two ‘incidents’ that transpired in the meeting. Firstly, when the researcher asked to take pictures 
of the audience/meeting/caretakers, most of the caretakers appeared to not mind but only 
objected to the request after the RCID coordinator had declined. Secondly, when the 
coordinator noted how generous most of the building managers were with their contact details, 
she told the researcher to not contact the caretakers until Mkhize had talked to their 
management companies and/or ‘bosses’. The researcher noted that after Mkhize had 
articulated this, the building managers became reluctant to engage with the researcher. To the 
researcher, Mkhize’s actions at that moment came across as use of bureaucracy as a pretext 
and as an obstacle to the researcher’s attainment of information from the building managers.  
With Mkhize’s authorisation, the researcher partook in the eKhaya events that followed the Kidz’ 
Day meeting – the Kidz’ Day preparations and the actual Kidz’ Day event. These events, most 
notably the preparations, allowed the researcher to observe the managers he had met at the 
Kidz’ Day meeting as well as meet more building managers who had not been at the meeting. 
In the course of the preparations, the researcher observed the building managers’ close 
interactions with each other as well as with the eKhaya coordinator, the eKhaya children and 
their parents. Not only that, the ethnographer/researcher made note of the managers’ pro-
activeness in organising ‘kids’ for the event as well as their knowledge of the children living in 
their buildings. At the eKhaya Kidz’ Day event – attended by the eKhaya children, numerous 
property owners, the coordinator, the building managers, the eKhaya guards, CoJ and JHC 
representatives - the researcher met and networked with many people either directly or 
indirectly affected by eKhaya. Moreover, the researcher helped the building managers organise 
and distribute toys to the eKhaya children; and even judged the children’s modelling 
competitions! Given that eKhaya building managers “voluntarily… organise events that 
enhance the overall wellbeing of residents and workers that bring the community together” 
(Savage Dodd Architects 2012); the researcher’s immersion in the aforementioned events 
61 
 
provided an opportunity for the researcher to observe first-hand the nature and extent of the 
building managers’ involvement in them and/or community organising.  
3.5 Moral Issues: ‘Secretly’ following up on Caretaker Leads, ‘Incentivising for Information’, 
Managers’ transition from Portrait to Anonymity  
Approximately two weeks after the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting – two weeks of not hearing from 
Mkhize re the approval of property owners and/or management companies to interview and 
shadow their building managers - the researcher grew increasingly wary of Mkhize and 
impatient for individual engagement with the building managers. This propelled the researcher 
to go behind Mkhize’s back and to contact the building managers whose numbers he had 
obtained at the eKhaya events. Of all the gathered contact numbers, only six were reachable 
because some building managers had either blocked the researcher’s number or ignored the 
researcher’s calls (see Figure 3A). This gave the researcher very narrow room for manoeuvre and 
limited options of building managers to work with and/or choose from. To make matters worse, 
two of the six building managers who answered the researcher’s phone calls – Tebogo Kodisang 
and Buyile Hlongwane (see Figure 3A) – expressed uneasiness at the researcher’s interest in 
them; and used more or less similar excuses for their inability to work with the researcher: tensions 
with their property management company offices and fear of job loss. The researcher’s 
persuasions and promises to hide their true identities did not help much either. This meant that 
the researcher had to work with four of the six potential building manager respondents –
Letswalo, Christianson, Morrison and Mkhwanazi (also refer to Figure 3A).   
Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles the researcher encountered was getting the four building 
managers to meet up with him and/or make time for him. While the selected building manager 
respondents expressed an interest in meeting the researcher, they more-often-than-not kept 
postponing their respective ‘appointments’ with the researcher on the grounds that they were 
very hectic organising eKhaya festive activities and collecting rent. Fearing that his attempts at 
shadowing the managers could prove futile, the researcher approached the building 
managers’ respective buildings and pleaded with each of them to let him interview them, 
spend the day with them and/or help them with their respective duties. Following the advice by 
people on the street – some eKhaya patrollers and the researcher’s acquaintances in Hillbrow – 
that, “Nothing is for mahala in Hillbrow”; the researcher considered offering his building manager 
respondents ‘an incentive’ for their efforts. The researcher took some building managers out for 
lunch and/or drinks as well as paid those who declined to be taken out for lunch. While the 
incentivising tactic may be deemed ‘morally unsound’; it seemed like the only resort at getting 
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the attention of the selected building managers; culminating in the researcher securing 
interviews with them. Also worth mentioning is the fact that while one building manager – 
Letswalo – expressed willingness to work with the researcher prior to the incentivising technique; 
he ended up being paid by the researcher because the researcher felt that it would not be fair 
on him to not receive anything for his pains; especially since the others had received the 
incentives. 
The interview questionnaire for the building manager respondents was designed in such a 
manner that some of the questions took the form of “life histories and narrative inquiry” (Marshall 
and Rossman 2006: 115). Dollard (1935 as referenced in Marshall and Rossman 2006: 115) argues 
that life histories and narrative inquiries, by virtue of the fact that: 
They assume a complex interaction between the individual’s understanding of his or her world and 
that world itself … [t]hey are … uniquely suited to depicting and making theoretical sense of the 
socialization of [eKhaya building managers] into a social milieu [such as eKhaya and/or Hillbrow] 
Life histories are valuable in studying cultural changes that have occurred over time, in learning 
about cultural norms and transgressions of those norms, and in gaining an inside view of a culture. 
(Marshall and Rossman 2006: 115 – 116)  
Having wanted to get into the eKhaya building managers’ social world and make his own 
depictions of their daily activities, the researcher asked them questions pertaining to when, how 
and why they moved into Hillbrow; where they came from; when they assumed their duties; 
when and how they have been incorporated and constituted into eKhaya; their conception of 
eKhaya activities; to mention but a prominent few. This helped the researcher gain an 
understanding of building managers not just as individuals but also as ‘quasi-frontline service 
people’, in terms of the challenges they face on a day-to-day basis, how they are working to 
resolve the challenges, the norms regulating them as well as the norms they have established on 
the ground. The monitoring of the participants while interviewing them was very necessary 
especially given their initial reluctance to be shadowed and/or spend the whole day with the 
researcher (refer to next paragraph). Not only that, the recorded face-to-face interviews 
provided the researcher with an opportunity to closely monitor the building managers’ gestures 
and the topics that most of them were uncomfortable discussing; one of which was/is the issue 
of informal trading taking place outside some eKhaya buildings (also see Chapter Four). 
Nevertheless, the researcher noted that the building manager respondents were very guarded 
on record, articulating many things off record, which had to be quickly scribbled on the 
researcher’s diary for use at a later stage. The interviewing of the building manager respondents 
ran concurrently with the shadowing process. The researcher was given a brief tour of the 
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building managers’ buildings and their immediate surroundings, and captured some interesting 
artefacts that emerged from these tours via photography and diarization.  
With regard to the shadowing, the researcher noted how uncomfortable most of the building 
managers were with being followed the whole day; preferring to be followed at certain times of 
the day (see Figure 3A above). This translated into the researcher’s exercise of flexibility and 
resulted in the researcher meeting the building managers at their preferred times. During the 
period that the researcher was shadowing the building managers – especially the times when 
the researcher was sitting with them in their offices or homes – he overheard their telephonic 
conversations, helped them with administrative work (sorting out receipts), and noted their 
relations with the tenants who came into their offices with complaints or proposals. Shadowing 
the building manager respondents thus was very requisite because it “articulate[d] the 
mundane and taken-for-granted [which in turn] offer[ed the researcher] important insights into 
research questions concerned with cultural issues and social norms” (McDonald 2005: 469). The 
researcher’s ‘being there’ gave him an opportunity to observe that the eKhaya housing 
manager does more than the average inner city building manager. This ultimately gave the 
researcher the impression that some of the most important work of the eKhaya housing manager 
is “off the record, impossible to document … and far from the public gaze” (Gilliat-Ray 2011: 
478). For instance, the researcher noted how attentive some housing managers were towards 
some of their tenants, some of whom came in telling the building managers their 
personal/private problems. The researcher also noted how well the building manager 
respondents knew their tenants – they knew most of their tenants by name. Puzzled by this 
realisation - mainly because it showed the researcher a compassionate side of building 
managers that he was completely oblivious to - the researcher asked the housing managers 
about it. Morrison (2013) expressly made this notion clear in the quote below:    
I do love my job, it keeps me busy. I’m normally busy because people come up and down, they 
come in here, they talk to me; they-they actually keep me busy, and so the day goes fast and 
that’s it. I love my job, really I love my job. The reason why is because you have to work with 
different kinds of people, different types of people, you know? Yes!! I’ve got quite a lot of them 
(laughs) but I get used to it. I commit myself to these tenants. Some tenants will come to me, they 
will sit here, they’ve got problems, marital problems, they will come and talk to me and I’ll talk to 
them; I give them advice and stuff like that. You know? I do quite a lot of things because while I 
was with eKhaya, well, I’m still with eKhaya. By the time when we started this whole eKhaya 
project, we were invited from GDZ, these German football people, I don’t know if you know them. 
And it was me and another guy – Mandla – and we used to go to Pretoria, they would book us in 
for a week or so and then we’d go for coaching training, coaches’ training, how to meditate and, 
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quite a lot of things. More like a psychology thing, you know? How to deal with people; how to talk 
to people; how to deal with kids that’s been abused and... You know in your [eKhaya] soccer 
team - you’ll find that there’s kids that’s been abused and some kids that don’t have food, 
youknow all these things. So we went there and got certificates, got quite a lot of things from them. 
So it was organised by Ekhaya. From Ekhaya. OK, [my property management company] was a 
part of it, […] and we went for weeks, sometimes we’d go for days, just to go to this training. But it 
was quite good because at first I didn’t even know how to handle my, probably my family, you 
know? Now I will sit down, I will listen, and then I will give… “OK you did this, you did that, OK let’s 
come to a conclusion”. And that’s actually what I do with my tenants, and you know some of 
them are so impressed. They say, “Sjo! It’s good to have you around us. When we’ve got problems, 
we come to you and talk to you, you give us advice”. You know, big people! You’d think I’m like 
the social worker here also, like really! People with babies they come talk to me and ask me, “What 
must I do when the baby’s crying?” Like… this one here (pointing to one of her building’s floors on 
surveillance screen) the baby is maybe 5 days old; and I’ll go there and I’ll tell her, “Do this, do 
that”, you know? That’s my commitment I’ve got, the communication I got with my tenants. That’s 
why my flats are full and my tenants don’t move! They’re full. […] Everyday! And there’s quite a lot 
of children here; they’ll run in here. They won’t pass there until they’ve come in here. Sometimes 
I’ve got videos and I’ll watch it here, then they come and sit here and we watch videos. (Morrison 
2013)  
Interacting with the eKhaya building managers and spending some time observing their 
interactions gave the researcher the impression that “[i]f all the types of tasks that [eKhaya] 
caretakers … carry out should be listed, the list would be unreasonably long” (Johansson 1994: 
235). Yet, more-often-than-not there were incidents that came across as having been staged 
and/or choreographed. There were instances when the researcher sensed that some building 
managers were adjusting their actions and conducting themselves in ways that they would not 
behave in the researcher’s absence; thus “bar[ring]” (Quinlan 2008: 1486) the researcher from 
seeing some things. This was made particularly evident when the building managers refused to 
take the researcher to some company meetings and/or end of year functions. Or when the 
building managers turned away some visitors to their offices and/or homes – presumably tenants 
– and told them to come back later. As when they either ignored calls or answered them only to 
quickly tell the callers that they could not talk at those particular moments. This was even after 
the researcher had told them that he really did not care much about the interruptions as long as 
the researcher could be there. It became clear to the researcher that although he had tried to 
maintain a certain inconspicuousness, he was still very much conspicuous; thus the notion of 
“conspicuous invisibility” (Quinlan 2008: 1480) associated with shadowing as something of a 
constraint to the researcher’s collection of data. Having noted this, the researcher somewhat 
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identified with Gilliat-Ray’s (2011: 477) argument that one of the paradoxes of shadowing is that 
sometimes shadowing “will seldom provide exposure to the everyday actions of an individual. 
The embodied presence of a researcher and the dynamic of the relationship that is formed, 
inevitably changes behaviour and action”. Still, the researcher decided to see opportunity in 
everything, eventually noting and interpreting both what was “[b]elaboured as well as what was 
omitted” (Quinlan 2008: 1486); which resulted in very thick descriptions. 
Another issue that emerged as the study proceeded was the building managers’ refusal to have 
their pictures/portraits taken as well as their refusal to have their names associated with the 
research. Some building managers even refused to have some of the internal sections of their 
buildings taken; arguing that they did not want to be associated with politics as doing thus 
would result in them getting into trouble with their bosses. Although on all occasions the 
researcher produced his student card and assured them that the material they had generated 
would be used strictly for academic purposes; the building managers still remained adamant 
that the researcher was either a journalist or a CoJ representative or a politician, and thus 
refused to have their pictures taken. The researcher – who at this point viewed the building 
managers as eKhaya/community leaders and heroes in their own right – was taken aback by 
the respondents’ insistence on being made nameless and faceless in the research. To some 
extent, the researcher reverted to his preconceived negative notions of building managers and 
almost became convinced that that they suspected a motive as they had something to hide. 
The respondents’ reluctance resulted in the researcher anonymising their names as well as 
names of the buildings under study and/or that they manage (refer to Figure 3A).  
3.6 Inscription/Transcription Blues: The Thin/Fine Line between Sincerity and Polemic 
The methods employed by the researcher – although not equally effective – more or less 
culminated in more information than had been anticipated, which overwhelmed the researcher 
(McDonald 2005; Quinlan 2008; Marshall and Rossman 2006). For instance, shadowing resulted in 
very thick descriptions which the researcher took great pains to organise and triangulate with 
theory emerging from literature as well as the transcribed interview material. As per the initial 
plan, the researcher decided to arrange the different issues emanating from the different data 
collection methods in such a manner that different quotes, photographs, recorded observations 
and identified concepts that spoke to each other were grouped together under folders. In the 
writing process, the data/findings were then presented by way of themes; in line with what 
Creswell (2009) refers to as ‘coding’. Some of the themes are expressed and developed on in 
the subsequent chapters. 
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With respect to the writing process itself, the researcher – due to his ambivalence about building 
managers and their ambiguous actions – struggled to find the right tone between sincerity and 
polemic. The researcher did not want to valorise the attack on inner city building managers that 
he grew up exposed to, and yet some of their mundane practices made it difficult for the 
researcher to expose them in a positive light in the report. As well, the fact that the eKhaya 
building managers who were interviewed and shadowed were from very different backgrounds 
– different management companies, different racial groups/ethnicities, thus different life stories – 
made it doubly difficult for the researcher to generalise them and the findings. Nevertheless, the 
researcher resolved to use the policies of eKhaya Neighbourhood Association – an institution 
that brings them together as a group – to uncover the extent to which the managers’ practices 
are in tandem with each other as well as the eKhaya official codes. In the policies, the 
researcher’s aim was to look into how building managers are constituted as a group in contrast 
to their individual behaviours, as well as what this says about building management. This was 
constrained by the eKhaya’s two organisers’ failure to give the researcher the eKhaya’s written 
rules of conduct; which the researcher eventually attributed to the fact that eKhaya is a 
voluntary organisation which still has no website, unlike official CIDs which have homepages. The 
researcher eventually decided to use the document by the HDA on eKhaya, the only document 
that came close to being the RCID policy and which delves into housing managers.     
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CHAPTER FOUR – EVERYDAY LIFE AS NEGOTIATION IN HILLBROW’S EKHAYA? 
PRACTICAL NORMS AND APPROPRIATION OF RULES ON R.C.I.D. TERRITORY 
But instead of coming up with a set of consistent norms and rules by which those incorporated should 
abide, [African] localities ... or urban neighbourhoods ... try to find new norms which best fit the particular 
hodgepodge of kin, strangers, passers-by, neighbours that they have on hand. Hence, a sense of stability is 
forged from the very instability of the compositions and relations of those institutions that try to provide a 
platform for social connectedness and collaboration. 
(Simone 2004: 239; added emphasis) 
Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate. 
(John F. Kennedy as quoted in BrainyQuote 2013) 
All training is negotiation, whether you’re training dogs or spouses. 
(Ian Dunbar as cited in BrainyQuote 2013) 
Civilisation had too many rules for me. So I did my best to rewrite them. 
(Bill Cosby as cited in Brainy Quote 2013) 
4.1 Introduction 
In a ground-breaking documentary titled Lagos Wide and Close: An Interactive Journey into an 
Exploding City; acclaimed architect Rem Koolhaas (2003), whilst portraying Lagos as a chaotic, 
ungovernable and dysfunctional time-bomb on the verge of ‘blowing up’, simultaneously 
observes a certain functionality/vitality within the disorder purportedly characterising the African 
city. In the film, while painting a grim picture of failed urbanism in Lagos, Koolhaas (2003) by and 
large still “emphasizes the resilience and resourcefulness displayed by African cities … [by 
stressing] the qualities drawn upon for local survival… [and] emphasiz[ing] the determination of 
urban Africans to find their own way” (Simone 2005: 1). This motion is shared and carried forth by 
AbdouMaliq Simone, a prominent urbanist who has written extensively on ‘urban life’ and ‘urban 
operations’ of African (inner) city residents, most notably “residents with limited means” (Simone 
2004: 406) and “unclear consequences” (Simone 2003: 8). In so far as Simone (2004: 1) concedes 
the prevalence of the conventional and commonly held notion that “African cities don’t work”; 
he is simultaneously aware of these cities’ residents’ “ongoing survival” (ibid: 2). Simone attributes 
this flexibility to something overlooked yet “magical” (ibid 2004: 426) that is being produced ‘on 
the ground’ by the various citystakeholders who,“ensconced in various hierarchies, locations 
and networks, interact with each other in different, out-of-the-ordinary ways” (ibid 2003: 8). Adds 
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Simone (2004: 410), “[t]he specific operations and scope of these conjunctions are constantly 
negotiated and depend on particular histories, understandings, networks, styles and inclinations 
of the actors involved”. Using Johannesburg’s inner city as a case study in one of his 
(master)pieces; Simone (2004: 427) finds that in as much as the inner city is highly contested, 
inner city life simultaneously fosters “emergent interdependencies” (ibid: 41) between residents 
of different backgrounds and ethnicities. Consequently, the different users of the Johannesburg 
inner city inevitably form “new reciprocal linkages … unanticipated interactions … complex 
relationships of mutual dependence” (Simone 2004: 420), that are “based on self-interest, self-
cooperation, and camaraderie, not on a long-term investment in the cultivation of a place of 
operation in Johannesburg” (ibid). 
Having come to this fascinating realisation of inner city Johannesburg’s processes, Simone (2004) 
suggests that if we are to fully understand the Sub-Saharan African city – its inhabitants, socio-
politico-economic operations, to mention but a prominent few aspects - we need to look at the 
city residents’ activities as a set of connections and/or “as [social] infrastructure[s]” (Ting 2012; 
see also Simone 2010). In this instance, we are asked to look at ‘African urbanites’ as “networks 
of people interacting and negotiating to secure very fundamental things like food, shelter, love, 
sex, material goods [and other services]” (Ting 2012).Ting (2012), after analysing the dynamics 
and “survival activities” (Simone 2003: 7) of Sub-Saharan African urbanites, finds that in African 
cities, 
[t]here is an entire way of life and functioning that has very little to do with the official bureaucratic 
and corporate institutions that apparently run the cities. Statistically, the African economies look 
like basket-cases, but somehow, people still manage to make do. (Ting 2012) 
Interestingly, or perhaps unfortunately, these micro-level activities – the essence of social life in 
African cities - are “difficult to mobilise on a larger stage” (Simone 2004: 1) and they 
subsequently cannot really be studied via macro-level justifications/policies. This remark, in 
conjunction with Ting’s (2012) aforementioned assertion, quintessentially suggests that 
notwithstanding structure – and perhaps due to structure - people in African urban settings, 
through engagement with each other for mutual yet respective benefit, find agency in their 
everyday micro-practices and/or lives. Here we somewhat encounter Giddens’s (1984) 
‘structuration theory’, which conceives of individuals as agents of social structural change and 
whose individual behaviours (agency) are intertwined with institutions (structure). Giddens 
(1984)argues that although human beings go through a socialisation process and become 
dependent on established/prevalent social structures; they – by virtue of their actions/agency - 
still have the propensity to alter, reproduce, reconfigure or even ignore these social structures. 
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Giddens (1984: 18, 25) thus shows that even if social structures “express forms of domination and 
power [...] [and] are constraining”; they are still “enabling” (ibid) because they create potential 
for individual action and/or manoeuvre. This not only shows us that structure and agency are co-
constituted - thus the dualism of structure - it also reminds us of the Foucauldian assertion that: 
‘Power is everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’ so in this sense is neither an agency nor a 
structure… Instead, it is a kind of ‘metapower’ or ‘regime of truth’ that pervades [each and every] 
society, and which is in constant flux and negotiation. (Foucault 1998: 63 as quoted and discussed 
in Powercube 2003) 
All the aforementioned theoretical concepts and arguments presented about urban activities 
at work in African cities not only portray the cities as fluid/dynamic “spaces of exchange” 
(Simone 2010: 7) and complicity; the arguments also present everyday life in these cities as a 
negotiation of different things, most notably social norms and/or rules. It somewhat becomes 
manifest here that in African cities, “[w]hat makes ‘economic sense’ according to prevailing 
norms, isn’t always a good fit with what makes ‘social’ or ‘political’ sense” (ibid). 
Equipped with the knowledge that prevalent norms in African cities are continuously being 
configured and reconfigured to suit socio-economic contexts as well as to facilitate micro-
practices on the ground; we then (need to) turn our attention to the positionality of 
state/administrative institutions such as municipal structures in urban residents’ micro-level 
activities. Ting (2012) has already alerted us to the fact that African urban residents’ micro-
activities have very little with the ‘macro-level orders’ governing at a distance. Simone (2003: 7) 
however points out that micro-level activities are increasingly being “appropriated by 
entrepreneurial networks operating at larger scales” - thus the depiction of our mundane 
practices as sources of knowledge for higher level orders – which therefore implies that “[t]he 
norms of the wider society creep into the professional public sphere … and … social norms 
imperceptibly migrate into the public sphere” (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 9). However, observes 
Simone (2003: 7), “[a] great difficulty in assessing the character of composition and scale of 
micro-level activities is the high degree to which these activities are illegal or are protected by 
various affiliations with legal institutions and transactions”. This might hold true especially in light 
of the realisation that “[e]ven in cities with highly effective municipal governance systems, … 
much of what is important to city functioning takes place beyond municipal borders” (Simone 
2010: 9). As a result of this, “in Africa, there is no shortage of institutions … vying for public 
authority, often bolstered by government authority … [and] negotiat[ing], forg[ing] alliances 
and compet[ing] to constitute public authority and political control” (Lund 2006: 686). Given the 
CoJ’s immense encouragement of eKhaya RCID – support of organisation’s initiatives, 
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recognition via accolades such as the Halala Joburg Award, allocation of funds for upgrading 
of eKhaya’s diversion spaces - could this ‘voluntary body’ be (argued to be) one of these “new 
emerging institutions” (Lund 2006: 686)? Or is eKhaya RCID an association of such institutions 
(property management firms and/or owners) working towards one goal – urban 
change/regeneration? Simone (2010: 13 – 14) remarks that these new bodies and their 
practices, added to the perceived weakness of African municipal structures, mean that in 
African localities:  
… management comes to rely on an intermediary sector of brokers and fixers who are not officially 
partof the municipal system but perform official duties. Because these are not formal sub-
contractual agreements, such intermediaries require certain autonomy of operation as a means of 
ensuring enumeration for the jobs they do. They have the flexibility to collect fees, a task that 
would otherwise not be necessary if citizens dealt with the bureaucracies themselves – if they 
actually could. (ibid: 13 – 14; added emphasis) 
Simone’s (2010) observations are interesting and illuminating – and thus relatable to the context 
of the (case) study - for a multiplicity of reasons. Firstly, they solicit us to look at who these 
intermediaries/managers are, as well as the “rules of the game” (Galaty 2010: 22) governing 
their actions; a standing obligation since “[a]ll regulation supposes norms, if not ‘official norms’ 
then other norms, which we must discover, which underlie actual patterns of governance” (ibid; 
original emphasis). Here we enter the realm of Olivier de Sardan’s (2008) “practical norms (or 
norms as practiced)” (Galaty 2010: 22). According to Olivier de Sardan (2008: 14), for the reason 
that “social change stems from pragmatic rules… [,] the professional milieu [inexorably] 
generates its own practical norms” (also refer to Section 6.3 of Chapter Six for an explanation of 
this assertion). These practical norms differ markedly from the official norms and/or professional 
norms in the sense that they – unlike the former – are “more often than not automatic and 
routine, existing in a vein more latent than explicit” (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 14). Galaty (2010: 22) 
solidifies Olivier de Sardan’s (2008) observations by adding that these practical norms – the 
everyday reality of African professionals and bureaucrats – ‘manifest’ themselves “in many 
forms, of ‘recurrent strategies of actors’ (whether for coping, metissage, or cultural hybridization, 
etc.) or ‘transversal form of social logic’, that is, risk minimization, generalized exchange, debt, 
honour, shame, etc.”  
Armed with the knowledge of social actors and their mechanisms of operation in African cities, 
we turn our attention to such actors at neighbourhood and/or institutional level, particularly on 
RCID territory. In the context of an organization such as eKhaya, such individuals would 
unquestionably include eKhaya building managers and RCID coordinators who, while not 
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officially part of the municipal structures, are actively involved in the management of RCIDs and 
urban neighbourhood change; collecting rents and interacting directly with tenants on a daily 
basis. So, by virtue of eKhaya building managers’ roles as knowledge brokers – they attain 
knowledge from interaction with tenants, property owners, City officials, and eKhaya RCID 
managers and attendance of meetings, to mention but a few – can they be argued to be 
‘quasi-street-level bureaucrats’? Can we look at these professionals as ‘quasi-street-level 
bureaucrats’ by virtue of such individuals’ roles as officials and their discretion on the ground?As 
well, having been schooled by Simone (2004) that life in Hillbrow unavoidably involves a 
negotiation and mediation of rules and space; can all activity on eKhaya Neighbourhood CID – 
an organization serving as a shining beacon of urban neighbourhood change - be argued to be 
practiced ‘by the book’ all the way?  
This chapter, an exploration and triangulation of the key/interesting issues emerging from 
fieldwork, does not dispel the aforementioned notions but seeks to answer the abovementioned 
questions. This chapter’s ambition is to point out that because “people [including the building 
managers] have their networks, their channels, and their rules” (Simone 2004: 426); the “People 
are going to behave however the social norms permit, and beyond that” (Max Cannon as cited 
in Brainy Quote 2013). Consequently, the chapter’s first section– via use of the data generated 
by eKhaya South managers’ micro-level activities – not only tests the hypotheses of African 
urban life/processes as collaboration and negotiation; the chapter seeks to argue that space, 
rule[s], information, and life can be negotiated; and the eKhaya housing manager plays an 
active role in the mediation of these aforementioned aspects. The chapter’s second section 
points out that “the right of [eKhaya building] residents to raise the prospects of refusing to be 
governed in particular ways … comes from the very heart of governmentality” (Simone 2010: 
13); doing this by way of instances of resident resistances to “particular norms and practices” 
(ibid) as told by the caretakers and as brought to light by observed artefacts on the field. Not 
only that, the chapter’s second section wishes to make use of the Ekhaya housing managers’ 
attempts at negotiating rules and space to uncover the governmental rationality of the eKhaya 
building manager. The chapter’s third and last section briefly reflects on the interplay between 
internal and external space as seen from the perspective of the eKhaya building manager. In 
uncovering the public-private relationship in eKhaya, the section interweaves theory with the 
researcher’s experience of following eKhaya building managers. 
4.2 Theme 1: Negotiation 
I’d like to add that negotiating is not something to be avoided or feared – it is an everyday part of life. 
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(Leigh Steinberg as quoted in BrainyQuote 2013) 
4.2.1 Theme 1a: Negotiation of [‘Dealing’, ‘Dozing’ and ‘Diversion’] Space 
Upon visiting Hillbrow to take pictures and get a sense of familiarisation with eKhaya South’s 
spaces, the researcher was astounded by the high level of informal activity – street trading, 
loitering, homelessness – taking place on the precinct on a daily basis (see Figure 4A). This was 
particularly confusing in the light of the findings brought about by the review of literature on 
(regulation of) CID/RCID space – the intolerance of informal activities on public space by urban 
regeneration initiatives such as improvement districts in RSA cities on the grounds that they are 
‘counter-productive’ to the formal economy (Paasche 2013). What made the materialisation 
(and prevalence) of the so-called undesirables on eKhaya space all the more surprising was the 
fact that they existed amidst eKhaya RCID CCTV cameras, surveillance devices installed 
recently to regulate illicit behaviour and/or monitor all activity on eKhaya turf. In the beginning, 
the researcher took it as an indication of eKhaya being a different kind of RCID; the researcher 
initially associated the existence of informality on RCID territory as proof that eKhaya was/is very 
suited to the developmental context of Hillbrow or that the RCID was not that influential in the 
governance of the street. However, all that changed when the researcher attended the 
eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting in November 2013. It was in that particular housing managers’ 
meeting that the researcher learnt of eKhaya’s policy/stance on informal activities transpiring on 
eKhaya public space. 
The researcher discovered that whereas the eKhaya Kidz’ Day preparations matter was 
supposed to be high on the meeting’s agenda, it was by far eclipsed by the topic of ‘Issues 
around the Buildings’. When the RCID manager raised the latter issue, the housing managers 
and eKhaya security guards – having been relatively quiet throughout the meeting – began 
‘opening up’ and engaging with the audience; they expressed concern over the ubiquity of 
informal traders and so-called izibotho (hobos) - on the corners of Klein/Esselen Street and 
Esselen/Banket Streets - most of whom, as the researcher discovered, had been ‘evicted’ from 
the Johannesburg CBD as part of ‘Operation Clean Sweep’4 . The housing managers also 
expressed concern over the ‘informal car operators’ cutting tyres and dumping them on eKhaya 
pavements, and thus “polluting” eKhaya public space. Perhaps the most interesting thing that 
the researcher discerned were the Ekhaya security guards’ testimonies attesting to the fact that 
                                                          
4 This was a mayoral initiative aimed at cleansing inner city Johannesburg of illegal trading, illegal dumping and all other 
‘informal’ activities. The initiative led to the chasing of informal traders and the homeless from inner city Johannesburg 
townships, most notably the CBD. See Chapter Five for a discussion of this initiative and its consequences. 
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some homeless people, upon being asked to vacate eKhaya space, customarily retort(ed) by 
maintaining that “they have been given the permission to sleep there”. Having been told all of 
this information, the annoyed RCID co-ordinator reacted by promising to do all she could to put 
an end to the “misunderstanding” as well as by advising the caretakers and eKhaya guards to 
have zero tolerance for such individuals and to do all they could to “remove them”. It became 
clear to the researcher that eKhaya RCID seemingly has no tolerance for the so-called 
undesirables that literature on improvement districts empathises with. What remained unclear, 
however, was why the ‘undesirables’ persisted on eKhaya public space, as well as who had 
authorised them to ‘access’ the space. 
 
Figure 4A: ‘eKhaya RCID: Home of Informality?’ – The ubiquity of informal practices on eKhaya space 
makes us curious to know eKhaya’s stance on informality. It makes us wonder whether eKhaya is 
empathetic towards informality or too pathetic to hinder it.  
Curious to find out who had permitted the informal traders, homeless people, mechanics – who 
the researcher kept observing on a daily basis during the course of the fieldwork – the researcher 
then turned his attention to the buildings under study, as well as their managers. On the day the 
researcher shadowed and interviewed Mkhwanazi for the first time, something interesting 
happened in one of the buildings under study. While standing inside Mkhwanazi’s building, 
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waiting for Mkhwanazi to show up, the researcher witnessed one of the many female informal 
traders here - who plied her trade outside Mkhwanazi’s building and lived there - running into the 
building under study with her wares; she was evading the Metro Police truck that was 
(presumably) patrolling the vicinity outside. The street trader was overheard by the researcher 
asking the building guard on duty to alert her after the truck’s departure and remarking that she 
was not about to give the Metro police officers “an early Christmas present”. Not only did this 
alert the researcher to the ‘cat and mouse’ game being played by informal traders and the 
police; it also hinted at the fact that “there are often bribes to pay to policemen ... [and] [a]ll 
traders run the risk of goods being seized, lost or stolen” (Simone 2004: 423; also see Kihato 2011). 
As well, the trader’s seeking of sanctuary in Mkhwanazi’s building made the researcher 
somewhat aware of “Johannesburg ... urban residents’ constant state of preparedness” (Simone 
2004: 424) for incidents such as police raids. Moreover, that incident made the researcher 
curious to know Mkhwanazi’s stance on the issue of informality and the street traders, who are a 
very prominent feature of his building’s environs. Having been asked about the issue of informal 
trade relative to improvement districts’ stance on the issue, Mkhwanazi (2013) said: 
Look, I have nothing against street traders. Yes, they know that they are violating by-laws and they 
know that... they will be harassed by the police people and their things will be taken from them if 
the police catch them. But one thing you must realise is that these people help me in my job 
sometimes. They bring us clients who then become tenants in this building and in my other building. 
What I mean to say is that they recommend people looking for flats to us, and then the people will 
call me and say, ”Oh I heard from one of the street traders outside your building that there is a flat 
to let in your building”, and then we give that person a flat, you see? [...] Ja, they are also trying to 
make a decent living; it’s not like they are committing crime like the homeless people close to [my 
building] and around that KFC area. (Mkhwanazi 2013) 
Noting that Mkhwanazi was somewhat empathetic towards informal trade – perhaps largely for 
the reason that the traders help him advertise vacant flats to let in the building he manages - 
and uncompromising of destitute people; the researcher realised that Mkhwanazi was inclusive 
of some informal people and excluding of those who he considered a nuisance. Interested in 
finding out whether the other building managers shared the same sentiments; the researcher 
sought for their standpoints via interviews. The researcher approached another building 
manager whose building is surrounded by informal activities (close proximity to informal car 
mechanics, is almost bounded by homeless people and comprises informal trading just outside 
it) – Christianson – and asked him how this impacts on eKhaya’s policy of clean and safe [public] 
spaces. Asked about the informal traders that are always outside his building; Christianson, very 
ill at ease about discussing the matter, quickly said the following on record: 
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Honestly, in my ten years as a resident of this building… in my years as housing manager here, I 
have never seen any hawkers so… I have no idea what you’re talking about (long pause) … I do 
not condone hawking in my building; my tenants know that… because hawkers block pedestrian 
space and they make it difficult for pedestrians to use my pavement. There’s no hawkers here. 
(Christianson 2013) 
Realising how uncomfortable the topic was for Christianson, the researcher swiftly moved to the 
next question but kept visiting the building at different times of the day to witness the informal 
traders plying their trade just outside Christianson’s building; and the results are expressed in 
Figure 4B below.  
    
Figure 4B: ‘Mediated Encroachment?’ – Christianson denies that there are traders outside of his buildings in 
spite of their presence on every day that the researcher frequented eKhaya and Christianson’s building 
However, when asked off-the-record about the high level of informal activity taking place 
outside/around his building, and the issues emerging from the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting; 
Christianson (2013) – seemingly sympathetic of the homeless – attributed the persistence of such 
activity to the existence of “a good understanding” (ibid.) between eKhaya patrollers and the 
homeless. Christianson (2013) argued that the homeless had a win-win arrangement with the 
managers of public space; the guards typically agree to let the homeless use the public space 
for sleeping on condition that the homeless keep the area clean during the day and report any 
strange incidents that take place at night. Having been unofficially told this by Christianson, the 
researcher decided to ask the other two primary objects of the research – Morrison and 
Letswalo. Letswalo, whose building façade is ‘free’ of loiterers and informal traders, conceded 
that “these things do happen” in eKhaya but then expressed zero tolerance for such activities, 
expressing it in the form of a ‘situation’, in the quote below  
JANUARY 2014 JUNE 2013 
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If it’s just a one person in the front of my building, for me it’s not hard. It’s easy for me to do that. Ja! 
I’ll go to that person in the front, and I’ll greet them nicely, and I sit there with him and I say, “Please 
Sir. You know what? I can leave you to do your job just for today; I can give you the whole day 
today, but please tomorrow don’t come back”. And they don’t come back the following day! 
That’s why it’s clean. I don’t want... you can see there’s no one outside my building… Ja, I don’t 
want no one there!! Other caretakers in other buildings you’ll see in front of their buildings there’s a 
lot of stands... Ja, some people they came to me and they said, “You see there’s space in front of 
your building, I can put a stand there” but I said “Uh-uh, no, I don’t want that!” (Letswalo 2013) 
When asked about the possibility of some pact existing between the eKhaya securities and/or 
building managers and the homeless; Morrison (2013) – whose building’s immediate surroundings 
are also ‘rid’ of such activity – denied any involvement in such activity. However, Morrison (2013) 
indirectly acknowledged the actuality that such arrangements exist on Hillbrow and eKhaya 
space by expressly stating the following: 
You know, sometimes when you look at a homeless person, if you see that this person you can’t... 
how can I say this? You need to meet that person halfway. You have to become half like him and 
he have to become half like you. So then you will have a[n] understanding, you know? Sometimes 
you find that those people are the ones that can protect you and your building from outside, while 
they sleeping there, eating there. But it’s just they like to mess! So if you have a[n] understanding 
with them to say, “You can sleep here, you can eat here but you must clean up!” I don’t think 
you’ll have a problem. (Morrison 2013; added emphasis) 
Having talked to all the housing manager respondents about their standpoint on informal 
operations taking place on eKhaya territory and in close proximity to some housing managers’ 
buildings; several things became clear to the researcher. The first thing was that in eKhaya, and 
perhaps the whole of Hillbrow, “elaborate relationships [have been] formed among hawkers 
[and the homeless as well as] those with some type of [formal] employment [security guards and 
housing managers] … social networks organised around patronage” (Simone 2003: 7). These 
relations, the researcher increasingly observes, seemingly transcend the stipulated eKhaya rules 
and/or policy on everyday urban issues such as informality. What also became apparent to the 
researcher was that “nothing is what it appears to be” (Simone 2003: 6) in eKhaya. For one, the 
researcher discovered that some of the people who were very vocal about the need to ‘stamp 
out’ informal activities on eKhaya public space in the eKhaya meeting, were in reality rather 
supportive/understanding of some people engaging in informal activities, albeit for respective 
personal – or political? - reasons. For one, given the fact that eKhayaguards are not on duty at 
night and thus there may still be incidences of crime at night (HDA 2012); it somewhat dawned 
on the researcher that the hawkers and the homeless – presented as a menace to society at the 
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eKhaya meeting – may not be as dangerous as they are portrayed in eKhaya’s invited spaces. 
Instead, we may conceive of (some of) them as (something of) a treasure to eKhaya caretakers 
and guards in view of the value and information they can impart. In this instance, it may be 
argued that: 
… within the density of activities and population numbers [in eKhaya], information itself becomes 
an important resource – who is going where, who comes and goes, at what time, who guards 
what, who knows whom – for all this can be converted into a potential ‘income-generating’ 
activity. Concomitantly, there is an intricate economy of managing impressions and the visibility of 
actions that accompany the broadly informal economic activities. (Simone 2003: 7) 
In this instance, it would appear that ‘one man’s meat is another man’s poison’, that “the order 
of some becomes a disorder for others, and vice-versa” (Simone 2003: 7). While eKhaya policy 
and the CoJ may discourage informal traders5; urban actors at the ‘top of the bottom’ – for 
instance eKhaya caretakers and guards – may be empathetic to the context of informality. It 
therefore appears that those with some form of authority at the sub-local level– regardless of the 
prevalent notion of informal (economic) activities - may be working with ‘informal people’ in 
intricate yet seemingly mutually beneficial ways. 
Having been given the impression that use of public space in eKhaya is open to negotiation, the 
researcher was reminded of the story below by Adler (2013) pertaining to how eKhaya Park was 
attained. Karl Marx (as cited in Jerusalema 2008) argues that “All property is theft” and, the 
researcher, when looking at the context of eKhaya Park and how the diversion space was 
attained, may be justified for thinking thus.  
So we said to the City, (pointing to eKhaya Park on eKhaya map) “This should be a park because 
nobody from here can get to Joubert Park”. Well, we lobbied for about 3 years, and then the 
Citysaid they’ve put R3 million for that, and then they said they can’t find the owners. I left law in 
1979, but send me what you’ve got. And I look at this – Mr Louw – and then I think, “This is either 
Lebanese or Jewish geography”. So I phone into both communities, and within 24 hours I find the 
descendants of the owners in Boston. They had given that property back to the City 10 years 
previously. Propcon - a city property company - had not taken it in; and in fact a woman in 
Propcon was letting the ground for her own account (whispers) to the taxis. Now I said, “I left law in 
1979; I work as a consultant by the hour; we pay your salaries and you couldn’t find this; now you 
owe us a park!” So it was very exciting. This is little eKhaya Park, and they run 4 soccer tournaments 
a year - kids under 12, kids under 16, and the grownups; it’s fantastic to watch when social 
                                                          
5The eviction of informal traders and beggars from Johannesburg Central, as shown by ‘Operation Clean Sweep’, is 
proof of the municipal structures’ intolerance of poor people on urban space and may be used as a case in point here.  
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management starts to e- ... I don’t use the E-word, it’s in the basket! [...] What’s the E-word? 
Empowerment; it’s citizens’ empowerment! The Council came at the beginning to sniff around 
and, everything that’s happening. (Adler 2013) 
Adler’s (2013) testimony above not only hints at her agency; it also attests that indeed “eKhaya 
negotiated with the City to undertake the joint management of [eKhaya play] spaces with the 
City doing the physical maintenance and gardening while eKhaya secures and manages the 
use of these areas” (HDA 2012: 8). When the researcher thus looked at the attainment of 
eKhaya’s recreational spaces, it became more or less clear that the precinct’s diversion spaces 
– their attainment, everyday use and maintenance – is/was mediated. 
Realising that eKhaya RCID public space may be negotiated in so far as it is open to conflict; the 
researcher then mused over the possibility of space mediation‘creeping into’ the buildings 
constituting eKhaya RCID, particularly the buildings under study. This was after the researcher 
had had informal conversations with ‘people on the street’ such as security guards of the 
buildings under study (particularly Letswalo’s and Christianson’s building) – on different shifts. In 
the course of these informal conversations, the researcher had asked the guards whether or not 
they had ever had incidences of homeless people coming into the buildings asking for places to 
sleep ‘just for the night’. These informal conversations – and this line of questioning – materialised 
after the researcher had discovered that the building managers, who had strongly ‘countered’ 
this notion, had been somewhat cagey and uncomfortable about discussing the topic. Sensing 
the building managers’ wariness; the researcher became more interested in – and even 
doubtful of - uncovering the ‘internal operations’ of the buildings under investigation. This was 
aggravated by the interesting ‘artefacts’ that materialised in the buildings under investigation, 
most notably in Letswalo’s building’s basement parking (see Figure 4C).  
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Figure 4C: ‘Multifunctional Parking Space?’ – The materialisation of beds/couches in Letswalo’s building’s 
basement parking spacegive us the impression that vehicles are not the only entities that rest here 
Having noted the building managers’ reluctance to talk, the researcher turned to the informal 
conversations with the guards of Christianson’s and Letswalo’s buildings. The informal 
conversations with the building guards brought to light the fact that there have indeed been 
such occurrences. In fact, the conversations pointed to the actuality that such incidences were 
very common, and that in the event of such cases, the building manager is always called in to 
talk to the people asking for accommodation – usually the homeless and “people with no 
relatives in Hillbrow” – most notably in Christianson’s building. The researcher discovered that the 
conversations between the building managers and those asking for accommodation always 
resulted in the building managers agreeing to let the homeless sleep in the building’s public 
sections. The guards also indicated that the building manager always allowed the homeless to 
sleep in the building for the night, as long as the homeless did not make noise and did not bug 
or steal from the building’s tenants. What remained unclear, however, was whether or not such 
arrangements involved a transaction/monetary exchange. Yet, the informal conversations – in 
conjunction with the observations – gave the researcher the idea that eKhaya’s private space, 
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just like its public space, can be negotiated; and perhaps ‘new norms’ on eKhaya’s public 
space have a way of ‘tiptoeing’ their way into the buildings comprising the precinct. 
4.2.2 Theme 1b – Negotiation of Rules for Residence 
If you obey all the rules, you miss all the fun. 
(Katharine Hepburn as quoted in BrainyQuote 2013)  
In his analysis of the socio-economic associations (Simone 2004) and housing politics associated 
with inner city Johannesburg, Simone (2004) notes that 
Life in the inner city fosters intense cooperation among fellow nationals and ethnics. The coupling 
of these trajectories produces an intricate territorialisation and a patchwork of zones of relative 
security. Some blocks and many buildings clearly ‘belong’ to particular national groups, in part due 
to the disparate practices employed by building owners and their managing agents. These actors 
have their own interpretations of the relative benefits and costs of renting to South Africans or 
foreigners. (Simone 2004: 415; added emphasis) 
Expanding on Simone’s (2004) observation, Kihato (2011) indicates that in inner city 
Johannesburg, some foreign nationals are either refused accommodation or charged higher 
rentals than their South African counterparts, sometimes just on the basis of the stereotypes 
associated with ‘non-nationals’6 (also see Chapter Two). This provoked the researcher’s interest 
in unveiling the criteria used by eKhaya housing managers in ‘screening’ clients, giving them 
accommodation as well as keeping them in the buildings they manage. Although the 
researcher’s interest in uncovering this issue waned over the course of the fieldwork, it was 
renewed by the data generated from the fieldwork; and these are discussed in this sub-section.  
On the first day the researcher met, interviewed and shadowed Mkhwanazi; Mkhwanazi 
received a call from one of his tenants, a call that fascinated the researcher and made him 
increasingly perceive of rules and residence as something to be negotiated and bent. In the 
telephonic conversation overheard by the researcher, one of Mkhwanazi’s tenants was asking 
Mkhwanazi for a favour. The tenant was asking Mkhwanazi to accommodate a relative who 
had no identification “just for two weeks” of the festive season, specifically, take the visitor’s 
biometrics and make a resident access card for the relative irrespective of the fact that the 
                                                          
6One of the housing manager respondents, made mention of fellow Ekhaya housing managers who have taken money 
from tenants; as well as those who have illegally filled in housing units with their own tenants without the property 
management company’s knowledge. Needless to say, according to Letswalo (2013), they were fired immediately; and 
have now found work in other housing management companies.  
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tenant’s relative had no identification. Mkhwanazi, while stressing to the tenant that what was 
being asked of him was against “the office rules”, told the caller that he was busy but still asked 
the tenant to see him later (for a discussion of “the way forward”). The researcher found this 
conversation interesting especially in light of Mkhwanazi’s (2013) argument that, “there’s no one 
who has to be in the building without proof [...] because access cards are processed using valid 
identification like IDs, passports, or asylum, right?” While the researcher never got to uncover 
what ‘the way forward’ would turn out to be, the telephonic conversation gave the impression 
that even though entrance into Mkhwanazi’s building – and other eKhaya buildings that were 
under investigation for that matter - appears very restrictive; entrance into and/or residence in 
the building can be negotiated for tenants and non-tenants. This impression was also motivated 
by the fact that on his constant visits to the buildings under study, the researcher was – on the 
different building manager respondents’ instructions - never made to leave his credentials or 
sign his name in the visitors’ registers upon entrance, an official requirement for all visitors in the 
different buildings under study. 
In trying to get a very good concept of this thought, the researcher contemplated on the 
‘appropriate way’ to ask the building managers without upsetting them. Ultimately, the 
researcher decided to bring the issue up by way of asking the housing managers whether or not 
there had ever been instances whereby the managers had to let the homeless in(to) their 
buildings and/or protect other vulnerable groups7 from ‘external forces’ such as police raids. 
Letswalo, upon being asked such a question, said: 
No! In this my building there are no police raids here; there was never a police raid here! Because 
people who are staying in this building they’ve got passports, they’ve got IDs, they’ve got asylum 
or whatsoever. Valid ones... ja! And then whoever maybe won’t have identity could be... you find 
that it’s a child and maybe it’s from another country – a foreign child - maybe a child who has no 
document; but anybody who comes in here whether with kids or with family must have ID. In order 
for me to do a fingerprint – we get in here using the fingerprint system here – I need to have your ID 
copy, whether it’s a passport or asylum... But then sometimes there will be someone who comes to 
me and says to me, “No, OK. Listen man, this person she is my relative; she doesn’t have identity” 
and then I’ll ask “Why?!” Then the person will say, “Because the asylum has expired”. And then I’ll 
say, “When are you going to get another one? When are you going to fix the problem?” And then 
maybe they’ll say, “No, within a month it will be fixed”. So in such a situation, I can take that 
expired asylum and do the fingerprint for that person maybe for that month; but only for that 
month; for that short space of time, and then after a month, that’s all... But really I never have 
those kinds of things of police raids; People are staying peacefully here...  (Letswalo 2013) 
                                                          
7 For instance, undocumented/migrant (relatives of) tenants evading police officials and deportation.  
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The researcher found this piece of information – especially the highlighted parts of Letswalo’s 
utterances – fascinating, especially in light of the notice board on Letswalo’s building’s foyer, 
which greeted the researcher upon entrance. Not only that, Letswalo’s testimony and 
Mkhwanazi’s phone call directed the researcher to the discretion of the eKhaya building 
manager in making sense of internal problematic situations involving their tenants, thus 
demonstrating – to a certain extent – their exercise of self-governance within their ‘respective 
realms’. This discretion was also noted in the speech by Morrison who, upon being asked 
whether or not she has been faced with the predicament of giving flats to undocumented 
people, responded thus: 
Uh-uh! Because you see in our buildings, if you come here and you apply for a flat or something; 
we need to check if that is original documents. If it’s not, we not taking you. They got this problem 
by... they picked up the problem in Blauwberg8 of Nigerians that were fighting with the building 
manager and stuff like that. I’ve got Nigerian guys here staying on the 1st floor. Believe me, that is 
why I don’t know what is wrong by the other buildings. But these guys are so smart! You won’t even 
hear them make noise, you know? Even with the World Cup when Nigeria was playing this and 
that, you won’t even hear them. I even said to my guards, “Let’s not bother with them if they blew 
the vuvuzela or something because... it’s World Cup!” But still they went in their flat; they buy their 
beers and stuff and they sit in the flat. You’ll just hear the cleaner throwing out bottles in the 
morning, out of the dustbin, but you don’t even see them come in here; not the way the... they’ve 
been respectful; they’re not disrespecting us, even the guards. We know they come in here with it 
[the bottles]9but then... especially the night shift one, the one who came in just now – him! 
(pointing to surveillance screen), he will tell them, “Make one more noise, make once noise! And I’ll 
come up and I’ll throw all of you out”. They respect I’m telling you [...] if you want respect then you 
can come in here. I don’t have problems with my tenants; [...] there’s foreigners here but their 
papers are legal. Even if they’re sub-tenants, their papers are legal; I make sure! Because that’s 
what [our property company] told us; they teaching us, “Make sure the tenants are legal. We 
don’t want illegal people in the buildings because it’s gonna cause problems”. So that’s why we 
check. Actually, they don’t want Nigerians again in the buildings because these guys they like to 
do business [...] But these ones of mine they’ve got shops – they’re selling clothes – so ... there’s a 
lot of them, like, 5 of them staying in one flat; brothers. Even next door, I’ve got Nigerians also but... 
you won’t even hear these people. You know in the meetings when they complain about the 
Nigerian guys, when the boss asks me, “How’s yours?” I say, “Truly speaking, they are quite 
respectful, they’re reserved people. They-they-they-they fit into this environment here. [...] So... they 
                                                          
8Blauwberg is another building managed by the property management company that Morrison reports to 
9Bottles are not allowed into Morrison’s building, and this is stated in the tenats’ leases (refer to Addendum). Yet the fact 
that Morrison allows the Nigerian tenants in her building to bring beer bottles in – just because of how disciplined they are 
– somehow points to her discretion and may suggest that exceptions to rules can be made. 
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fit into this so each and everybody here fits into this, in this group so nothing, no problems! (Morrison 
2013) 
More interestingly, when discussing the issue of things/norms that are not tolerated by property 
owners and/or property managers but which she allows in the building, Morrison (2013) also 
indirectly touched on the discretion she has as a building manager by stating that: 
OK, parties is not allowed at all as well here; but if you come to me and you asked me. “Listen, I’m 
gonna have a party” I will tell you, “No liquor, if you want you can bring in beers but in cans, no 
bottles”. No bottles... [...] That’s how I work with my tenants. But I don’t think I can have parties 
anymore! (sighs deeply) [...] Yoh! Yoh! Yoh! They gonna kill me these people with parties. You know 
how people are; when there’s a party there must be liquor [...] Whether you can say it’s going to 
be a baby christening or baby shower or whatever! But there will be liquor involved there so... I 
don’t know; I will see what I do, I’ll see who I’ll do it for, because I don’t want to say no. I’ll just have 
to put down my rules. I can’t say, “No” [...] But then I just have to keep a watch-eye, watch-eye; 
then I won’t sleep, I must watch! I will sit here. I will watch on the screen... so I have to watch them 
here (points to surveillance footage). How they get into the lift; how many in the lift; things like that! 
Then I’ll have to call the guard and tell him, “Hey! There’s too many in the lift!” you know? We’re 
working very hard when we have parties; we must be so observant. We don’t want anything to 
happen because we will get into trouble, you know? (Morrison 2013) 
From Morrison’s narration above, it would seem that there are some norms that are not really 
permitted and/or approved of at the ‘high office’ but which are still being implemented on the 
ground by the building manager in dealing with tenants; thus the exercise of discretion by the 
housing manager. The researcher also got the impression that there are certain things that 
building managers ‘hide’ from the institutions they represent, a contradiction in terms especially 
when we take note of the alleged close relationship between eKhaya housing managers and 
their property owners, as captured in the quote by Morrison (2013) below:  
We’re friends with our bosses [...] and-and... We communicate good with each other. And when 
we sit in the meetings, we’re open; we just talk to each other [...] There’s no things that you hide 
from the boss and stuff like that. Our-our-our thing is good; we’ve got good communication with 
them, with our bosses, all of them - admins, managers, everybody... good, good, good; no 
problems. (Morrison 2013) 
What remains unclear though is whether this exercise of discretion – allowing of parties, bottles 
into buildings, to mention but a few – involves a transaction or not. Could this be a tactic 
employed by the building manager in her quest to keep her tenants happy and ensuring that 
they stay longer in the building?  Mkhwanazi acknowledged the fact that certain groups of 
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foreign nationals do not get housing by stating the following as one of the criteria that clientele 
must meet: 
Yes [...] because you cannot give someone a flat without getting that person’s documentation 
and all that, like IDs and passports. So definitely a person with an ID does get a flat, and a person 
with a passport... well, we do check that person’s passport to see whether the passport is still valid 
or it has expired. If it is valid, then by all means we will give the client a flat; but if it has expired then 
no... because it gets us into trouble as building managers; giving people flats when they have 
expired passports is risky because at the office we’ll be asked, “Why did you give this person a flat 
when this person’s passport is invalid?” [...] So we do give flats to people with IDs and valid 
passports. It’s just that people with asylums... we can’t give flats to such people. But it’s not that we 
cannot accommodate them totally, no... Rather, we do give them a chance because we allow 
them to live here as sub-tenants, under people with flats and who have the accepted 
documentation, you see? [...] So it’s not like we do not want them; we do give them a chance to 
live here as sub-tenants. But they know that they cannot apply for flats here, you understand? 
(Mkhwanazi 2013) 
The researcher noted from Mkhwanazi’s (2013) account above, and from the experiences on 
site, a certain leniency towards sub-tenancy in Hillbrow buildings, even in buildings comprising 
Ekhaya. This is an interesting fact especially when we go through the house rules attached with 
tenants’ leases in eKhaya buildings, and note that there is no rule that explicitly sanctions tenants 
in such buildings to have sub-tenants. Could this be a sign of housing managers’ empathy 
towards non-nationals and thus an adaptation to the context of high-density in Hillbrow? 
Letswalo (2013) indirectly explained the concept of sub-tenancy by explaining to the researcher 
what he and other housing managers – those from his management company as well as those 
he meets via eKhaya meetings - tell their tenants: 
So we tell people, “Listen here, if you want to live alone you can stay alone, but you must 
remember that rent comes first!” [...] You can stay alone, but you can also get 3 more people to 
help you cover the rent; they must help you cover the rent if you can’t cover it alone; that is 
reasonable. But suppose you are the only one living in that flat and then someone in your family 
dies, and then now the family needs you and all of a sudden you’re the breadwinner in the family 
and you must pump out the money and then eish! You cannot pay the rent; then we don’t want 
that!!  Then don’t stay alone! If you want to stay alone; then always know that the next time you 
have financial trouble, we’ll still need the rent! We’re not forcing people to stay together but in a 
one bedroom flat we need 4 people. So that if 1 person has problems, then the other 3 can help; If 
2 people cannot pay then the other 2 can help. We don’t want you to say, “I cannot pay the rent 
this month because... my mother died!” No! We don’t take that! (laughs hysterically) [...]We want a 
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situation where if you are in trouble, you can still have other people helping you to cover the rent... 
but bottom line is rent comes first! Ja! (Letswalo 2013; added emphasis) 
Other housing managers, with the exception of Christianson, concurred with Letswalo by 
indirectly stating their tolerance of sub-tenancy; giving more or less similar reasons. More 
interestingly, what also came through was the fact that the payment of rent – which, according 
to written rules, must be done by the 3rd of each month in all buildings investigated – can also be 
negotiated. Evidence of this fact materialised when the researcher, while seated with building 
managers such as Mkhwanazi and Morrison as part of following them, saw some tenants coming 
in to explain that they would not be able to pay their rents for the month of December on time. 
The building managers appeared to be understanding of the predicaments of the tenants in 
question. Morrison in particular stated that  
So your rent must be paid up to... from the 3rd. After that you will get a fine, alright? But my tenants, 
if they’ve got a problem, they come to me and-and-and they’ll explain to me, m-m-maybe one or 
two, not all of them because all of them, they’ll they pay their rent on time, especially in the 
building next door. They pay their rent on time; I don’t have an issue. Yeah some few of them 
they’ll say, “OK, we waiting for the sub-tenant” and all those things. If they come to me and say 
they’ve got problems and stuff like that, I’ll say, “OK, pay later”. If they said, “I’ll pay on the 4 th”, I’ll 
say, “OK. It’s fine; pay on the 4th”. I’m not going to kill you just because you didn’t pay my rent on 
the 3rd”. We all human; we all working; and some get paid late, some get paid early so... (Morrison 
2013) 
Not only did it become clear to the researcher that the housing manager plays a crucial role in 
rent collection in eKhaya buildings; it was also brought to light that the eKhaya housing manager 
can bend the rules pertaining to rent to accommodate his/her tenants, as long as the rent is 
eventually paid. This is also made manifest by the fact that: 
And where money is involved, the caretaker will need the rent on the deadline [...] Yes, because 
remember, we are in business in eKhaya [...] His main role is to collect rent, to see that people are 
paying in time. Yes ... otherwise if he doesn’t do that, the property business will collapse [...] Ja, that 
business will collapse. So the housing manager will understand your problems if you’re a tenant. If 
you’ve got a problem, you go and explain to him. “I will pay my rent late because of A-B-C. I’ve 
got a problem like this”. You don’t just keep quiet until he comes and knocks at your door. So the 
tenants really know their housing manager; such that if they-they-they think they’ll have difficulties 
in paying rent sometimes they can go and approach him and tell him [...] But otherwise the HSV 
must make sure the rent is collected FULLY! (Mkhize 2013) 
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Having become aware of the fact that rules pertaining to rent payment, residence, and other 
activities, can be negotiated and bent by eKhaya building managers to accommodate their 
tenants; the researcher got to thinking what the eKhaya building managers could possibly 
(bar)gain from all this empathy towards different types of tenants. What is in it for the eKhaya 
building manager? The interviews with Christianson, Morrison and Phillip brought to light the fact 
that eKhaya housing managers whose flats are full and who collect rents in full every month get 
rewards in the form of end-of-year bonuses. In fact, the researcher noted the desire for the 
bonuses that the aforementioned managers expressed while talking of the issue. What the 
researcher realized from the data emerged from these interviews, was that eKhaya building 
managers - in their quest to keep their companies and property owners happy, secure 
themselves bonuses at the end of the year as well as keep their buildings full/occupied - exercise 
self-governance by using means of their own to ensure that these goals are achieved. Faced 
with the predicament of keeping the tenant happy and staying longer in the Ekhaya building on 
the other hand; and pleasing the ‘boss’ via making profit out of the tenant for the ‘boss’ (refer to 
Section 4.2 below); the building manager appears to have implemented ‘new unofficial norms’ 
that – while not necessarily not in tandem with those of the employment agency – are 
somewhat viable in the achievement of the stipulated goals. It would thus appear that the 
building managers’ negotiation of rules when dealing with tenants is a survival strategy and an 
everyday coping mechanism towards ensuring social order in the buildings they manage. 
4.3 Theme 2: Tenants’ Agency and Appropriation VERSUS Building Managers’ Agency 
When the researcher spoke to Mkhize, the coordinator of eKhaya RCID, to get a sense of how 
eKhaya building managers transmit and enforce eKhaya rules to their respective buildings; 
Mkhize (2013) made mention of the following: 
[T]he housing supervisors in the buildings now; what really makes them work well with the 
Neighbourhood ... the first thing that we introduced was to know your neighbour ... because if you 
know your neighbour you can share whatever problem that the two or three of you encounter; 
you will come together, talk about it and come up with a solution. [...] Yes! Because someone will 
be saying, “Your tenants are throwing rubbish in the lanes!” – we’ve got lanes that the buildings 
share – and someone else will be saying, “No, your tenants are the ones throwing rubbish in the 
lanes, and they are making noise and doing this and that”. So, to counter that, we always try to 
bring them together so that they understand each other, and go back to their buildings and then 
talk to their tenants and tell them, “Please; these are the house rules to follow – Do not throw things 
over the balconies; do not play loud music; Do not do public drinking in the balconies”. Things like 
that. So the housing manager will actually be giving them the way to live in the building as well as 
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going outside. And outside the buildings we’ve got Bad Boy’z Security. [...] So by doing this we are 
trying to suppress the level of crime in the streets and keeping the area clean and safe for our 
Neighbourhood, so that the tenants who live in the buildings live longer, hence we get profit out of 
them. So that is the interest of the stakeholders. [...] Their primary interest is to make money, right? 
So if the tenants live longer, they will sustain the business, which means the property owners will stay 
longer in this business of buildings. (Mkhize 2013) 
Mkhize’s (2013) account brought to light many things about tenant and building management 
in eKhaya. For one, it showed the researcher how ‘surveilled’ the tenants of buildings comprising 
eKhaya are, which led to the researcher questioning the tenants’ agency and/or extent of self-
management and management of the building manager. As well, the account informed the 
researcher of some of the eKhaya building managers’ responsibilities as well as gave the 
impression that housing managers – in close conjunction with eKhaya security guards – have 
total control of their tenants in the management of their buildings’ private and public spaces. 
However, upon attending the eKhaya Kidz’ Day and hearing the guards’ and building 
managers’ complaints regarding the issue of building management; the researcher was led to 
thinking otherwise. When the topic of ‘Issues around the Buildings’ was raised in that meeting; 
the building managers and eKhaya guards expresslycomplained to the RCID coordinator about 
“new stubborn and noisy tenants” who “just don’t listen”. Similarly, eKhaya guards expressed 
concern over their safety by pointing out that lately there had been a proliferation of “drunkards 
playing loud music” on spaces such as eKhaya Park and spaces outside buildings in the 
evenings, leaving beer bottles there every weekends and becoming violent upon being told to 
vacate such spaces. Additionally, the housing managers and Ekhaya guards collectively called 
for the RCID coordinator to “arrange with SAPS and JMPD to start attending the Ekhaya 
meetings just like they used to”, believing that doing thus would result in the JMPD “enforc[ing] 
by-laws” to control these people like before.  
Seeing the housing managers and eKhaya guards complain about issues collectively affecting 
them made the researcher aware of the fact in as much as housing managers manage their 
tenants, the eKhaya tenants and/or residents still have the tenacity to control the building 
managers. Consequently, this realisation alerted the researcher to the tenants’ agency as well 
as culminated in the aforementioned theme – Agency and Appropriation. This section, divided 
into two sub-sections, delves into the tenant-building manager issues, relationships in eKhaya. 
This section does this by way of unpacking tenants’ appropriation of managers’ and building 
rules in the first sub-section; thus bringing to light the challenges encountered by the building 
managers as well as the norms they fail to enforce. The first sub-section seeks to show that since 
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tenants have minds of their own, they can demonstrate their agency by self-governing in 
particular ways and refusing to be governed in certain ways. The second sub-segment discusses 
the building managers’ (re)action and approach to tenants’ appropriation of and/or resistance 
to rules, thus bringing to light the norms that the tenants cannot resist as well as the 
governmental rationality of the eKhaya property manager. 
4.3.1 Theme 2a: Tenants’ Appropriation, Resistance and Agency 
 
Figure 4D: ‘Same Property Management Company; Divergent Public Space Governance’ – Mkhwanazi 
and Morrison may be under the same building management company but their building environs are 
differently managed 
The design above juxtaposes two different surroundings of two buildings under study for the 
reason that the two buildings happen to be managed by one property company. What are the 
notable differences between the (management of the) two buildings? Mkhwanazi’s environs as 
depicted by the image signal ‘poor space management’ whilst Morrison’s surroundings – when 
compared to Mkhwanazi’s – come across as an epitome of ‘good management’. Although the 
researcher initially took this as proof of some of Mkhwanazi’s tenants’ resistance to rules used to 
govern them in Mkhwanazi’s building, and interpreted it as Mkhwanazi’s inability to control the 
activities of his tenants in their private spaces (flats/homes); the researcher wanted to get 
Mkhwanazi’s side of the story. Asked to state the challenges he has had with controlling tenants 
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and managing his building’s surrounds – the management problems he faces in enforcing 
Ekhaya and company rules on a daily basis - Mkhwanazi (2013) initially came across as very 
much in control, stating:“I have no challenges […] I’m not sure, maan […] No, I don’t have any 
challenges […] everything is fine, seriously! Everything is easy”. However, later on in the interview, 
Mkhwanazi (2013), upon being gently probed about the matter, expressed his inability to 
manage every aspect of the building and all tenants’ activities; by stating the following:  
eKhaya asks that property managers have to make sure that tenants do not throw dirt out the 
windows and on the lanes. Like now, it’s the festive season... they don’t do that. The tenants also 
know. So now the tenants get this information from us; the tenants get these instructions from us 
and we obtain this from our property management companies and sometimes from eKhaya 
meetings. […] So we are the ones who relay these messages and things like that to tenants 
because we’re told by property management firms who hold these meetings with eKhaya.  So we 
as building managers take the message to tenants via property management companies and 
Ekhaya meetings. To say, “Such people must not do this”. Even in the tenants’ lease forms there are 
rules pertaining to this, there is a rule that says tenants must not throw stuff out the windows... So 
tenants see this on their lease agreement. So when a tenant signs the lease they see these rules, 
and they have to be bound by these rules. […] Yes, there are some difficulties. There are some 
stubborn tenants who, even after you tell them, “Do not hang your washing on the verandas but 
bring it down here to the washing lines”, will still do it. Some will keep throwing trash in the lanes and 
out the windows, you know? But [...]you can’t really tell who threw rubbish on the lanes through the 
windows and all that... It’s not like there is someone monitoring the lanes, it’s not like there are 
securities or cameras by the lanes, especially at night, you know? (Mkhwanazi 2013) 
Having learnt this from Mkhwanazi, the researcher not only got a sense of eKhaya’s influence on 
building managers and internal building politics; the researcher also sensed the responsibility 
placed by eKhaya on (the shoulders of) building managers, as well as the difficulty faced by 
building managers in enforcing these rules in their buildings. This was also picked up by the 
researcher from the interview with Morrison (Mkhwanazi’s fellow employee) who complained, 
albeit in passing, of stubborn tenants who used to make noise, dry their washing lines on their 
balconies and threw rubbish into the building’s lanes and pavements, before she came up with 
her own rules. Morrison (2013) also parenthetically made mention of several tenants who have 
moved out of her building because of the no noise rule stipulated on their lease agreements 
and which Morrison goes to great lengths to enforce in her building (also refer to Annexure). This 
not only showed the researcher Morrison’s strength of character (agency); it also somewhat 
pointed to the limited participation of residents/tenants in defining the house rules, and 
suggested that tenants’ contest to rules is limited to breaking them or exiting the buildings 
and/or units. Interested in learning more about tenants’ resistances to building managers’ and 
90 
 
house rules, the researcher asked the building manager respondents about any incidents in 
which their rules had been secretly or openly challenged by tenants. On the record, Christianson 
(2013) said: 
My tenants are very self-disciplined… they are easy to control; they know what I like and they know 
what I don’t like, so I cannot think… I cannot think of any time that I had a problem with any of my 
tenants. And they have been staying here for a very long time, so they know what I don’t like so… 
if you’re looking for a flat here, too bad… you won’t get a flat here because they are not moving 
anytime soon. (Christianson 2013) 
However, off-the-record, Christianson – while speaking about his intolerance of sub-tenancy in 
his building – indirectly alerted the researcher to tenant resistance in the building he manages. 
Christianson – who stated to the researcher that he has keys to every tenant’s unit and 
emphasised that he has taken measures to ensure that his tenants’ keys are not ‘reproducible’ - 
made mention of the many occasions that he and his building’s security guards have ‘raided’ 
the building’s flats at night to find too many people sleeping in the units’ kitchen and 
bathrooms.Christianson stated that he knew that in such buildings, the lease holder is usually 
paid to accommodate such people without his knowledge, “behind [his] back”. Could this act 
be associated with tenants’ appropriation of building manager’s rule of accommodating 
‘outsiders’ into the building? (Refer to Theme 1a above). Christianson considered this as an 
example of “tenants get[ting] out of hand” and stated off-the-record that, “You really have to 
control them otherwise there’d be disorder”. The off-the-record conversation left the researcher 
thinking that there is perhaps very little room for tenants to define and/or reconfigure the 
eKhaya building managers’ house rules, and that the only way they can do this is through 
secretly breaking them. This also appeared to be the case when the researcher talked to 
Letswalo and Morrison. The two eKhaya building managers gave testimonies pointing to tenants 
who have hosted parties either in secret or under false pretexts. This was made particularly 
evident by Letswalo’s testimony below: 
And those people when they came to me, they did not tell me that there was going to be a party; 
they lied to me and told me there was going to be a stokvel. That Granny lied to me and said that 
she was going to host her stokvel members because it was her turn to host them, and she said that 
there were going to be a few people coming, so please can I accept those people, like, 15 
people? In real fact she was going to invite 30 people – young and old – and they came here with 
booze; many, many beers! After 10 o’clock people started calling me and telling me, “No, man... 
we can’t sleep here”. So what I did is I-I-I phoned security, I came down to security and I said, “Do 
you know what’s happening up there?” [...] No-no-no, come let’s go up there and talk to those 
people”. And then we got there and I talked to them [...] I talked to them and greeted them 
91 
 
nicely, and then I said, “What’s happening here? What’s happening?! People can’t sleep guys. 
You didn’t tell me you were gonna have a party here; you said you were gonna have a stokvel. 
Your neighbours cannot sleep here because you’re making noise”. And the other ones were so 
drunk, man! They were so drunk! I remember one guy who was getting really violent – his family 
had to sit him down and talk to him, seriously. He kept asking me, “And then who do you think you 
are?! Who’re you?!” [...] And you know this was after I had introduced myself, “Hello guys, my 
name is So-and-so, and I’m a building manager”. The guy kept saying, (bangs on table) “Who’re 
you?! We don’t know you; who’re you and how can we help you?!” I said to him, “No man. I want 
to help you! People are complaining here, boss”. Eish! The guy just couldn’t stop; he kept jumping 
at me saying, “Who’re you! What do you want here?” So I asked him, “Ah sorry boss, but do you 
even stay here?” He said, “Uh no, I don’t”. I said to him, “But then you see now? Why are you 
asking me who is me?” (Letswalo 2013) 
Morrison (2013), in the quote below, alluded to the same situation in the building she manages 
when she stated the reason why she does not want to encourage tenants’ hosting of parties: 
Because the people, the last time I give them a party – 63 people? - they made a hell of a noise! I 
had to go switch off their lights for them to keep quiet. They never left at the exact time. I said to 
them, “10 o’clock everybody out; that’s our visiting time at night!” After 10 you must be out; you 
can only visit until 10 at night, then you have to take your ID and go. They even got stuck in the lift! 
My guards had to come and wake me up that time of the morning. I had to call the maintenance 
guy out at 3 o’clock to come and take them out of the lifts, and the guy stays in Rosettenville. He 
had to come from there to come and take them out of the lifts. So I said, “No parties anymore. I’m 
giving you this to do, and I give you my instructions but you don’t follow my instructions so just 
forget it; no more parties!” [...] But if she comes to me then we can discuss this thing, then I have to 
go to the bottom tenants to tell them, go to the top tenants to tell them, go to your neighbours to 
tell them, “Listen, this tenant is having a baby shower. There will be little bit of noise but it will be 
from this time to that time” [...] because the buildings is not soundproof; they are not. [...] So I said, 
“I will have to go to your neighbours and explain to them, and then everybody will be fine! No 
stress; nobody will phone me to say there’s noise because I told them”. (Morris 2013)  
As it appears, although tenants are constrained by the management of buildings – and 
seemingly lack the willpower to define collective rules for housing management as laid out by 
the eKhaya caretakers - they still have the propensity to take advantage of ‘loopholes’ – as 
signified by building managers’ ‘exceptions’ and/or rules on the ground – to “assess what it is 
possible to do” (Simone 2003) to behave in their own ways; and perhaps to secretly resist and 
reproduce some of these rules. Yet, given the actuality that the African inner city is a “locus for 
diffuse and highly contested authority on a day-to-day basis” (ibid.); how do eKhaya building 
managers react when ‘provoked’ and faced with threat to their ‘domination’? The next sub-
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section, an attempt at unpacking the difficulties and governmental rationality of the eKhaya 
RCID housing manager, seeks to explore this in detail.  
4.3.2 Theme 2b – Building Managers’ Agency and Discretion VS Institutional Control 
In the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting, the researcher observed that the aforementioned ‘invited 
space’ seemingly created a platform for eKhaya building managers from different 
management companies to offer each other advice about issues jointly affecting them; and 
thus enabled them to collectively reconstruct new norms. This was made particularly clear when 
the issue of noise in and outside eKhaya buildings by new tenants – arguably the hottest and 
most relatable topic in the meeting – was touched on. Morrison, who was perhaps the most 
verbal of the housing managers in the meeting, recommended to other housing managers to 
follow her advice in order to avoid problems, stating: “You make noise, I switch your power off 
[...] Sometimes you have to be crucial with these people I tell you!” Morrison’s discussion of how 
she goes about dealing with the everyday problems in her building – in conjunction with those of 
other Ekhaya building managers and guards – not only pointed to the individual and collective 
agency of tenants; it also made the researcher turn his attention to the individual tactics and 
strategies employed by his building manager respondents in ‘taming’ their tenants. Eager to 
follow up on this topic, the researcher asked Morrison, one of the respondents who had been 
very engaging about the issue at the eKhaya meeting, how she deals with problematic tenants. 
A fascinating ‘artefact’ that the researcher took note of upon frequenting Morrison’s building 
was the materialisation of (one of) her self-imposed norms (see Figure 4E below).  
Morrison (2013) believes that it is the rules that ensured that her tenants “listened! [And] ... 
don’t... throw their rubbish out or sweep their rubbish out”, coincidentally a rule that eKhaya 
imposes on eKhaya building managers. What is interesting here is the fact that eKhaya RCID 
does not stipulate to the housing managers how they should go about controlling tenants and 
making them stop throwing litter on pavements and lanes; rather, the housing managers devise 
their own different ways of ensuring that this does not happen. 
 
93 
 
 
Figure 4E: ‘Punitive Practice or Mere Scare Tactic?’– One of Morrison’s notice to her tenants serves as one 
of her ‘norms as practised’ 
Upon being asked of the ways in which she dealt with tenants and instilled norms in her tenants, 
Morrison (2013) had the following to say: 
Fighting, I don’t... I really don’t. People will come... people are so respectful here, towards each 
other, you know? Some people will fight in the house, I know! Some of them they argue and stuff 
like that, and the next day I will hear about it. But then the tenants will come the next day to say, 
“We’re really sorry we made a noise yesterday. We were fighting”, you know? 10 And then 
everything will be back to normal, square... Here I don’t have... like... that is why people in the 
caretaker meetings they ask me, “How do you get it right?!” I said, “Guys, just communicate with 
your people, communicate with your tenants. Don’t scream at the tenants! Don’t shout at them! 
Don’t swear at them! Don’t fight with them! You making them stubborn and once they are 
stubborn then they are stubborn, and you can do nothing about it! So... just talk to the people 
nicely. Talk to them; tell them, ‘This is how it is’”. They say, “No, we can’t talk a lot” and I say, “No. I’ll 
talk to the tenants even if it had to cost me talking the whole day with a tenant. But once you get 
them into that line, they will stay in that line. Don’t let them fall off or go this way; keep them in that 
line”. I said “That is why I’ve got this issue here”. [...] That is what I’ve got here because people 
respect me and I respect them. Sometimes they get out of line, and if you take me to that limit, 
                                                          
10It is interesting that some tenants feel the need to justify their conduct in ‘private space’ to the building manager. This 
gave the impression that Morrison (2013) has ‘trained’ her tenants very well such that they have internalized the gaze of 
the housing manager as ‘informal panopticon’, thus feel the need to rationalize even their behavior to the housing 
manager. 
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then I will just start (snaps her fingers) and they’ll say, “OK, OK, OK”because they know I don’t get 
angry, I don’t fight. If you start to be a problem, I’ll just look at you like that; then you’ll get discipline 
there by the eKhayaguards. They will discipline you, not me! They will really discipline you! [...] That’s 
how it goes, you know? You know how it goes. My tenants are fine; they don’t have problems. 
Even new tenants when they move in, I just give them the... feedback on how it’s been done here. 
Easy as that... They don’t even fight; they don’t even make noise, nothing.[...] Some are rough! But 
they... obey my rules if I tell them that, you know?[...] You have to use your... you have to use 
psycho on them, you know?[...] One was asking me one day, “Are you... did you study these things 
or what?”I laughed! I said, “No, why?” He said, “No, you just know how to deal with the problem; 
you just know how to talk to us, you know? You’re not fighting with us”. [...] I said, “There’s no need 
to fight. If I’m gonna fight with you, you gonna fight with me; problem not solved... unsolved! So 
let’s solve the problem nicely and then it’s done!”11 (Morrison 2013) 
This appears to be a philosophy shared by other eKhaya housing manager respondents, one of 
whom is Letswalo (2013). In a bid to hint at the dangers of being a building manager in Hillbrow, 
the researcher shared with Letswalo the story of a Hillbrow building manager who got shot just 
for arguing with a tenant about noise, a story that made headlines a couple of years ago (refer 
to cited news headlines in Chapter One’s Section 1.1). Letswalo, upon hearing this story, 
surprisingly shifted the blame from the perpetrator of the crime to the building manager, arguing 
that, “It was probably that building manager’s fault”. According to Letswalo (2013) 
I think that building manager that you telling me about, he got shot because of his approach 
towards the tenant. That man you telling me about, probably his approach wasn’t right... He was 
not going to get shot if he had used the right approach, they were not going to shoot him if he 
had talked to them nicely, you understand? I don’t think you will get shot if you go to a tenant with 
a right attitude. I’m sure he went there and started insulting the tenant and trying to show the 
tenants that he was a building manager and all that, that’s probably why he got shot. They were 
not going to even take out the gun and hurt him if he used the good approach. No! I don’t think 
so. A tenant is living up there and paying to live up there, and we must show them respect! You go 
there with respect. (Letswalo 2013) 
In fact, Letswalo (2013) believes that the conflict he encountered with a relative of a tenant 
(cited in theme 2a above) ended “peacefully” due in large part to his modest approach: 
We solved it... easy! If you confront them nicely then you’ll never have a problem. And then since 
then it’s happened only once, maybe a year ago so ... we no longer have those kinds of things. 
The parties they can have birthday parties, the space I’ve got a space up there and I can give 
them space and I can give them their space and they can bring in children or whatever; as long 
                                                          
11This quote’s interest also lies in its ability to reveal Morrison’s (strength of) character. 
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as we understand each other and have an agreement to say, “This is the time and this is the time. 
If you stay on after this time, it won’t be good to do it but I will have to call eKhaya Neighbourhood 
and Bad Boy’z12 and their backup or something like that; and you know, it’s not good for me to do 
that, it’s not nice”. And then they do it the way you want them to do it... As long as you can 
manage in a good way, they’re gonna follow that; you’ve got to educate that person and put 
that person in line. Whether it be a madman, you can educate that person and make him OK. In 
the end that person will shake your hand and say, “You know what? You got me; I was a bad 
person but now you made me right.” (Letswalo 2013) 
Mkhwanazi also made mention of how he deals with problems he encounters with tenants on a 
daily basis, in the quote below: 
OK, what I do is when I get a new tenant coming into an empty flat, isn’t it that tenant comes in as 
a client? So I’ll tell the new tenant, “OK, now you’re no more a client but you are now a tenant. So 
now here are the house rules; these are the house rules in this flat.” And because most problems 
we have had between tenants stem from the kids – where as a tenant you find mostly that your kid 
has been beaten by the child of a co-tenant – I’ll explain to a client with kids who moves in here; I’ll 
say, “Please, if ever there is a problem, maybe if a co-tenant hits your child, don’t react angrily, 
please! Rather, call me to stand between the two of you so that we can solve that particular 
problem. Let’s avoid wars; let there not be wars because wars only worsen situations and lead to 
something else”. [...] And our company ... is intolerant of wars and fights and conflicts. And, like, I - 
as a building manager - have no right to hit a tenant. I cannot fight with a tenant or beat a tenant; 
if I beat a tenant up I’m fired immediately! [...] Ja! Exactly! I don’t have the right; I must control my 
temper and I must always be calm. Even in instances where the tenant wants to fight with me, I 
must be calm; I must be the calm one. I have to be the better person and talk to the tenant and 
find the way forward to solve the problem. So I tell a new person moving in here, “Listen, you are 
now a tenant and you are no more a client. In this flat, these are the rules. If ever there is a 
problem between you and the other tenants, do not... do not take the law into your own hands 
and then solve the issue on your own; because if you do that, you will be wrong eventually, even if 
you were right. You will go about solving the issue in a wrong way and may look like the bad guy in 
the end. But if you call me to come and solve your problem, I’ll be there. Here’s my number, just 
call me if ever something comes up”. So after we solve the issue, it’s solved and we go forward. 
There will be no side-eyeing each other or glaring at each other. The following day is another day; 
we forget about what happened the previous day because we would have solved yesterday’s 
issues yesterday, on the particular day the issues happened, you understand? (Mkhwanazi 2013) 
                                                          
12This suggests that eKhaya Neighbourhood – via its contracted security service providers (Bad Boy’z) intervenes in the 
buildings for issues such as noise; hence the penetration of the RCID norms into the internal building’s management. 
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When he was ‘compelled’ into talking about his ‘punitive practices’ to obstinate tenants - what 
happens if and when tenants continue giving him problems even after being warned -a cagey 
Mkhwanazi mentioned that he takes the issues to the office, after which the problematic 
tenants’ leases are never renewed the following year. However, Mkhwanazi (2013) mentioned 
that even when the tenant’s lease is never renewed the next year; this is usually done “nicely” 
and with no hard feelings because “we make sure that when the tenant leaves, s/he is happy 
and understands perfectly why s/he is being asked to leave” (ibid.). What the researcher found 
interesting from the three accounts of the respondents was not only the punitive measures they 
take against ‘bad tenants’ but their belief in the power of humility and humbling themselves – 
‘talking nicely’ with tenants in showing them “the way forward” (Mkhize 2013), thus (the power 
of) negotiation. As well, the researcher found it – and more interesting –that even with the 
practical norms they have come with, in their respective realms/buildings, the housing managers 
are inevitably constrained by professional and/or official norms – those of Ekhaya RCID, property 
management companies, property owners. The fact that the managers have to keep their cool 
even when provoked and insulted by tenants not only points at the extent to which they are 
repressed by the professional norms; it also hints at their exercise of self-governance and self-
control, even in times of ‘ill governance’ by the tenant. In this case, official norms and practical 
norms may coincide. The eKhaya caretaker cannot risk his/her life (cf. Story of caretaker who 
was shot for arguing with a tenant about noise) especially in light of Hillbrow’s notoriety for 
violence and easy use/availability of weaponry. The researcher interpreted all this as a sign of 
the eKhaya housing manager as both governor and governed.    
When another ‘hot sub-topic’ under the umbrella topic of ‘Issues around the Buildings’ was 
discussed in the eKhaya meeting, the researcher learnt of another norms reconstructed by the 
housing managers. On top of calling for the RCID coordinator to see to it that the JMPD 
implement by-laws; the managers called on future eKhaya meetings to incorporate SAPS and 
metropolitan police officers like in the previous years, and advocated for the implementation of 
measures that would make it possible for eKhaya guards to patrol the precinct at night. While 
the researcher was not interested in pursuing the matter further at the time; it was raised 
subconsciously by Mkhwanazi when he was talking about the challenges he still faces around his 
buildings at night. The essence of the matter is highlighted in Mkhwanazi’s (2013) speech below:  
It’s still very dangerous at night around here! The thing is that the eKhaya guards do not work at 
night; they do not work for 24 hours a day so they work mostly during the day... So we have people 
killed or hurt at night, like last week when someone was mugged and hurt. The other time some 
people were killed at night close to my building, you know? It’s bad at night, man... [...]Ja, we 
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have tried to do something about it... We’ve been trying to get other caretakers to work with us in 
combating crime at night, you know? So we’ve been trying to get other caretakers to persuade 
their property companies to do something, like talk to their bosses and... talk to their property 
owners about this, and recommend that they pay extra money for security to operate at night [...] 
But the thing is some property managers will agree to this... they will agree to this but they are sort 
of reluctant to go forward with it, like the JOSHCO property managers close to my building... So it’s 
hard convincing other people that this is the way forward, If only we could have security people at 
night... our people would not get shot or injured coming from their shifts at night, you know? 
(Mkhwanazi 2013; added emphasis)  
This oration by Mkhwanazi somehow made the researcher realise that in so far as housing 
managers exert a type of influence in decision-making and defying accepted norms (for 
instance, lack of eKhaya security guards at nights); they may not be powerful enough to 
challenge these norms and exerting change on the ground due, among other things, to a lack 
of leverage on other bosses who are not their bosses. This, to some extent, was also made clear 
by Letswalo who expressed his annoyance of informal activities close to his building and his 
inability to ‘make them go away’ singlehandedly: 
Look, eh... Ja! There are some things that you just fail to do outside there, especially outside of my 
building there, just in front of you.... like for example this side, there are a couple of guys who are 
always fixing their cars on the street, you see? And you find that it’s not gonna be easy to me... for 
me to say, “Guys why are you fixing your cars in front of my building or beside my building?! Why 
are you fixing your cars close to my building?!” Sometimes it’s gonna be difficult for me, so now 
what I do is uh... I-I-I’m gonna communicate with eKhaya... [...] Ja! I’m gonna communicate with 
her and then they-they-they gonna make a meeting and then they are gonna go to go meet 
those people. And they’re gonna even get the City Council – the right people, you know, City 
Council – they’re gonna bring them. Even if I was not there, they’re gonna... as long as they are 
gonna come and are gonna check, “Oh this is one, two, three; this is what [Letswalo] was 
complaining about? Fine!” They’re gonna get City Council if that problem needs City Council or if 
that needs a Metro Police or if that needs a SAPS; then they’re gonna get those people. They’ll 
phone them and say, “Come here, come here; let’s make a meeting while doing a walkabout. 
Let’s meet in a certain place”. Those guys they’ve got the right to tell them; me I might not... I 
wouldn’t tell them... I cannot do it on my own, you know? If I go there and tell them, “Why are you 
doing one two three?” they gonna tell me, “No, f@!k off, man; who’re you?” So now when City 
Council is there, they gonna say, “Listen here, why are you doing this?” and then you’ll see going 
like, “Aw sh#+! Ah sorry, man... Yada, yada, yada”. And then City Council or SAPS or Metro will say, 
“We’re giving you one day to move your things from here or to stop what you’re doing here, or 
else you’re gonna get a fine for that.” That’s how it goes, you see? (Letswalo 2013) 
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It became clear to the researcher that there are some activities on eKhaya space that 
somehow seemingly go unnoticed on a day-to-day basis but which ‘nag’ the eKhaya housing 
managers, which may translate to them having to ‘nag’ the City Council to ‘fix things’. It also 
became clear that try as they might, the eKhaya housing managers fail to contest the social 
norms, even with the employment of their norms as practiced. This, to a certain extent, ultimately 
gave the researcher the impression that eKhaya caretakers may have control of the 
happenings in their internal and (certain sections of) their external building spaces but they do 
not possess control of certain sections that comprise their building environs. The power of the 
eKhaya housing manager may in this instance be viewed as something to be negotiated, as 
well as something that is continuously being modified and/or mediated.   
4.4 ‘Conclusory’ Reflection - Interplay between Public and Private Space in eKhaya: From the 
Caretakers’ Perspective 
I know every corner of this building, and I know exactly what’s happening inside this building and 
outside this building. 
(Letswalo 2013) 
Myambo (2010: 105) argues for a conception of urban space as more than just a social 
construct by urging us to think of it “as social relation, as constituting the self and being 
constituted by the self”. This quintessentially suggests that urban actors control and comprise 
urban space in so far as they are comprised and controlled by urban space. This, to a greater 
extent, may then warrant an inquiry into how the everyday practice of the eKhaya building 
managers - the primary objects of the study – “shape and are shaped by the [eKhaya internal 
and external] neighbourhood spaces they regulate” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 349). This 
concluding section of the chapter, for a multitude of reasons stated in the whole chapter and in 
this section, argues for a conceptualisation of the eKhaya building manager as an important 
lens for the conception of the interplay between the private and the public on RCID turf.  
Interviews with all four eKhaya building manager respondents revealed that  
If you’re a caretaker or a building manager, you have to stay in that building; they give you 
accommodation in that building, it doesn’t matter if you’re gonna pay for it or not... but you have 
to stay in that building ‘cause a lot of things can happen while you are not there. (Letswalo 2013)  
By virtue of their residence in the buildings they manage, eKhaya building managers can be 
conceived of as ‘constituents’ of the buildings they govern and – as can be deciphered in some 
of the interview excerpts comprising this chapter – they are very familiar with and conscious of 
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their respective buildings’ activities. This was made more apparent by the ‘tours’ of the buildings 
that the researcher partook in with the building manager respondents; which brought to light 
the actuality that building managers have mental maps of building floors comprised of 
troublesome tenants and ‘good’ tenants. The researcher also noted that the eKhaya building 
managers’ consciousness of their buildings is aided not only by knowledge of – and interaction 
with - their tenants (whom they see on a daily basis) but is also enhanced by the ‘technologies 
of surveillance’ – video cameras, visitors’ books, building security guards, biometric system - that 
are at their disposal. Using these ‘disciplinary technologies’, eKhaya building managers can 
define and decide on collective rules for housing management - who can visit and at what 
time; who can sleep overnight; how many tenants in units and on lifts; who can hold activities 
such as parties in flats; acceptable noise levels; to mention but a prominent few (also see 
interview excerpts in this chapter). Although all this can be negotiated, the deep involvement of 
the eKhaya building managers in the building’s internal ‘place-keeping’ is undeniable. 
By virtue of their active engagement/pro-activeness in eKhaya events – for instance walkabouts 
with the eKhaya organiser(s), children’s events - eKhaya building managers are very conscious 
of their buildings’ surroundings. The shadowing and interviewing of the eKhaya building 
manager respondents revealed that they carry with them a mental map of all activities 
happening in the immediate surroundings of their respective buildings (also refer to interview 
excerpts in this chapter). As well, they have conceptions – and perceptions - of which 
buildings/spaces outside their respective buildings are well-maintained, which ones are in need 
of management intervention, the eKhaya caretakers’ power in intervening in the management 
of such buildings/spaces. This fact is made more manifest by the fact that some buildings within 
the eKhaya South precinct are not members of eKhaya. During the interview and shadowing 
process, the researcher increasingly became aware of the fact that in as much as the building 
managers have control of their respective buildings and their immediate surroundings, they are 
not in total control of some of the buildings’ environs, especially those comprising non-eKhaya 
member buildings. While building managers such as Morrison (2013) have been able to co-opt 
such surrounding buildings to work with eKhaya buildings in managing space; some building 
managers – for example Mkhwanazi, Letswalo and Christianson – appear unable to convince 
building managers to work with them in maintaining the external environment. A fact that, as 
the researcher realised, was made more and more by the fact that some buildings within 
eKhaya South are not part of the initiative. Yet given that some of the buildings under study are 
characterised by informal practices (panhandling, trading, homelessness) that are seemingly 
tolerated by (some of) the eKhaya building manager respondents and not tolerated by some 
respondents; it may become clear that eKhaya building managers’ “daily practice entails 
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negotiating tensions between competing ideas of order in [the external spaces of] a changing 
built environment [such as Hillbrow]” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 355). “Geographical 
imaginations [of external eKhaya space] are a set of informal expressions – perceptions of urban 
spaces and spatialities that condition discretionary decisions” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 
355) of the caretakers. By virtue of the fact that some building managers appear tolerant of the 
informal activity taking place outside their buildings whereas some are not, it appears that the 
daily practices of eKhaya building managers are very influential in the physical and socio-spatial 
character of their buildings’ surroundings, that of eKhaya South, as well as that of urban 
residential neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow.  
The external space of the buildings under study is comprised of surveillance technologies (CCTV 
cameras) and human surveillance (eKhaya patrollers); and the eKhaya housing manager 
respondents not only have video cameras pointing to what is happening in their buildings’ 
immediate surroundings, they also work closely with the eKhaya patrollers. Yet in so far as 
building managers appear to have internalised a modernist psyche and/or official discourse of 
‘clean and safe spaces’ as a condition for growth and investment; the operation of informal 
practices outside some of the buildings under study is manifest. This then somewhat points to the 
relationship between – and interplay of – internal and external space on eKhaya: in sofar as 
both these spaces are guarded/surveilled, the rules and norms pertaining to who can 
access/use them appear fully negotiable. Not only that, the eKhaya building managers – by 
virtue of their residence in the buildings, their daily interaction with their buildings’ environs, and 
the power vested in them by their property owners/management companies – play an active, if 
not central, part in mediation of what activities are to transpire on these spaces. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – DRIVING AND MANAGING URBAN CHANGE: THE BIGGER PICTURE 
What drives a city? It’s private investment. I wish it wasn’t like that, trust me. But [...] the lifeblood of most 
economies is the private sector [...] The only thing that really sustains a city, an area is private people 
putting their money there – individual households maintaining their property or corporate owners. So ... if 
we declare ourselves to be un-interested in private investment then we are failing to take responsibility for 
future generations. 
(CoJ’s LaelBethlehem as cited in Lipietz 2004: 9) 
But the lesson - I was very surprised –was people are crying out for management and leadership […] which 
is why I work with leaders. It’s not that all [eKhaya] housing supervisors are leaders […] But some people 
have developed as citizens and they’ve gotten as much gratification out of it; because I’ve got people 
who’ve lived in Hillbrow for 20, 30, 40 years and have participated in this; and they’ve come into their own 
as people with agency. You know when I watch those guys organise those soccer games, these are men 
who’ve been drawn their whole life; they see themselves within their company... Something’s happening. 
I’m not going to call it citizenship or part citizenship. I’m going to say I’m working with men and women [...] 
The process is organising around an issue, developing action around an issue and seeing them through with 
a more or less dormant city council which has just got to put ticks on a score card... the City only wants to 
score successes for the score cards; the officials. But they’re starting to get it some of them are leaders who 
are starting to engage […] Now, leaders, must they only be poor people? No! Leaders exist everywhere; it 
depends how you work with them; and they will decide who will be the leaders and who will be the 
followers and who will operate at what level. But I can’t say that property owners have learnt majorly about 
great leadership. [...] They really were worried that I was gonna mobilise tenants! [...]And it’s been 
interesting for me over 9 years to see how they have all learnt a lot from each other, because the market is 
fiercely competitive, and the management has had to come from 30 years. Landlords in history are 
demons; property owning is not a game for sissies. But there wouldn’t have been another stakeholder 
group with whom to make a neighbourhood than that one. You couldn’t have mobilised tenants to make 
a neighbourhood, could you? It just wouldn’t have been the real thing until you organise property owners. 
(Adler 2013 on the lessons that eKhaya has taught her) 
Housing management is also a political activity. 
(Clapham 1995: 765) 
5.1 Introduction 
Many contemporary scholars, most notably advocates of the neoliberal agenda, argue for a 
devolution of power to the sub-local scale on the grounds that the small scale offers us a viable 
magnitude to look into the collective associations in “the real world” (Torres 2011: ; Jupp 2012; 
also refer to Chapter Two). There is a commonly held assertion that the small scale “encourages 
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greater democratic participation on the part of local level institutions and citizens” (Ellis 2012: 
1145). Yet Purcell (2006: 1921) squashes the claim that “the local scale is... inherently more 
democratic than other scales”. The scholar argues that there is nothing more democratic or 
socially progressive about the local scale; and that thinking thus is falling into ‘the local trap’. He 
particularly points out that no scale has inherent’ properties attached to it because scales – just 
like truth, discourse, knowledge, norms (Foucault 1991a) - are social constructs, a result of 
political struggle, and are a strategy aimed at achieving specific objectives. Using the instance 
of the proposed biotechnology project in Seattle’s inner city - South Lake City - Purcell (2006) 
also demonstrates that there has been a ’misappropriation’ of yet another important concept in 
the domain of urban studies: Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’. Purcell (2006) argues that a ‘right to 
the city’ based on the idea that users not owners should be part of decisions affecting 
production of the city might fall into the local trap if it over-emphasizes everyday uses (ibid.). In 
the context of eKhaya, can this argument then justify the participation of property owners in 
affairs pertaining to Hillbrow regardless of the fact that they do not live there. Impacts of 
decisions made at local level may extend beyond that scale and affect the metropolitan area 
as a whole; which may limit the participation of other city citizens in other city sections, thus 
deprive them of their ‘right to the city’ (ibid.). Hence, suggests Purcell (2006), in some 
metropolitan large-scale projects occurring at sub-local scale – for instance those happening in 
the inner city – residents at large too should decide.  
In the context of Hillbrow’seKhaya, can all the aforementioned arguments hold true? Purcell’s 
(2006) aforementioned arguments and recommendations appear to be more or less in harmony 
with Adler’s (2013) advice that,  
The most important thing about the [eKhaya Neighbourhood] CID is not to define it, because the 
minute you make a wall, you’re building reaction against the wall. Nobody knows where eKhaya 
begins and ends, and that’s useful [...] you can see eKhaya has a funny shape, and that’s where 
the [CID] legislation is not useful”13. (Adler 2013) 
Having been thus advised, we get the impression that eKhaya – an urban renewal initiative 
which continues to expand to areas outside of Hillbrow (HDA 2012; Adler 2012; also see Chapter 
One) – should be imagined not as ‘an island’ but as a (significant) constituent of Hillbrow, 
Johannesburg Central and CoJ Metropolitan Municipality. Picturing eKhaya thus may be 
requisite because “[w]hile it is focused within a defined neighbourhood, eKhaya [purportedly] 
                                                          
13Important to note is the fact that even within the so-called eKhaya wall, there are other buildings within the precinct 
that are not part of this. The implications of this will be touched on in this chapter’s following sections. Also refer to 
Chapter One’s Figure 1G for a cartographic illustration of this point. 
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also addresses the broader concern of sustainable socioeconomic regeneration across the inner 
city” (Savage Dodd and Architects 2012). Given that the eKhayaRCID is a 
…project [that] is primarily committed to the improvement in the quality of the environment in 
Hillbrow and through this the quality of life of those living and working in the area. Its primary 
objective is regeneration of the ‘business of the city’ by creating a financial node that encourages 
and protects investment for owners of residential buildings, businesses and social infrastructure. 
Essential for achieving this is the improvement of the quality of the environment and the life of 
people living and working in the area and larger surrounds.(HDA 2012: 11) 
It becomes apparent that just like Seattle’s proposed South Lake City biotechnology scheme (as 
depicted in Purcell’s (2006) text), eKhaya is a project whose impacts affect the CoJ and the lives 
of its inner city residents and residents generally, one way or another. The CoJ aspires to be “a 
world class African city” (CoJ GDS 2040 2013) by 2040; and in a bid to accomplish this objective 
the City has “committed itself to an intensive process of engagement with a variety of 
stakeholders, including, importantly, the citizens who live and work here” (CoJ GDS 2040 [2013: 
6).This then solicits our understanding of the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association’s position on a 
broader city/regional/metropolitan scale. In other words, this begs for an unpacking of how a 
RCID like eKhaya has affected and been affected by the Johannesburg city government’s 
agenda/policies. There is a pressing need to uncover the degree– if any - to which “eKhaya 
outputs, projects and activities” (HDA 2012: 33), norms and operations resist, calibrate and/or are 
in tandem with “the city’s cosmopolitan aspirations [… and] imaginary and ambition toward 
world-class city status” (Ellis 2012: 1149). Trying to uncover this may require of us to look at 
eKhaya’s relationship with the City, in terms of the extent to which eKhaya– as an institution 
and/or urban renewal initiative – participates in the citywide issues via its leaders; and the 
degree of the City’s involvement in eKhaya issues. 
This closing chapter is based on the researcher’s reflection on how the day-to-day working of 
RCIDs is intertwined with “orders from the top” (Bawa 2011: 494); how management in/of RCIDs is 
recruited by macro-economic institutions such as the (local) state. The chapter is focused on 
urban change and the role of private actors in driving urban change; with the primary objective 
of discerning which stakeholders drive change – and what type of change – in RCIDs such as 
eKhaya. In attempting to do this, the chapter initially engages with Ananya Roy’s concept of 
‘civic governmentality’. The theory of ‘civic governmentality’ is engaged with on the grounds 
that it offers an important twist in thinking about (neoliberal) governmentality, and allows room 
for popular associations from individuals and institutions down below and/or at the bottom (Roy 
2009; Ellis 2012) – institutions such as eKhaya and individuals such as eKhaya coordinators and 
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building managers. Perhaps more importantly, in light of the realisation that “’participation’ is ... 
one way in which various institutions and individuals become enlisted in the governmentality of 
the neoliberalizing state” (Ellis 2012: 1149; added emphasis); this chapter unpacks the 
relationship between “various state, non-state and quasi-state actors [who] become [actively] 
involved in urban governance” (ibid: 1145) of eKhaya and Johannesburg. Furthermore, the 
chapter attempts to outline the history of landlord-tenant relations/tensions; with the aim of 
tracing the evolution of Hillbrow caretakers (in terms of when they really became prominent), as 
well as uncovering the extent to which the City has become engaged in such a presumably 
private relationship. In a nutshell, the chapter seeks to discern the extent to which the micro-
processes of eKhaya building managers can be constituted with the behaviours of ‘people at 
the top’ (eKhaya co-ordinator, people in City institutions); and what this means for urban 
change and our view of the city as a whole. 
5.2 Unpacking Liaisons between State (CoJ) and Civil Society Organisations (eKhaya RCID) via 
‘Civic Governmentality’ 
5.2.1 ‘Negotiation over Confrontation’ as Characteristic of Contemporary Activism: Arguments 
for and against the Concept of ‘Civic Governmentality’ 
Ellis (2012: 1143) studies the “politics of inclusion… and… technologies of governing” (Roy 2009: 
159) in Indian cities such as Chennai; the degree to which “various segments of civil society” (Ellis 
2012: 1143) participate and/or are engaged in citywide issues such as urban renewal in India. In 
the context of “the brutal violence implied by urban development in India [...] that ha[s] directly 
led to the demolition of the homes of more than 300,000 slum dwellers” (Buckley 2011: 272 – 273); 
Ellis (2012: 1143 – 1153) concludes that: 
Contemporary forms of urban governance in India are characterised by an increasingly influential 
private sector and bourgeois forms of activism. But complicating any wholesale neoliberalization of 
urban governance is a dynamic and heterogeneous terrain of urban politics, and a local state that 
adopts policies of neoliberalization in a piecemeal and at times contradictory fashion. Moreover, in 
many instances, middle class sensibilities are not in tune with either state plans or with the influence 
of private capital [...] so that we can assume no easy alliance between middle class civic activism, 
capital and the liberalizing state [...] Now [there] is a collection of private sector leaders who 
recognize they have to step in, both as businessmen and as citizens of that city to make Chennai, 
for example, into a world-class city ... What’s in it for me? [A]world class city of your own! (Ellis 2012: 
1146; added emphasis) 
Ellis’s (2012) observation implies that in the Indian city, urban politics and urban change/renewal 
are increasingly being influenced by affluent members of society at the disbursement of the 
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urban poor. Ellis (2012) also seems to be implying that these affluent members – while able to 
influence the local state – more-often-than-not hold divergent interests and rationales of urban 
renewal that are in conflict with those of the local state and/or “orders from the top” (Bawa 
2011: 494). This then begs the questions: how does a politics of co-operation/participation unfold 
in a context of “conflicting rationalities” (Watson 2003: 395), violence/chaos, neoliberalism and 
urban renewal that typify the Indian urban landscape? “What does it mean... to try and 
construct more inclusive ways of living the city, in such a context of disorderly-ness?” (Lipietz 
2004: 6). What are the real impacts/outcomes of community participation as discourse for 
inclusion in the [Indian] city? How far can some community-based stakeholders/organisations 
compromise in order to keep a working relation to the city government? To answer these 
questions, Ellis (2012) – whose work is heavily dependent on new theoretical perspectives 
emerging from cities of the south - would draw heavily from Ananya Roy’s concept of ‘civic 
governmentality’. Ellis (2012: 1144) would argue that while a discourse of participation “privileges 
and normalises a civil society-centred politics”; it is still “inherently exclusionary” (Roy 2009: 164) 
because it rules out the poor and recruits “urban elites as stakeholders in the world-class city” 
(Ellis 2012: 1156). Thus, notes Ellis (2012: 1144; original emphasis), these diverse segments of civil 
society are being engaged via “an emerging civic governmentality... specifically through the 
practices of public consultation. It is through these practices of public consultation that a vision 
for the world-class city becomes common sense among diverse urban interests”. Thus, the co-
optation of the privileged – and the mediation of their conflicting conceptions regarding urban 
development - is largely attributable to a budding civic governmentality. Still, what is this ‘civic 
governmentality’ and how do contemporary urban practices of participation produce it? 
According to Roy (2009: 160), civic governmentality is a concept that can help us to understand 
the various types of “’civil society’ and ‘political society’ [uncivil society]” (Chatterjee 2004 as 
cited in Roy 2009: 160) communicating with the local state “in ways that do not always gain full 
articulation in more traditional views of state-society relations” (Bradlow 2013: 22). Roy (2009) at 
once acknowledges and rejects preceding forms of governmentality invented by fellow scholars 
Appadurai and Chatterjie– ‘governmentality from above’ and ‘governmentality from below’ – 
and constructs the theory of ‘civic governmentality’ which, according to her, pertains to:   
...organizations that seek to construct and manage a civic realm [...] regimes of government that 
both resist and comply with what may be perceived as top-down forms of rule, be it those 
emanating from the state or from international institutions. Such civic regimes produce a 
‘governmentalization of the state’, recreating the terms of rule and citizenship. At the same time, 
there is also a ‘civilizing’ of political society, such that grassroots governmentality comes to turn on 
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formations of civic identity and a broader civic commitment to the idea of a unified city.(Roy 2009: 
160) 
Roy (2009) constructs this theoretical concept through a study of two different types of civil 
society organizations – Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centre (Mumbai, India) and 
Hezbollah (Beirut, Lebanon) - the one discussed in this section being Society for the Promotion of 
Area Resource Centre (hereafter SPARC). SPARC is a small support NGO that is internationally 
celebrated and respected in academic and philanthropic circles for “working to improve the 
lives of slum dwellers in India and around the world”. The group is a “mediating institution” (Roy 
2009: 163) that “perform[s] a bridging function between social movements and the state” 
(Buckley 2011: 280). On top of “work[ing] with rather than against the state” (Roy 2009:); SPARC 
works hand in hand with “urban poor social movements” (Bradlow 2013: 21) such as Mahila 
Milan and Slum Dwellers International (SDI), helping to resettle Mumbai’s displaced 
“encroachers” (Buckley 2011: 280) as well as helping to secure ‘substantial’ compensations for 
them (Bradlow 2013). SPARC’s work has received vast (financial) support from supra-national 
agencies like the World Bank for empowering political society –the institution mobilises 
disadvantaged communities to raise money for producing their own basic amenities as well as 
to negotiate with the state (Roy 2009; Buckley 2011). 
Nevertheless, rather than see SPARC as entitled to being called an instrument of “deep 
democracy” (Appadurai as quoted and described in Buckley 2011: 277); Roy (2009) declares 
that SPARC is an agent of gentrification “collaborat[ing] with the bourgeois” (Buckley 2011: 281), 
“operat[ing] as part of the state” (ibid: 282) and manipulating the indigent in the process. Roy 
(2009) argues that the organisation, by working co-operatively with the displaced poor and 
helping them get compensated, ensures that the urban poor are peacefully dislocated and do 
not resort to radical/’uncivic’ tactics like picketing. By “insisting on collaboration rather than 
confrontation” (Roy 2009: 169), the NGO somewhat “bureaucratizes and deradicalizes urban 
social movements” (Davis 2007: 76; added emphasis). Roy (2009) also points out that SPARC, by 
encouraging the movement of the poor from areas targeted for redevelopment/renewal, “at 
best follows a strategy that appeals to middle-class sensibilities about cleanliness and order […] 
effectively selling out the poor to the forces that would transform Mumbai into a neoliberal, 
bourgeois city” (Buckley 2011: 277). Hence, asserts Roy (2009: 169), SPARC’s behaviour 
consequently implies that the status quo – the overall city agenda of urban renewal and/or 
“turning Mumbai into the ‘next Shanghai’”-remains unchallenged and thus unchanged. This 
therefore means that SPARC accepts the state’s modernist psyche of a clean ‘disciplined’ city; it 
acknowledges “Vision Mumbai’s cliché of a slum-free world-class city” (ibid: 175) and “[k]eeping 
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the [p]easants out” (Davis 2007: 51) of this city. What is more, SPARC’s operations of cooperative 
participation in deprived communities naturally involve discrimination - exclusion of “those 
communities unwilling to contribute or organize a payment scheme for maintenance and 
running costs of […] service[s]” (Buckley 2011: 281); conduct which Roy (2009) finds to be “very 
much [like] that of an agent of the [neoliberal] state” (Buckley 2011: 281). As well, by 
redeveloping slums, SPARC is not only “formalis[es] the informal in an attempt to ‘extract value 
from the city’” (Lipietz 2004: 1); it also effectively “push[es] out the poorest members who are not 
able to afford the redeveloped units” (Roy 2009: 170) and thus undermines their use value. 
Perhaps Roy’s concept of civic governmentality as it relates to SPARC and similar grassroots 
institutions worldwide is best summed up by Ellis (2012) in the extract below: 
… despite the pro-poor and rights-based language of certain civil society organisations, much of 
this new civic-ness is inherently ‘developmental’ because it envisions a city comprised of ordered, 
sanitary living spaces and also ‘civilising’ as it promotes a politics of co-operation and mediation 
over confrontation. (Ellis 2012: 1143) 
When SPARC’s behaviour as an institution is looked at through Roy’s (2009) concept of ‘civic 
governmentality’; we may be justified for thinking that the NGO is co-opting ‘political society’, 
doing this via bringing the ‘infringers’ under the requirements of the law as well as through 
discarding and rendering ‘uncivic’ political society’s radical attempts at being heard. By so 
doing, SPARC not only “help[s] to impose the arbitrary dictates of the bureaucracy” (Buckley 
2011: 282) on poor urban subjects; it also moulds them in such a way as for them to be 
“simultaneously… disciplined and… wilful,… empowered… and…obedient,… desiring… and… 
altruistic… The creation of such subjects is a key aspect of civic governmentality” (Roy 2009: 
168). Ultimately, civic governmentality implies that the urban poor only participate and/or are 
included by way of being compensated and ‘appeased’/’tamed’. Bayat (as cited and 
discussed in Davis 2007: 77) would in this case be justified for arguing that “the professionalization 
of NGOs tends to diminish the mobilizational feature of grassroots activism, while it establishes a 
new form of clientelism”. 
Yet scholars such as Buckley (2011) have rushed to the defence of SPARC, and have criticised 
Roy’s (2009) concept of ‘civic governmentality’ in the process. Some of the criticisms articulated 
by Buckley (2011) about Roy’s work on SPARC and ‘civic governmentality’ are that Roy (2009) – 
in her quest to go for “bigger conceptual fish than just SPARC” (Buckley 2011: 278)–analyses 
SPARC theoretically with no careful consideration of the organisation’s economic 
basis/rationalities. Buckley (2011: 277) finds this absurd and argues that SPARC’s economic 
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underpinnings are justified especially since “economics matters too” (ibid: 277). Whereas Roy 
(2009)dismisses NGOs like SPARC as facilitators of a politics of negotiation and arrangements 
with power that are intrinsically conservative – not challenging policies and strategic directions 
for property value creation –Buckley (2011) conceives of this politics of negotiation with power 
as inevitably necessary. Writes Buckley (2011: 282), “by negotiating, the community and the city 
can in principle achieve a solution that is superior to either of the extremes”. While Roy (2009) 
argues that SPARC automatically excludes the (poorest of the) poor by mobilising them and 
making them pay for services like sanitation; Buckley (2011) sees SPARC’s actions as justifiably 
necessary on the grounds that:  
The commitment by community members to pay for services and keep the property clean avoids 
the “free rider” problem that arises with collectively provided goods. […] [S]uch free riding can 
accelerate asset depreciation by enormous amounts. […] As a result, working out both which 
communities are willing to organize to provide the good and then how to pay for it on an ongoing 
basis are basic democratic functions as well as functions that can increase the likelihood that rapid 
asset depreciation is reduced. This kind of agency on behalf of the state appears to have high 
economic value as well as high democratic content. (Buckley 2011: 281) 
Buckley’s (2011) defence of SPARC’s agency is interesting because it takes us back to the 
characteristics of RCIDs, the most important for this discussion being “[p]aying for … privately 
provided service[s]” (Samson 2007: 128). This evinces neoliberal governmentality’s economic 
agent rationality of citizenry as market actors who “get [their] money and do it… [because] who 
pays gets” (Adler 2013; also refer to Section 2.3 of Chapter Two). Adler (2013), in her capacity as 
organiser of eKhaya and other community projects in Johannesburg, echoes this economic 
agent rationality in the quote below: 
So JDA is terribly excited about these lanes that were upgraded (pointing to eKhaya map), and 
these are the lanes where I’ve got management agreements and the neighbours work together 
[…] There’s a Tswana proverb that says, “You must look how many people cook, and how many 
people come to eat” … JDA, they’re like, “Oh we’ll roll out another project!” Now organising likes 
tensions, it doesn’t like peace; good tensions because that way you can make change happen. 
So these property owners in Berea were complaining, “Why didn’t our lanes get?” They only got 
one lane there because of one influential strong property owner here, so he got his done. But that 
is not managed like these were; but the residents in the building the area, everybody got proud of 
eKhaya Neighbourhood. JDA now comes, “We’re gonna roll out another 13 lanes“. So the Council 
is mourning and the work committee is mourning there, “You’re only doing it there, why aren’t you 
doing it here?” “Well, wake up and smell the roses; get organised!” As when I worked with the 
squatters in Alexandra; we had a meeting at 8 o’clock and they said to me, “Why are they only 
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bringing the toilets down to there? Why don’t they carry on down to 15th Street?” And the reason 
is pretty obvious: “Because the people up there are gonna be paying; they’re gonna be 
ratepayers, and you’re squatters. Smell the roses and get organised.” Isn’t it so? Well, coffee... 
whatever you like! (Adler 2013; added emphasis) 
Adler’s (2013) quote is interesting because it suggests that her work as community organizer has 
always involved a ‘civilizing’ of political society via making them collectively pay for privately 
provided services. Interestingly, or perhaps sadly, in the context of “a voluntary association” 
(Adler 2013) such as eKhaya, we find that “even though only half pay […] the other 50% who are 
not paying are eating; [and so] they’ve benefitted from a safe area” (bid.). HDA (2012: 15) is 
also conscious of the problem of those who are not paying but are getting/eating; and largely 
attributes it to “the reluctance of commercial property owners […] [as] they already have their 
cleaning services for their pavement space and already pay for their own security”. We then 
wonder how eKhaya organisers are dealing with and/or intending to address the purported free 
rider problem affecting the district. More importantly, we ask ourselves whether or not the 
concept of civic governmentality can help us better understand the relationships between the 
CoJ and different eKhaya stakeholders. Is there a budding civic governmentality in 
Johannesburg just like in Indian cities? If there is, to what extent is eKhaya - an institution that, 
unlike other RCIDs in Johannesburg, has “a ‘human settlement development’ approach” (HDA 
2012: 19) - contributing to this civic governmentality? Most importantly, how is the agency of 
building managers constituted in this civic governmentality? The following sub-sections are 
dedicated to answering these questions. 
5.2.2 A Bottom-up Association serving ‘Randlord’, Landlord and State Interests? Unpacking 
Current and Coming eKhaya-CoJ Relations via ‘Civic Governmentality’ 
As “a new form of urban governance for the improvement of residential areas” (Friesecke and 
Lockemann 2008: 1) in inner city Johannesburg; RCIDs such as Maboneng Precinct have gained 
momentum not just locally but nationally and globally for the change that they are driving. For 
instance, Murphy (2012), writing for internationally renowned American fashion magazine W, 
argues that creative urban renewal initiatives like Maboneng Precinct are playing a crucial role 
in the construction ofJohannesburg as Africa’s “Capital of Cool”. Thanks in large part to urban 
renewal initiatives such as Maboneng; Johannesburg – a city that has since 1994 come to be 
“an international case study in urban decay” (Mabuse 2012) and hard-core crime – is steadily 
“shedding its painful, crime-ridden past to emerge as Africa’s hippest hub for art, music and 
fashion” (Murphy 2012). Murphy (2012) however does not delve into how CIDs like Maboneng 
feed into Johannesburg’s recasting of its history and/or brand image as a slum and crime 
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capital. In spite of this, it remains palpable that the CID, by virtue of its “concentrat[ion] on the 
formal tackling of ‘crime and grime’ through contracting of service providers to provide direct 
cleaning and security services” (HDA 2012: 13), is contributing to the reduction of reported crime 
in Johannesburg’s inner city. As well, it becomes manifest that urban renewal initiatives like 
Maboneng Precinct have led to an increase in property values in inner city Johannesburg, in line 
with the CoJ’s aspirations of property value creation. 
The same can be said of Hillbrow’s eKhaya. Since its inception in 2004, there has been a 
significant drop in reported criminal activities in Hillbrow (Adler 2004; JHC 2008; Morrison 2013). 
Adler (2013) and HDA (2012: 18) declare that the success of the eKhaya Neighbourhood 
Association – which “in [large] part grew from the City and the inability of state agencies to 
manage some key functions in the area” - has silenced cynics and surpassed the expectations 
of sceptics such as the City officials. With its emphasis on strong community involvement as a 
cornerstone for inclusive urban renaissance; eKhaya appears to have succeeded where the 
City has perceivably failed: constant garnering of different community members towards the 
goal of urban (neighbourhood) change. Given that the City appears incapacitated to act on 
‘bad’/’hijacked’ buildings in Hillbrow and the Johannesburg inner city; the eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association is somehow working with such buildings – non-eKhaya buildings 
included - via the buildings’ managers: 
But we have managed to work outside of them and keep them with their problems inside, with 
their internal problems. We had one here by Metropolitan Bank, you see this one over there; they 
used to throw things over the balconies; but through talking to the caretaker, we have now 
managed to control them; they’re no longer doing it. Even though the building looks ... they are no 
longer throwing things onto the streets and what-not. That’s the only difference that we have... but 
we’ve got quite a number of hijacked buildings in eKhaya; but you cannot realise now because of 
the outside environment. Before, you could see the hijacked buildings by the area, the dirtiness 
outside; but those within our area now, the outside is clean, it’s only when you get inside the 
buildings that you can see that this is a hijacked building. (Mkhize 2013) 
Against the backdrop of “an ephemeral police presence” (Gossmann and Premo 2012: 2) in 
Hillbrow, the work of the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association has contributed significantly to the 
drop in criminal activity in the neighbourhood (Henry 2011; HDA 2012), which may lead us to 
believing Adler’s (2013) notion that, “people stop crime, not police”. These commendable feats 
on the part of eKhaya and its organiser[s] highlight the possibility of mobilising and managing 
people in “situations of chronic violence” (Gossmann and Premo 2012: 1)–thus constructing 
governable urban subjects and governable urban spaces -further demonstrating that private 
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actors play an active role in driving urban change (Jupp 2012; Lipietz 2004). eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association’s achievements and its “ongoing lobbying  with the City” (HDA 
2012: 14) have meant that the ‘civil society organisation’ “has become more recognised and 
respected” (ibid: 18) by the CoJ and other RSA metropolitan municipalities14; the CoJ having 
‘poured’ substantial capital investment for the improvement of public space amenities in the 
district (HDA 2012; also see Chapter One). Indeed, the movement’s continuous conciliation and 
co-operation with the City have culminated in the accomplishment of many services; among 
them open derelict spaces which have been converted into recreational parks for the eKhaya 
Neighbourhood community, and possibly the whole of Hillbrow (refer to Chapter Four’s Section 
4.2.1). These spaces provide a good setting for eKhaya sporting activities and/or social events, 
which are driven by building managers. After negotiating with eKhaya, the City has given the 
organisation management responsibilities regarding these spaces. In this instance, the eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association comes across as a ‘movement’ working with the state to secure 
services for residents of a neighbourhood that was once redlined and considered 
unruly/ungovernable. 
These are not the only accomplishments that eKhaya seems to have bagged. Not only has the 
movement ‘bargained’ with the state for services/amenities, it has also gone to great lengths to 
get the City to modify its policy on CIDs and sectional title buildings on the basis that sectional 
title buildings render it impossible to get the votes of a majority of the owners to pass a RCID 
(Adler 2013). We are told by the Housing Development Agency that “in so doing [eKhaya] is 
helping to redefine forms of implementing CIDs that require policy consideration by 
municipalities” (HDA 2012: 14, 28; Adler 2013). Indeed,  
eKhaya has made representation to the City of Johannesburg about certain revisions to the 
[current] CID legislation. It will need to continue to lobby for the changes. If these are made it can 
then proceed with the formal approach of establishing itself as a Section 21 company and a CID. If 
not it will have to proceed on the ‘voluntarist’ basis that it has been successful with to date (HDA 
2013: 28) 
From the citation above, it comes to light that eKhaya Neighbourhood Association, whilst 
complying with the local state, may also attempting to reconfigure – and perhaps challenge - 
the laws/policies/rules emanating from the City vis-à-vis CIDs; doing this through persuading the 
City to change some ‘written’/’official norms’. Not only is this reminiscent of Roy’s ‘grassroots 
regimes of government’ (Ellis 2012) that both resist and comply with the state’s forms of rule; it 
                                                          
14According to Mkhize (2013), city authorities from Nelson Mandela Bay have come to eKhaya to find out what the fuss is 
all about; and have been in awe of what they have seen so far. 
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also makes us wonder how the City really interacts and negotiates with eKhaya Neighbourhood 
Association on an ongoing day-to-day basis. To what extent is eKhaya governmentalized? To 
what extent is the City actively implicated in eKhaya’s everyday activities? Mkhize (2013), in her 
account of her duties as eKhaya organiser, sheds light on this relationship in the quote below: 
I convene meetings - eKhaya Board members’ meetings; AGM meetings; Housing Supervisors’ 
meetings. I even attend Visible Service Delivery meetings. That’s a meeting that is held by Region F 
since Hillbrow is part of the inner city. So under all those meetings we will be planning different 
issues for the Neighbourhood. Like in the case of housing supervisors; when we’re with them we 
have some walkabouts in the neighbourhood. In these walkabouts, we will be compiling some 
issues outside for service delivery. So each housing manager is giving us whatever issues are around 
his place, around his area, so at the end all the housing supervisors will be having issues to be 
resolved by the City, and then we put them together in a matrix and we send them to Region F for 
MOEs, Heads of Departments - like JRA, Pikitup, Joburg Water, City Power – to come and solve 
those problems that we identified together with the housing supervisors [...] And then the AGM itself 
is structured simply in eKhaya; it’s not very complicated, because the stakeholders – the property 
owners15 – have appointed the board members who run the whole organisation: the day-to-day 
activities of the organisation, managing and running their financials, getting in new members, 
installing some safety projects like ... we’ve got cameras outside. Those are long-term projects that 
need to be approved at the AGM and implemented by the Board, hence to report back that, 
“This is done”. So, at the AGM actually you’ll be reporting back to them; giving them the picture of 
the organisation; what has been going on annually within the organisation. Are the people happy? 
Because all what they have to check is their profit to see whether is this business sustainable? And 
the only way they can look at that is to see that their buildings are always full... and so they will 
know that this place is what? It’s liveable if their buildings are full. So they will be getting those kinds 
of reports at the meeting, that, “This is how we’ve been doing; we’ve been holding meetings 
about this and that”. You tell them how many meetings, you tell them what you are planning; you 
give them the picture again of the way forward, what you are planning for the upcoming year. So, 
their mandate is to approve of other things that you cannot approve at the Board; so to tell them, 
“You’ve got new members because we’ve managed to get other new members coming in to join 
you”. (Mkhize 2013) 
Yet Adler (2013) and Mkhize (2013) indicate that although the City is supportive of the 
Association, it does not always ‘deliver’; and when it does solve the problems identified with the 
building managers and other stakeholders in eKhaya and Region F, the City usually does not 
                                                          
15Interesting that she conceives of property owners as ‘thestakeholders’ - it gives us the impression that in the association, 
only the property owners are worthy of the title ‘stakeholders’ 
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deliver on time. Adler (2013) narrates a story that points to the everyday challenges that eKhaya 
stakeholders initially had with City institutions like Pikitup in the quote below: 
So Pikitup announced that property owners have to pay for replacement bins. [...] So when we 
started with eKhaya, the trucks used to come around and they wouldn’t take the rubbish from 
Silverdale16, from Lake Success17 unless we bought them beers or cold drinks from the taverns. OK, 
that was 7 years ago, they don’t do that anymore; but they do throw the bins around. So the 
cleaners would say that it’s the Pikitup guys who break the bins. And then they don’t come on time 
so ... the bins get stolen! You can’t stay outside with your bins all day, and then they come at 10 
o’clock at night, and your bins grow walkies. So I took the opportunity of ... because I knew the 
owners are going to complain to the housing supervisors that they’ve gotta pay for replacement 
bins! The housing supervisors have been complaining in housing supervisors’ meetings that the 
Pikitup guys are throwing the bins around, and that they don’t come! Right! What’s the opportunity 
with Pikitup statement they’re going to have a meeting with the housing supervisors. So we ask 
them from the whole of Hillbrow. 60 came to a meeting, 60 building managers came to meet 
Pikitup; the 60 guys who are defensive aggressive! And all the issues came out. And, as an 
organiser, you use that opportunity to say, “You know, we know that your street ladies are terrified 
working in Hillbrow! They’re unhappy working here. But we also know that they sweep the one side 
of the street going down and they carry the brooms going up! They don’t sweep the other side of 
the street.  But we also know that they sweep into storm water drains, and then the storm water 
drains are then blocked! We also know that the people from Idlewild and other badly managed 
buildings throw bottles at them at night, and pap! And that they’re abused! Isn’t it time now for 
Khomanani18?” Bambanani19 […] So we can’t have the buildings here and the rubbish here and 
Pikitup here and they’re supposed to take the rubbish and the rubbish is sitting in-between; we’ve 
gotta be like this (puts hands together). So you have one bloody good meeting and of course the 
City people are all ... you know ... they’ve been trained! And their people-ness has been reduced 
so ... about what they can and what they can’t do [...] but that meeting was an amazing success 
because now the Pikitup people, now we’re working with their team leaders. (Adler 2013) 
Mkhize (2013) however disagrees with Adler’s (2013) view that things have changed since the 
meeting was convened. Asked about the everyday challenges and benefits she faces as 
current co-ordinator of eKhaya, Mkhize (2013) contradicted Adler (2013) by stating the following: 
You know, it’s very challenging outside because, really, making people do what they don’t realise 
sometimes is very difficult ... Like, say, the issue of service delivery. The City is known for not 
                                                          
16A JHC-owned building that is part of eKhaya 
17Idem 
18Xitsonga term for ‘Unite’ and/or ‘Come together’ 
19Nguni term for ‘Unite’ and/or ‘Come together’ 
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attending to these things as quickly as possible; so what you have to do is you have to be behind 
them in order for them to come and perform the duties. You have to liaise with them, phone them, 
tell them, ask them, beg them; do everything! But at the end of the day they’ll take their time to 
come and do it. On the other hand, you’ll be getting pressure from the property owners and their 
housing supervisors who will be expecting to see the area clean; so you’ll be in between now, who 
to chase... those are the things. And again .even, Pikitup sometimes, they’ve got a programme, 
they’re doing well sometimes. It fluctuates. You could find that they’re all outside but on Mondays - 
every Monday – they’re having an issue because not all of them are at work. So you have to see to 
it that where they are not having any cleaners, you make sure you get our cleaners to go and 
support them. And then the nice thing is when you walk out and you see the results of what has 
come out from what you have done, though it is a long process. Those results are not very quick to 
see; they take time but when you see them, if you go outside and you see that the area is clean, 
you know it’s not on your shoulders and it’s out of you. You see the kids are playing and they can 
now go to the shops without anyone supervising them. Unlike before when you could not send your 
child to the shops, when you could not talk over your phone in public and you could not do 
anything in public. But now all those things are back to normal so you can really actually see what 
we’ve been doing in the neighbourhood has been working for us, because it’s now safe: people 
can now walk without any intimidation or complaints. That is what really makes us ... it really drives 
us, it motivates us to keep doing all these things that we’re doing. At the end, you do see the 
results, but they come very slowly (laughs very loudly) (Mkhize 2013; added emphasis) 
Having been informed of this, the researcher became conscious of the fact that although the 
City institutions still provide services to eKhaya to complement the privately providedservices in 
eKhaya, private service providers in the RCID are playing a more active role that eclipses that of 
the municipal institutions. Although very supportive of the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association; 
much of the City’s support for the voluntary organisation is not only still limited to 
capital/financial investment but also: 
… remain[s] fairly ad hoc with operational responses coming mainly because of persistent 
monitoring and reporting of problems and through a strengthened informal network. […] There is 
presently no formal agreement of co-operation between the City and eKhaya except that the City 
has encouraged eKhaya to follow its formal processes to be established as a CID […] The pro-
activeness of responses from municipal official[s] still does rely on a personal rather than a broader 
institutional commitment linked to stated service standards. […] The management of roles and 
responsibilities of the municipality and eKhaya need careful balancing […] Where [can] the line 
[be] drawn [to ensure that] eKhaya’s role is not to do all but ensure that different agencies fulfil 
their formal responsibilities [?] (HDA 2012: 8, 18) 
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In her study of how different institutions and individuals of Johannesburg and Mumbai access the 
state and its services; Bawa (2011: 501) observes that: 
Institutions that are aligned with the state, where the functionaries follow rules, regulations and laws 
to the last letter and hierarchies are rigidly instituted and followed by an organizational 
restructuring, are marked as efficient. However, such efficiency largely accrues to those citizens 
who are already at an advantage in terms of their proximity to institutions, decision makers and 
implementers through networks, personal resources and political clout. (Bawa 2011) 
In light of this realisation, we – having discovered that the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association 
has become somewhat closely/personally aligned with the CoJ - ask ourselves whether the 
establishment of eKhaya as a formal RCID/institution would go a long way in quickening the 
City’s response/efficiency and/or valorising eKhaya’s relationship with City institutions. Will City 
institutions pull their weight after the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association becomes formalised? 
As has already been observed by the HDA (2012), should the organisation be successful in its 
quest to persuade the City to reconfigure some of its CID rules, it will become a business 
company. Given that “[o]nce a district is authorised, 100% of property owners within a district 
have to contribute financially in the form of a monthly levy” (Urban Genesis 1997: 1); it becomes 
manifest that eKhaya South’s ‘free riders’ - property owners within the area who are currently 
unwilling to join eKhaya and/or pay – will be forced to pay against their will. Yet, will the 
“expansion of [the eKhaya] membership base – filling in the gap in the existing area… [and] 
increased financial base through levies” (HDA 2012: 20) ensue in the City’s high accountability to 
the Association? Should this happen, it will most likely have come at the disadvantage of 
property owners on eKhaya turf who do not need the amenities provided by eKhaya as they 
already have them. In fact, it appears that pressure is already being exerted on such property 
owners to become a part of the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association, with Adler (2013) stating, “I 
now have to go to that area [eKhaya South] and try to make more of them pay.” 
Perhaps more importantly, what will registration of eKhaya as a formal RCID and business mean 
for the urban poor (homeless, informal traders, street children) who characterise the environs of 
some of the buildings used for the study? Lipietz (2004), in her analysis of the branding and 
marketing strategies that the CoJ is pursuing/adopting, notes that Johannesburg is not just a 
‘neoliberal city’ but a “wannabe world city” (Stanley 2003 as cited in Lipietz 2004: 2; also see 
Winkler 2013). Johannesburg’s godfathers – in a desperate attempt to ‘world’ it and gain control 
of the allegedly chaotic inner city environment (ibid) – are blindly adopting/encouraging 
international models like CIDs and increasingly co-opting business interests in the process. Lipietz 
(2004) argues that in Johannesburg the world class city is being constructed in the city’s derelict 
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inner city; and the urban poor – concentrated here and trying to survive amidst the so-called 
disorder - do not form part of city government’s aspirations of global city status. The essence of 
these arguments is highlighted in the long quote below:  
In a move reminiscent of cities across the globe, Johannesburg’s city managers have opted to 
conceive of the future of the city in terms of a well-trodden imagery, that of the ‘World City’ [...] In 
Johannesburg, urban regeneration in the inner city seems, at first glance, to be following rather 
blindly in these footsteps. After all, the Inner City strategy’s stated objective is to ‘raise and sustain 
private investment leading to a steady rise in property values’ [...] Meanwhile the encroachment of 
City Improvement Districts on ... the inner city, the development of bunker-blocks in the banking 
district aimed at protecting capital’s stake in the city, or again, the attempt to foster close 
relationships with business through investment breakfasts, etc. – all point to a certain cosying up of 
Council with private interests in the city. Such developments, coupled with evictions of 
residents/squatters from downgraded and slum-like and ‘obsolescent’ buildings [...], the apparent 
attempt to toughen up on city by-laws, and it is hard to avoid the feeling that ‘World-class’ 
imageries are in Johannesburg’s inner city, as elsewhere, helping to recast urban spaces in the 
interest of dominant elites [...] The current buzz around falling office vacancy rates, new property 
developments and the embryonic emergence of ‘loft living’ in the erstwhile CBD [...] would 
indicate that such initiatives are in fact starting to bear fruit. (Lipietz 2004: 2 – 3) 
Lipietz (2004) seems to be implying that in Johannesburg, just like in Indian cities, there is an 
emerging civic governmentality co-opting influential businesses and businesspersons as 
participants in city issues such as urban regeneration. Lipietz (2004) also seems to be suggesting 
that this civic governmentality manifests itself via ‘caucus meetings’ between the City and the 
private sector and CIDs which - among other urban renewal efforts - are “slowly turning into a 
haven for the middle class in the city centre” (Bauer 2012). According to Hedley (2013), this 
appears to be the case because: 
Expatriates exposed to urban living overseas are increasingly taking up residence in 
Johannesburg’s inner city. Private developers are trying to market the urban living concept to 
locals. The regeneration of the inner city is gaining momentum as private investors partner with the 
Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) for the first time. (Hedley 2013) 
Lipietz’s (2004) and Hedley’s (2013) observations reminded the researcher of one of the 
discoveries he made at the eKhayaKidz’ Day meeting. In the meeting, the eKhaya building 
managers had been told by the eKhaya organiser that JHC had been approached by six 
coaches from Arsenal FC – an English football club – who would be staying in eKhaya’s JHC 
buildings for six months scouting for football talent. The eKhaya coordinator advised the building 
managers present at the meeting to see the move as an opportunity for the eKhaya children; 
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and to be ‘super-housing managers’ in the course of the visitors’ stay. Not only did it dawn on 
the researcher that eKhaya is indeed under international scrutiny and is thus not existing as an 
island; it also made the researcher curious to know what this international visit would mean for 
the future/reputation/brand of eKhaya, Hillbrow and Johannesburg respectively. Will it change 
the global perceptions of inner city Johannesburg and make the world look at it a little 
differently? As well, Johannesburg is a city that is “almost exclusively self-financing [which implies 
that] the cost of letting the built environment slip any further into decay is simply too high a price 
to pay” (Lipietz 2004: 8). Thus, the creation of high property values in Hillbrow and the inner city is 
one way or another a positive and profitable move for the City because it is in line with the CoJ’s 
aspirations of property value creation. Yet would these international visits change the property 
values for the ‘better’? If so, what would it mean for the urban poor? 
Johannesburg is a city where the urban elites’ intolerance for the urban poor manifests itself via 
repressive and “revanchist” (Paasche 2013) ‘inner city cleansing initiatives’ that criminalise the 
poor. The most recent of these is ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ (Ndletyana 2013). Endorsed by 
institutions such as the JRA, City Power, Joburg Water, the MTC, and the Departments of Health, 
Home Affairs, Environment respectively; ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ has attempted to drive 
“illegal informal traders” (Ndletyana 2013) and the homeless from the whole of inner city 
Johannesburg – most notably Hillbrow and the CBD - on the basis that doing this will “fight crime 
… limit the presence of vagrancy” (Paasche 2012: 280). Slammed by media and the RSA highest 
courts alike20 - the urban poor are back on the inner city streets after winning the case against 
the City - ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ has been referred to as “a dirty game” (Ndletyana 2013) 
and “the purge of the poor” (Ndletyana 2013); and is what Bénit-Gbaffou (2008: 1943 as cited in 
Paasche 2011) would refer to as a “’quick [spatial] fix’… for a complex [spatial] problem”. To 
make matters worse, unlike in Indian cities - where there is some form of compensation for the 
displaced – civic governmentality in Johannesburg usually takes ‘a more brutal turn’ since 
“people [are] being evicted without necessary compensatory mechanisms [and] hawkers’ 
wares [are] confiscated” (Lipietz 2004: 3; Simone 2004). In the EkhayaKidz’ Day meeting it was 
revealed that some of the evicted urban poor are seeking refuge on eKhaya turf where, as it 
turned out in the meeting, they are not really welcome (refer to Chapter Four). Indeed, the HDA 
(2012: 11) makes a remark about trepidations that initiatives such as eKhaya have led to an 
increase in property values, and that this might result in “changing access” for the urban poor: 
                                                          
20The informal traders won the case against the City of Johannesburg and are now back in business in the inner city. 
Nevertheless, their future remains uncertain especially when we take into cognisance Roy’s (2009) warning that the 
victories of the urban poor/political society are in “a state of limbo” (Kihato 2012: ) and are thus not to be… 
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Without specific subsidy mechanisms in place there is danger that over time such successful 
regeneration will force existing lower income households out of the area and make it unaffordable 
for new low-income households to move into the [Hillbrow] area. (HDA 2012: 11) 
Given that the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association might soon become a business, we wonder 
whether a budding civic governmentality in Johannesburg will come into full force and manifest 
itself strongly in eKhaya and the whole of Hillbrow. We may argue that formalising the eKhaya 
CID is a form of governmentality for property owners (a way of ‘coerce’ them to pay and/or be 
financially involved in their area’s revamping. It may be seen as a form of ‘civic 
governmentality’ – regulating the conduct of property owners and/or making them ‘behave’, 
doing this via simultaneously  coercing and co-opting them to take responsibility and action for 
the improvement of their neighbourhood; and thus discouragement of the issue of 
‘irresponsibility’ (the ‘free rider’ problem). Attempts to formalise eKhaya may also be seen to be 
an attempt to bring the City institutions/bureaucrats – for instance Pikitup (cleaners) – to book; 
making them behave (do their jobs) via increased and improved payment for public-but-
privately provided services (in this instance, refuse removal).  
We ask again: What will registration of eKhaya as a formal RCID mean for the homeless, informal 
traders, street children who characterise the environs of some of the buildings used for the 
study? As well, given that formalised improvement districts in RSA cities such as Cape Town are 
“put[ting] pressure on the urban poor” (Paasche 2013: 280) to either “participate in social 
development programmes” (ibid) – thus their ‘enumeration’ and civilisation – or “be [forcibly] 
referred to private security companies” (ibid); we wonder what the fate of the urban poor will 
be. Will Hillbrow continue to be the urban poor’s premier port-of-entry into Johannesburg? Will 
the ‘originality’ and ‘uniqueness’ of eKhaya Neighbourhood CID vanish once it is formalised? 
Was eKhaya ever in possession of this humanistic original flavour or was this just a marketing trick 
aimed at making eKhaya appear more socially inclusive? In the quote by Adler (2013) below, 
she laughs off the notion that eKhaya has displaced – or will displace - the urban poor in any 
way. In fact, Adler (2013) opines that scholars have misconceptions about the urban poor and 
their agency and/or economic capabilities in the RSA city: 
The poor people in eKhaya?! The poor people in the eKhaya Neighbourhood (bursts into laughter) 
have had a better deal than anywhere else in the city because the general environment for them 
has improved. The CID purpose is for the environment not for the internal of each property; 
although of course it overlaps because if you’re throwing your nappies out the window, that 
means you haven’t got a management internally, which you’ve gotta have in the city. [...]Now, 
that for me is the key thing in all the work I do. It’s that the environment has to be liveable – and this 
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is not a neoliberal notion – so that people can experience their lives in ways in which they can 
develop themselves as responsible citizens. Is that too naive and idealistic? [...] But the poor can’t 
pay? They can! To treat everybody as though they are permanently poor is to make a big mistake. 
There’s a pathological group of poor people who are always in cities, a percentage of all cities - 
street people. But all the people we say can’t pay are paying plenty for everything! (pause) It’s the 
truth! You don’t, you sit with people; they’ve got a problem they will tell you the answer. [...] Well, 
it’s about citizens’ power but it’s also the question of citizens’ responsibility. (Adler 2013) 
It is uncertain as to whether eKhaya Neighbourhood Association’s inauguration into the pool of 
inner city Johannesburg’s formalised/fully legislatedimprovement districts will come at the cost of 
“fish that [currently seem to be evading social control and the police -] the mentally ill, street 
people and the urban poor” (Paasche 2013: 281). What seems certain, however, is the fact that 
approximately ten years after its ‘establishment’, eKhaya still has not managed to attract the 
‘middle class’ to its ‘territory’. This is perhaps evidenced by the eKhaya building manager 
respondents’ acceptance of and leniency towards the urban poor and subletting, possibly 
because this is a means to an end (it is most likely the only way rents can be collected in full for 
their ‘bosses’). eKhaya Neighbourhood CID may be seen perhaps solely for the reason that the 
potential for gentrification is far from being realised at the moment; which translates to our 
perception of eKhaya caretakers’ acceptance of the poor and/or subletting as a pragmat ic 
choice – presumably temporarily – to continue business. While this perception may suggest that 
eKhaya building managers’ actions in this regard are not a humanisitic, redistributive or socially 
aware effort; we may still conceive of their practices as efforts to ‘house’ the poor and make 
their neighbourhood more liveable. However, supposing that the potential for gentrification 
does indeed become fully realised in eKhaya South; it is highly likely that the formalisation of 
eKhaya will displace the poorest of the poor one way or another. Yet against the backdrop of a 
crime-free liveable public and private environment that eKhaya has supposedly created, Adler 
(2013) still laments:”You haven’t moved the crime; no! So people will say, ‘OK, so now you’ve 
moved the crime out’; you haven’t!! They’re still in the buildings there! They’re just not doing it 
out there”. This implores us to get into the internal space of the eKhaya buildings under study, 
look into their building managers and their engagement with stakeholders such as the eKhaya 
coordinator and City institutions; as well as the implications of this for urban change and the city. 
This is attempted in the following sections. However, before attempting to do that, there is a 
need to look at the relationships of different urban stakeholders in the context of Hillbrow, 
particularly landlord-tenant relations, and how they have been shaped over the years; as well as 
the events that could have given rise to the need for the caretaker in Hillbrow buildings. 
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5.3 Tracing Hillbrow’s History via (City Government Intervention in) its Landlord-Tenant 
relations/tensions: The Rise of the Caretakers’ Criticality as Bureaucrat 
In Alan Morris’s (1999) critically acclaimed work, Bleakness and Light, Hillbrow is portrayed as an 
inner city neighbourhood that has always been a grey area (HDA 2012) and has over the years – 
principally since the 1980s - undergone a drastically depressing metamorphosis. Hillbrow has 
been extensively written about and/or used by Morris, in his other works, as a microcosm of inner 
city Johannesburg’s physical and socio-spatial transition and/or degeneration(see for instance 
Morris 1994; Morris 1997; Morris 1999). The central argument running through all of Morris’s pieces 
of literature on Hillbrow is that although “landlord-tenant relations” (ibid 1999: 509) played a 
huge role in Hillbrow’s physical decline and ungovernability; a myriad factors and actors – other 
than tenants’ overcrowding of apartments to meet the exorbitantly high rents (and pushing up 
of maintenance costs in the process), and landlords’ abandonment of apartments –catalysed 
Hillbrow’s decayand are thus also to blame. We thus need to look at these overlooked “actors, 
processes and structural features” (ibid 1997: 172).We also need to look at (the actions that 
contributed to) Hillbrow’s decline holistically via focusing onstakeholders such as“financial 
institutions, the local stateactors, managing agents and tenant organisations [...] and [...] the 
central and local governments”, particularly their behaviours towards Hillbrow over the years. 
Indeed, Morris (1997: 155) adds that “the conduct of the actors involved can only be 
understood within the [historical and political] context” of Hillbrow and Johannesburg.This may 
then justify our tracing of past and present events/processes that have shaped Hillbrow 
stakeholder associations such as “landlord-tenant relations”(Morris 1999: 514). In fact, Morris 
(1999) opines that landlord-tenant relations – catalysed by attitudes of banks, managing agents, 
local and national governments - played a central role in Hillbrow’s physical decline. Using 
tenant-landlord relations as its focal point, this section is based on an outline of how landlord-
tenant relations in Hillbrow, among other relations, have changed over the years as well as to 
what extent, if any, the City has over the years come to intervene in a relationship that is 
perceivably private. More importantly - but to a lesser extent - the section also uncovers 
circumstances that gave rise to the dire need for management in the form of managing agents 
and caretakers in Hillbrow, as well as the point at which they started actively engaging with the 
City. Doing this, the researcher argues, may go a long way in strengthening and setting the 
scene for our conception of the Hillbrow/eKhaya caretaker as a street-level bureaucrat. 
According to Morris (1997; 1999), although physical and socio-spatial decline in Hillbrow can be 
traced back to the 1970s - when Indian and Coloured familes began defying “the segregationist 
Group Areas Act” (Seekings 2003: 199) by moving into the traditionally White suburbs - the 
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decline of many of the neighbourhood’s residential building blocks really took effect in the “mid-
1980s” (ibid 1997: 153). This was a time when “townships were hell” (Adler 2013) - ‘African urban 
residential areas’ such as Soweto were characterised by political upheavals such as strikes and 
rental boycotts, parenthetically (ibid; Morris 1994; Morris 1999) - and influx control laws were 
repealed in 1986 (Morris 1997; Morris 1999). “[T]he scrapping of influx control ... meant that 
Africans were now able to move freely between urban centres, whereas previously they had 
been restricted to a particular urban or rural area” (Morris 1999: 514). It was during this period 
that Black people -pushed by “the critical shortage of township housing” (Morris 1997: 156), 
escaping the political upheaval that characterised the residential areas designated for them by 
the apartheid regime (Morris 1999), and attracted by Hillbrow’s proximity to places of 
opportunity - moved into the neighbourhood, in so doing risking “harass[ment] and prosecut[ion] 
by the authorities” (Morris 1997: 153). Morris (1997: 170) writes that the central fascist 
government’s incapacity to address the housing backlog “in the Johannesburg area and 
elsewhere in the country ... [meant that] in Johannesburg a move to the inner city became the 
only viable alternative for black South Africans ... throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s”. 
Against the backdrop of Hillbrow’s Black tenants’ desperate situation, their “prepared[ness] to 
pay much higher rents than ... white tenants” (ibid), and the pronounced White flight from the 
neighbourhood; Hillbrow landlords took complete advantage of these conditions to charge the 
‘new residents’ much higher rents and thus “maintain properties [and] [...] property prices” 
(Seekings 2003: 200). Argues Morris (1997; 1999), by charging high rentals, the landlords were not 
entirely to blame because the landlords themselves – this was aggravated by the flight of White 
tenants to northern suburbs, declining physical condition of properties due to overcrowding, and 
increasing redlining by banks - were desperate to fill in their housing units as well as maximise 
their economic capital. The landlords’ desire to maximise their profits - combined with their racist 
attitudes towards the new Black tenants - culminated in them cutting back on building repair 
costs by ignoring the tenants’ maintenance complaints; thus landlords’ contribution to physical 
decline (Morris 1997; Morris 1999; Morris 1999; Adler 2013; Seekings 2004). Perhaps the scenario - 
and the role of each Hillbrow stakeholder in the mid-1980s - is summarized adequately by Adler 
(2013) in the extract below: 
The nationalists were in power and they wanted rates. The owners were losing control of the 
buildings; they were letting people in because the buildings were empty; the whites had moved 
out to the suburbs, some of them in the ‘60s because Johannesburg had spread all the way out to 
Discovery and started going Randburg. You know, the city was developing! That’s a normal thing 
this phenomenon, isn’t it? Inner city degeneration, but ours was accompanied by the racial thing. 
People were qualifying as nurses, people were getting jobs ... job reservation was breaking down; 
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people were getting jobs as tellers in Checkers. And if you were a woman who’s got a job at the 
Brenthurst in Parktown here, and you can get in a flat here, you don’t have to live in the township, 
with all the mayhem that’s going on there; but you’re not gonna bring the kids here. Now the 
landlord ups the rent, and the City doesn’t do anything about it! So you bring friends in to share the 
rent. Suddenly you get 20, 30 people ... and that became the ACTSTOP21 Group Areas thing of the 
‘80s. So, on every front, whether it was in the squatter camps that we were working in around the 
city to break down the Wall of the city - I call it Jericho’s Wall – or whether you were fighting the 
dispossession in the rural areas, or whether you were fighting the frontier; it’s all that settlement 
battle. [...] And the fight that went on here (points to map of inner city) resulted in absolute 
degeneration, and a whole lot of people in abandoned buildings, which then permits ... hijacked 
buildings because criminals are not stupid (laughs). So, whether they call themselves democratic 
committees in the buildings, or they’re just playing hijack, or there are owners who’ve abandoned 
it, the whole governance thing is loose. The relationship between the City and the landlords is 
gone, and the relationship between the landlords and the tenants is gone, and the tenants are 
victims, they’re not tenants.The governance in the buildings was bad news. I’ve said to you that 
landlords were bad, tenants were bad, the tenants were victims, the landlords were aggressive; it 
was an absolute nightmare. And I stood and watched all this. (Adler 2013) 
Adler’s account above sheds light on the fact that 
In Hillbrow, during the key years of the transition in the 1980s, the local authority’s intervention in the 
neighbourhood was minimal ... that this was linked to racial transition and that that, from the early 
1980s, the Johannesburg City Council made little effort to rein slum landlords or to adopt proactive 
measures to halt the decline of the neighbourhood [...] As soon as black people started moving in, 
the Johannesburg City Council simply abrogated its responsibilities. (ACTSTOP’s Cas Cavoodia as 
cited and discussed in Morris 1997: 170 - 171) 
Morris (1999: 171) adds that although there was “legislation that governed residential buildings in 
Johannesburg during this time” - the Accommodation Establishment By-laws for the 
Johannesburg Municipality of 1984 and the subsequent Slums Regulation of the Municipality of 
Johannesburg, which was “[o]ccasionally applied” (ibid) - these pieces of legislation did not 
make provision for strongly punitive measures against the ‘infringers’.This ensured that landlords 
continued profiting from the Black tenants and unfairly evicting them (Morris 1997; Morris 1999). 
Adler (2013) and Morris (1997) note that it was the Johannesburg City Council’s “total 
ineptitude” (Morris 1997: 171), incapacity, and indifference to slum landlordism - that quickly 
                                                          
21 ACTSTOP (Action Committee to Stop Evictions) was a tenant resistance movement that was formed in inner city areas 
during the 1980s. It comprised Black people (Africans, Coloureds and Indians) and its main objective was to ‘squash’ the 
Group Areas Act and the provisions it made for (most notably, the notion of living apart and keeping Black people out of 
the then-traditionally White areas such as Hillbrow.    
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spurred “united and organised tenant resistance” (Morris 1997: 167) via tenant organisations 
such as ACTSTOP (Action Committee to Stop Evictions); as well as “individual acts of defiance” 
(ibid)by way ofdeliberate defacement of buildings. It was not long before Hillbrow’s Black 
tenants who felt exploited by their landlords, most of whom were now absentee landlords, “felt 
inspired by struggles in the townships and when organised would often embark on rent boycotts 
to press their [maintenance and rent] demands” (Morris 1999: 511). These actionsnot only 
worsened the already fragile landlord-caretaker relations but also ensured that Hillbrow - like the 
Black townships and 1980s South Africa - became “a highly charged political setting” (Morris 
1999: 515). Yet, as suggested by Morris (1997), tenant organisations did not necessarily imply 
improved landlords’ responssiveness to tenants’ demands and requests, especially since the 
tenants kept being charged high rents even well into the early 1990s. 
The growing tensions between landlordsand their tenants, in conjunction with landlords’ poor 
management of their apartments, resulted in “about two thirds of Hillbrow landlords ... 
delegat[ing] responsibility for their apartments to a managing agent and, in a few instances, to 
a ‘middleman’” (Morris 1997: 161). This, to a greater extent, sheds light on the rise of the 
caretaker community in Hillbrow and their role as intermediaries. In the citation below, Morris 
(1997: 61) strengthens this notion by elucidating on the duties/practices of the managing agent 
and the middlemen, suggesting that the aforementioned  
The managing agents collected the rent and took responsibility for the maintenance and day-to-
day management of the building. The owner usually paid the managing agent 10 percent of the 
rent collected. In the case of responsibility being delegated to a ‘middleman’, this person signed 
what is called a head lease and paid a set monthly rate to the landlord. In return the middleman 
ad total control over the running of the apartment block concerned [...] Managing agents played 
a key role in the management of physical stock in the neighbourhood and freed the landlord of 
dealing directly with tenants. 
Elsewhere, Morris (1999: 125) describes the role of the caretaker in Hillbrow at the time as having 
been “pivotal ... In many blocks the caretaker is responsible for selecting the tenants 22 , 
collecting the rent and handling tenants’ requests and problems”. Morris’s (1999: 125 - 126) 
survey conducted in Hillbrow buildings around the late 1980s and early 1990s,  
confirmed the centrality of the caretaker. The blocks without caretakers were far more likely to be 
in poor condition [...] Those flats without caretakers were often controlled by landlords who 
endeavoured to cut costs at every turn and thus were also far more likely to be overcrowded, 
have bad security, have shebeens operating in the block and be on a spiral of decline [...] It is self-
                                                          
22 This may serve to shed light on the caretaker’s discretion 
124 
 
evident that a key function of a caretaker is to maintain control: in many instances competent 
caretakers in Hillbrow compensated for the landlords’ lack of concern. 
Thus, caretakers in most cases played a central role in not only representing landlords/employers 
but also representing the tenants; ‘forcing’ the indifferent landlords to respond to tenants’ issues; 
and the fact that most caretakers resided in the flats they managed somewhat helped matters. 
Yet Morris (1999: 125) points out that the availability of a caretaker in Hillbrow building blocks at 
that time did not necessarily guarantee that [the buildings] would be well maintained since the 
capabilities of the caretakers varied”. Morris (1999: 126) portrays caretakers as having been 
powerless in the face of an unresponsive property owner and/or body corporate - because the 
money stemmed from the landlords, the landlord always had the final word regarding building 
maintenance issues. As well, Morris (1997; 1999) suggests that even though the Hillbrow caretaker 
possessed a degree of discretion - giving flats to tenants of his/her choice, standing up for 
change - that discretion was often limited by “the actions of the landlords [...] Absentee 
landlords often weakened the control of caretakers by placing unsuitable tenants in their flats”. 
Yet the discretion of the caretakers at the time is also presented as having been influenced by 
prevalent discourses and racial/ethnic stereotypes - some caretakers chose the tenants to be 
courteous/polite/responsive to as well as the tenants to  be rude towards, based on criteria such 
as race (Morris 1997; Morris 1999; Adler 2013). Moreover, what did not guarantee change in 
Hillbrow buildings was the fact that even the caretakers/middlemen themselves are portrayed 
as having been acting in the self-interest sometimes - Morris (1997) argues that some caretakers 
at that time abused their discretion bytaking advantage of some tenants’ vulnerability to 
charge them higher rents, thus extortion of money from fragile tenants for individual gain. This 
suggests an appropriation and/or internalisation of landlords’ economic rationality for personal 
benefit. Combined with landlords’ neglect of their buildings; caretakers’ attitudes may, to some 
extent, have given rise to the hijack/‘takeover’ of the everyday running of some Hillbrow 
buildings by tenants’ committees (Morris 1999; Winkler 2013; Jerusalema 2008; Adler 2013).  
With regard to City government’s intervention in Hillbrow after the RSA’s attainment of 
democracy in 1994, Seekings (2003: 200) asserts that “[l]ocal government showed little interest in 
the area, even after the political change of 1994/5” (Seekings 2003: 200). Nevertheless, Morris 
(1999) somehow counters Seekings’s declaration. Morris (1999) observes that following the dawn 
of democracy in 1994, laws on tenant-landlord interactions were tightened with the birth in early 
1998 of the Landlord-Tenant Dispute Resolution Board. Morris (1999: 334), who notes that the 
Board was derived from “an innovative piece of legislation, the Landlord-Tenant Dispute 
Resolution Act … passed by the [post-apartheid’ provincial government”, finds it “encouraging 
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that the authorities [we]re slowly beginning to revamp the legislation governing maintenance 
and landlord-tenant relations”. While lamenting that “the [government] interventions have been 
fairly limited and have not has the direct effect of reversing the decline” (ibid: 335); Morris (1999: 
334) applauds the post-apartheid “provincial and local authority [for having become] more pro-
active than its predecessors”. According to Morris (1999), the two authorities played a crucial 
role in the appointment of an inner-city manager as well as the “granting of hundreds of 
subsidies … to help inner-city residents purchase their flats” (ibid). One of the City-supported 
initiatives was the Seven Buildings Project, an initiative that was expected to  
transform the mostly poor residents of the combined 400 slum-style apartments of Argyle Court, 
Branksome Towers, Coniston Court, Manhattan Court, Margate Court, Protea Court and Stanhope 
Mansions into joint owners of their buildings in a collective housing scheme, the scale of which the 
country had not yet seen. (Russouw 2013)  
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality – a ‘Unicity’ formed in 2000 - specifically 
aimed to support these seven badly managed Hillbrow buildings – which were in serious service 
arrears – clear off some, if not most, of the arrears. These seven buildings were among the many 
inner city residential building blocks that the City referred to as “bad buildings” (Winkler 2013: 
315) requiring immediate intervention. The City’s Better Buildings Programme – a replacement of 
the Seven Buildings Project - defines bad buildings as    
properties where little or no investment is being made in maintaining the building, either because 
(i) the owner has abandoned the building or the building has been hijacked, and so there are no 
clear landlord/caretaker structures or arrangements in place; (ii)residents are not paying rents and 
so owners do not have the means to pay for building upkeep; (iii)residents are paying, but the 
payments are not being utilised by the owner or manager to maintain the building or pay Council 
rates and service charges, often leading to disconnections of services, with a resultant 
compounding of the problem. (CoJ 2007: 49 as quoted in Winkler 2013: 315) 
Nevertheless, ambitious and auspicious as it was, the Seven Buildings Project and other similar 
projects “never made it that far” (Russouw 2003; Lipietz 2004) due in large part to tenants’ lack 
of coordination.  
Indeed, the City seemed more hands-on in the allaying of tenant-landlord conflicts and 
Hillbrow’s plight; supporting social housing companies such as JHC to purchase derelict Hillbrow 
buildings and convert them into social housing. This social housing company brought in its own 
building managers – for instance the deceased John Gololo (refer to Chapter One) - who 
interacted directly with the City and openly engage with their respective buildings’ tenants on a 
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daily basis (JHC 2010) – and who we can conceive of as something of a ‘street-level 
bureaucrat’ improving City-tenant relations. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was 
estimated that JHC had purchased more than 105 buildings in Hillbrow alone. This would give us 
an impression that things had started looking up in Hillbrow. Yet Adler, recounting the problems 
that prevailed in most Hillbrow buildings even after the year 2000 and before eKhaya came 
about, appears to counter this notion: 
Then there was subletting in the flats, and the conditions that I had watched from Soweto in the 
‘60s, ‘70s and ‘80s were prevailing in the flats! Because I’m a tenant of the flat and now the rent is 
now R1000, so I can let to you and you and a whole lot of other people. We don’t know each 
other and I’m subdividing the flat. There’s one toilet and then there’s one bin, and I’m allowed to 
use that bin. You can’t be putting your rubbish in my bin. The same way as in Soweto in the ‘60s 
and ‘70s and ‘80s - your kids are not using my bucket; I’m going to work, I’ll lock that toilet. Right, 
got it? You’re staying here, you’re paying me! I’m not paying the Council in Soweto, remember? 
Because it’s a boycott, but you’re paying me ... but you’re not using my bucket toilet and your 
kids. Now the same thing was happening in 2004 in Hillbrow! So now what must people do with the 
dirty nappies and the rubbish and the so on? Out the windows! And how must people get in? With 
IDs! So now with that management, now you’ve got a class of people who are in formal 
employment for the first time and able to sustain these rentals. The Council wants the rates for our 
overpaid city service, and the-the landlords want the profits, and the social housing company 
wants their businesses to work. You’ve gotta have this governance here […] I had to work without 
myself quite quickly because the process is one of gentrification, without a doubt, because our 
national government is not doing anything about it. Buildings do not stand up either from 
overcrowding or from memory. If you put 20 people into a 1 bedroom flat, it’s going to be a matter 
of 3 years before the sewerage comes out the walls on the way down. Holy Chambers opposite 
Jeppe Street Post Office had to be closed; those offices, they were doctors’ rooms when I was a 
child. There were 20 people in there! You went in and on the ground and the sewage was coming 
up the walls, the pipes can’t handle it! It’s capacity! They were office blocks (laughs) and if you 
don’t maintain those buildings, they’re not gonna stand up, as I said, from memory and 
remembering that they are 20 storey buildings. So until something changes at Pravin Gordhan’s23 
level of the dinner table, formal housing is not for people for informal living. You know, this country’s 
got big talks to have, and there’s no danger of having them soon. (Adler 2013) 
Coincidentally, it was around the same time – the early 2000s - that building 
managers/caretakers, trustees and police officers were getting assassinated in their lines of duty 
(see for instance Cox 2005; Lipietz 2004; SAPA 2008; Boyce 2012; Witbooi 2012; Cox and Ndlovu 
2013; also see the opening headlines in Chapter One). More interestingly, the early 2000s were 
                                                          
23 Pravin Gordhan has been serving as Minister of Finance from 2009. 
127 
 
the period that eKhaya – approximately 10 years old at the time of writing - was implemented 
by JHC’s Adler.  So what change are eKhaya building managers are driving in eKhaya, Hillbrow 
and CoJ? The next section wishes to unpack this. 
5.4 Driving Change and/or Managing ‘Chaos’? For whom? eKhaya Building Managers’ 
engagement with the City and other eKhaya Stakeholders 
Bawa (2011: 492) realises that even if the state is manifest in our everyday lives; we encounter it 
differently due to our  
… [divergent] political, social, economic and historical positioning[s] in society. Ordinary citizens as 
well as the state’s own employees experience the state through their everyday encounters with it 
[…] Sometimes the state appears in the form of the pipeline man to propertied residents and slum 
dwellers alike, threatening to disconnect them from the municipal water supply if his demands are 
not met. […] The institutional location of the state is critical because that determines the capacity 
of people and their intermediaries to access the state. Thus, it may be relatively easier for citizens 
and their representatives to negotiate with the pipeline man or the municipality for water than to 
influence the policies of regional or central governments regarding urban water supply. […] The 
everyday transactions between governments and populations via intermediaries regarding service 
delivery can substantially redefine notions of modernity, property and law. (Bawa 2011: 492) 
In the context of eKhaya, we are already conscious of the fact that the eKhaya Neighbourhood 
Association organiser encounters the city government regularly by way ofVSD meetings; via 
telephonic reporting of service delivery issues emanating from eKhaya building managers’ 
meetings; as well as through invited spaces that appear to have been demanded by eKhaya 
(for instance, walkabouts with City officials). However, what remains unclear is when, how 
and/or to what extent the building managers - the other stakeholders actively involved in 
eKhaya activities – interact with the local state. As noted by the HDA (2012: 12), one of the most 
central organising elements in the eKhaya structure is the housing manager forum, which  
…comprises building managers from all the buildings that are part of the membership, as well as 
representatives from the security company (service provider) and the City’s service delivery 
agencies. They meet three to four times per year to review neighbourhood matters, plan and 
coordinate activities and deal with any day-to-day problems. (HDA 2012: 12) 
Indeed, that the eKhaya housing manager meetings and events have opened a forum for 
eKhaya building managers to meet and mingle with the City’s service delivery agencies came 
through in the interviews with the building managers themselves. For instance, shadowing and 
speaking with Christianson brought to light the fact that through the eKhaya meetings, he has 
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made a connection with a City Power official who does electricity readings for his building every 
month or fortnightly “depending on how busy he is”.The researcher followed Christensen (2013) 
while he was doing his daily water readings/estimates from flat to flat, and asked him why the 
City did not do the estimates for him; to which he responded: “The City estimates are not right, I 
prefer doing the water readings myself. I think prepaid water meters is the way to go”. Morrison 
(2013), in the quote below, also alludes to the fact that she has made allies with state officials via 
eKhaya gatherings/meetings: 
I’m like a people’s person; so I mingle with everybody. Like when I was working for Bad Boy’z; half 
of this Hillbrow knows me, half of the police force knows me, you know? There’s some people that 
knows me that I forgot about! […] Even the General of SAPS, ja, SAPS General Pharasi, ja he knows 
me. We like this (joins two of her fingers) because the last time, somebody… When my brother was 
murdered, when this surplus money and things come out then… we were all there; it was this time 
of the year last year when we had meetings with them [the police]. All Jeppe Police Station, all of 
them came together here, and we had this meeting saying that we are going to open the park - 
Joubert Park - and all the other parks for people to go and drink there and go on there and have 
the parties and shoot the fireworks there, you know? And then like I asked Pharasi, I said to him, 
“I’ve got a problem, what must I do?” Because this guy – my brother - before he died that week, 
he went and applied for a new ID because his ID was lost or my mom washed it or something, so 
the ID was like… Ja! So he applied for a new ID. And, a week before he died he was supposed to 
collect the ID, and I don’t know what happened because I was staying in Boksburg.Wednesday he 
came home and he said, “I must go fetch my ID” and I said, “No problem”. Thursday he said, “I will 
bring my son”, Thursday was the 16th 1999 I can remember. Then he said, “I will bring my son” and I 
said, “No problem”. Then… I don’t know what happened afterwards but I ask at the office to do a 
PTN, I gave his ID number and everything. Then we find out somebody else is using his ID. The 
person even got businesses in Vanderbijlpark. Then Pharasi said to me, “Go… go open a case”.  
Then my mom said, “Aargh, leave it”… you know how mom, you know how some people are 
sometimes…“No, leave it”. I said, “OK I’ll leave it; I will do what you say; I’m not going to go against 
you, mom. If you said I must leave it I will leave it”, you know? But that person is still using my 
brother’s ID. […] So that’s how I became very close with Pharasi but anyway I said, “Aargh! Let me 
leave it because my mom wants me to leave it”, you know? (Morrison 2013) 
Yet it came as a bit of an ambiguity to learn that there were no City officials/representatives 
present at one of the meetings attended by the researcher - the eKhayaKidz’ Day meeting - 
where indeed the building managers’ day-to-day challenges were discussed (also see Chapter 
Four). Rather, the meeting was convened by the eKhaya organiser. At the same time, it 
somewhat made sense that the building managers asked the eKhaya co-ordinator to get the 
City institutions to come to the meetings like they used to. Upon wondering why the City 
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representatives had stopped coming to these meetings, the researcher got the notion that it is 
not that easy to get accountability from public representatives. While the links between eKhaya 
and CoJ may have been established; they are still not that strongbecause eKhaya organisers still 
struggle to keep the link going. In light of the fact that every neighbourhood wants the City 
officials to come attend meetings and thus settle local issues; it is still difficult for eKhaya to keep 
the City – via its bureaucrats – accountable; even though it has showed the City its commitment 
to organising and its openness to negotiation. 
Another ambiguity that came through relates to the building managers’ interaction with the 
eKhaya co-ordinator as well as their liaisons with some City officials. When the researcher asked 
Mkhize (2013) to describe her relationship and interactions with eKhaya’s building managers, she 
stated the following: 
Me and the caretakers really work like this (joins two of her fingers). It’s like a hand and an arm; we 
can’t work separately(laughs). We can’t because whatever issues they have, they will phone me 
and then I’ll phone the City or whoever is supposed to go and attend to that. We go around the 
visits together; we have social sports together ... Like now, we’re going to have Kidz’ Day together 
in December with the housing managers, because they’re the ones who are the link to the 
tenants. When I’m talking about Kidz’ Day I need kids from the buildings; so, if I’m not in connection 
with the tenants how am I going to get the kids? You cannot get kids from someone’s building 
when he doesn’t know what you are doing. Tenants don’t trust you; they don’t know you 
(chuckles) ... they know the caretaker. So the caretaker is the one who organises all the projects 
that eKhaya uses - soccer in April, soccer in July, soccer in October, Kidz’ Day in December. So all 
these eKhaya projects, they work closely with the caretakers. […] Remember, I am the coordinator 
of different people who are from different companies but who are having the same interests... 
These people only meet at a certain point but their operations are different, so you work with them. 
So amongst them, you make sure that you control all the conflicts and you try to manage the 
conflicts; and the only way to do that is to treat them equally, yes. Never show that you favour 
such a building manager more than the other one; never show that you favour that company over 
that one; to you they are just the same. Where you see something like dust rising, you try to make it 
settle down. Hmm! Never take sides - that’s what Josie has always said. Never take any sides, no 
matter who is right... Never talk to the other one about someone, ever. Never show all those 
differences. You must always... in front of them, you must always be neutral and fair. If you’re doing 
a walkabout, you don’t do it on a certain company only; you involve everyone. If you’re doing 
your sports, you make sure all of them are involved; you don’t plan a certain event with other 
members when other members are not there (laughs lightly). So, all those things you have to be 
careful when you’re dealing with the neighbourhood... Because once you leave out someone, 
they’ll say, “I’m being sidelined”. It’s very difficult, you see? […] Like, the meetings, we meet 
collectively in meetings; then there are some times, like the walkabouts, we’ll be doing them block-
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by-block... Like this section, I’ll say, “OK, this section is for these housing managers and that one is 
for those housing managers” and then at the end you’ll finish. And then you’ve got the one-on-
ones with the caretakers in the buildings; there you’re strengthening the relationship; you go 
specifically; you get him in his building and ask him, “Is everything OK?” You know? You just talk 
and keep all those ties like that. You don’t wait until you see them at the meeting; you keep the 
relationship going. Or if we were to just go out and just walk around here, everyone will be just 
waving. So as a coordinator you will be asking, “Hey,is everything OK?” Some caretakers will even 
say, “Oh I was looking for you”, you know? Things like that (laughs) then you just keep that thing 
going. I remember I was with two girls from the UK; they were also doing research like you. They are 
in the Housing Departments in the UK. So when they came here, after the discussion we went 
outside; we went to [eKhaya] park. So on our way to the park, everyone was just talking to me, 
and the UK girls said, “How do you know all these people?” I said, “No, this is neighbourhood; 
nobody can say they don’t know us and the Bad Boy’z”. And they said, “Yoh, you know in the UK, 
it’s just you and your room, you pay rent, don’t make noise, that’s it” (laughs hysterically) and I said, 
“No, here it’s different; we are doing it in a more close manner”. (Mkhize 2013) 
The researcher found Mkhize’s (2013) account of her relations to the building managers 
interesting because it, for one, revealed much about the stake they hold and the power they 
have. Given that “knowledge is power” (Foucault), the eKhaya building managers – by virtue of 
the fact that they know their tenants and everything happening on their building’s environs – 
possess much information needed by the eKhaya office and the local state. Informality is not 
tolerated at the eKhaya office but is still manifest outside some of the buildings under study; on 
the surface some housing managers appear intolerant of the urban poor on eKhaya space but 
seem to co-exist with them as well as benefit from them on an everyday basis (see Chapter 
Four). Here there appears to be a complete contradiction as well as a dominance of modernist 
discourses on the part of eKhaya building managers. Seeing as the RCID coordinator seemingly 
visits the building managers personally to ‘check on them’ and/or establish relationships with 
(each of) them – as revealed by Mkhize’s (2013) citation above – does she overlook the informal 
practices taking place within the vicinity of some eKhaya buildings or are these hidden from 
her? If that is the case, it would appear that building managers are hiding some informal 
practices from Mkhize. What do the building managers want to gain by hiding these 
‘idiosyncrasies’ from the organiser? In a long account of some of the challenges eKhaya has 
had with City institutions, Adler (2013) seems to fuel the hypothesis that building managers 
do/did engage in dealings with the City officials that somehow evade[d] her as an organiser  
The other thing was the chicken farms; there were chicken farms in the lanes, live chickens. We’re 
not privileged to take goats up into the buildings to slaughter them for ritual processes - and I don’t 
know whether that was predicted into the Constitution or what - but as this lane management 
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process carried on, now comes JDA, “We’re going to upgrade the lanes”. And now the City’s a 
partner for this project, “We’re going to put close the city gates and lanes are going to be paved 
and are gonna be managed”. So now the chicken farms have to get out the lanes, the taxis have 
to get out the lanes. But it’s not coming in like... the City’s never done this; the JMPD, they don’t do 
anything, and one by one we have to do this in the lanes. So now comes the fateful day when we 
have to do the lane - the one lane with the chicken farm - and I’ve been watching this for 5 years. 
One of the buildings is owned by a Muslim couple and it’s very offensive to them - and the garage 
is managed by a Muslim man - that chickens are slaughtered in the lane. And it’s in a building, it’s 
owned by a Jewish man, where the flat’s old art deco building and the [unclear] that the 
restaurant [unclear]. So the chickens and the restaurant are connected. It’s not my business, I’m 
just aware of it that there’s chickens in the lane. Now the Jewish man knows the Muslim lady, but 
they talk about each other and not to each other. So I said to my husband, “You know, I’ve got 
my other building, the fourth building... they’re in partnership we know this, OK... they gotta be in 
the lane. But maybe the Middle East will be solved before I get these two owners into the lane, it’s 
an open book. We’ll see what happens”. So I gathered a meeting ... there are 13 of us standing in 
the lane. The City has come; Environment Health; the owner... well, two owners that I knew would 
come, and their caretakers; the Indian family come, fully dressed even into the water...And the 
Jewish guy’s there and he’s in his suit; and the eKhaya guards and me; and uh ... ‘cause eKhaya 
cleaning and security have to be part of the lane management. So I’m facilitating and what’s to 
happen? There’s one person missing - it’s the caretaker of the Jewish building ... Now I know her; 
she’s from the caretakers’ meetings and so... and it’s a Coloured lady and she’s been there for 15 
years. Her property owner and employer gets on the phone and she comes down the fire escape 
stairs and she’s in a state and says to me, “You broke my water pipes!!” And I say, “Hello Cynthia! 
Lovely to see you... Did the pipes in the lane get broken during the paving? What happened? The 
chickens are on top of the new bricks now”. “She broke my water pipes!” I said, “Cynthia, you 
know about eKhaya, you know about the lane project, you know the bricks were coming. If they 
broke the water pipes, you could have phoned me, you could have contacted anybody, you 
could have spoken to JDA. This is City property and if they knock the pipes, they’ve gotta fix them!” 
But she’s... very fast. Anyway she quickly gets on the phone, and the next thing a two-ton truck of 
JMPD drives into the lane and the blue lights going like this, and out gets this huge inspector and 
he comes like a grizzly bear with a sore head and he comes to me and says, “You stole my gates!!” 
(laughs hysterically) Ja! OK. ‘Cause the chicken farm’s his! And the truck that you’re paying for for 
him to do his work, he’s been running this chicken farm with it. And he’s been giving the lady 
chickens, and the restaurant... Now this is all against the by-laws if you believe in the by-laws. So 
he’s running the chicken farm in the lane, he put the gates illegally, he’s using the truck illegally, 
the whole thing’s like this. And the process which I’ve been stirring has come together. Bing! And 
I’m standing there and this guy’s raving. And I said, “Inspector, this is a meeting of the property 
owners not the JDA’s or the City’s. It’s about fixing the lane; it’s property owners managing the 
lanes. But if you want me to tell the City contractors that the gate was yours, you know of course 
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that the law allows the City to take away what’s put up illegally. There! Uh, but if you want me to 
tell them that it’s your gate, I will! Just tell me, it’s OK”. He goes off and rum-rum-rum, and the next 
thing he’s throwing these big iron things with these chickens and they’re squawking and their 
feathers are flying and he’s throwing them all into the van, and they’re all out the lane. So I say to 
the meeting now, “Now this is where I’m looking for my leader because I’m not running a project”. 
So the portfolio manager from the JHC is there and I say, “Now, what’s the way forward with the 
lane management?” He says, “The owners must sign the agreement here and now and we must all 
pay for our keys and we must keep the lane clean”. So everybody agrees! Now do you see what 
I’m talking about, about how this happens? When I go out the lane, don’t think that that inspector 
isn’t there and telling me in no uncertain terms – and I don’t know the Zulu word for it – that this is 
not a place where fu@&!n% white b!+c#@$ get out of the suburbs... Ja! Now is that a challenge or 
a hurdle? It’s not! It’s part of stirring the bowl, you’ve got a lump in your pap. You’ve got (laughs) ... 
OK. I didn’t break the pipes, I didn’t steal the gates but can you see what comes out of the 
processes? But can you see how you’re managing this with your leaders? And if you haven’t got 
your leaders that process is not gonna cook.  
From the quote above, we can decipher a “bending and stretching of rules” (Chatterjie 2004: 
66) by City officials in collusion with the eKhaya building manager for personal interest. This takes 
us back to the case of eKhaya Park which, prior to being attained by the eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association, was being informally rented out for personal interests by an official 
in one of the City institutions (Propcon) (Adler 2013; also refer to Chapter Four). As well, it 
appears that the building manager is managing informality on behalf of the inspector. This may 
give us the notion that in Johannesburg – and perhaps in any other (South) African city – the 
local state is certainly not homogeneous; rather, it appears very fluid, with various points of 
access for individuals such as eKhaya building managers. In view of Adler’s (2013) remark that, 
“In any situation you’ve got this constant waiving between the formal and the informal”; we 
question whether the City can behave – and is in fact behaving – ‘informally’. In the case of 
eKhaya’s building managers’ liaisons with some City officials – coupled with some local state 
officials’ clientelistic interactions with the informal traders (see Kihato 2011; also see Chapter 
Two) – it would seem so. It would seem that the City is behaving informally - and perhaps 
criminally – via its officials/bureaucrats. Given that the City is currently engaging with the eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association in strong but unofficial networks of negotiation (HDA 2012); it would 
appear that these informal networks with the City have imperceptibly trickled down to the 
eKhaya staff/actors/leaders holding the fort ‘on the street’and/or at the top of the bottom. 
Seemingly, these informal networks between City officials and eKhaya “ground staff” (Bawa 
2011: 494) – somewhat made possible by the informal CoJ-eKhaya relationship - may create 
breathing space for ‘transgressions’/informal activities which go against the City by-laws and 
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norms of eKhaya RCID. It thus becomes simultaneously interesting and ironic that the eKhaya 
building manager, celebrated as a leader who has played a huge role in the dropping crime 
levels in eKhaya (HDA 2012; Adler 2013), may in fact be engaging with City officials (and 
tenants) in acts considered criminal/extra-legal by eKhaya Association and the CoJ. Yet it still 
remains to be seen whether these activities will stand the test of time even after eKhaya 
becomes a formalised CID; whether the activities will protect the ‘informal people’ from the 
territoriality/surveillance that seem tied to formal RCIDs/CIDs.  
Perhaps one of the most interesting pieces of information that came about via theresearcher’s 
attendance of the eKhaya Kidz’ Day meeting was that in so far as the eKhaya building manager 
appears to be the central broker in eKhaya – what with his/her access to tenants, property 
owners, the eKhaya organiser, other building managers – the eKhaya caretaker is not always a 
transmission belt between the eKhaya coordinator and the property owners. In the meeting, it 
came to light that some eKhaya property owners – rather than talk to their building managers 
about the issues they had with building managers’ practices - had gone directly to the eKhaya 
coordinator and threatened to financially pull out of eKhaya Kidz’ day festivities on the grounds 
that their housing managers were letting ‘outsider children’ participate in the event.The 
researcher interpreted this as a sign that the eKhaya coordinator is the central knowledge 
broker and/or perhaps has more knowledge of the organisation’s activities than the eKhaya 
housing manager. The eKhaya organiser, by virtue of the meetings that she attends other than 
the housing managers’ meeting, engages with more stakeholders – CoJ/VSD meetings, property 
owners’ meetings – hence has more knowledge than the housing manager. In fact, upon being 
asked some questions about the Neighbourhood’s dynamics, some housing manager 
respondents referred the researcher to the coordinator for the full story (for instance Morrison 
2013).From Adler’s (2013) account above, we candecipher the high likelihood of eKhaya 
building managers’ engagement with City officials clandestinely and/or without the full 
knowledge of the eKhaya organiser. This prompts us to wonder what building managers stand to 
gain by claiming to be anti-informality in meetings when their routine activities appear to involve 
informality and are interwoven with the ‘extra-legal’ activities of tenants and some state actors? 
Why do the building managers appear to be telling the organiser ‘half truths’ about informality; 
why do they seem to be telling the organiser what the organiser wants to hear? Seeing as the 
eKhaya building manager is not always a transmission belt between the Ekhaya coordinator and 
the property owners, it would look as if that some of the knowledge that the eKhaya building 
manager possesses has to be kept clandestine, especially if it is implicating and/or “in any way 
jeopardizes [the building manager’s] personal and [micro-] institutional power”(Bawa 2011: 495). 
When looked at in this way, housing management in eKhaya may be argued to be a political 
134 
 
activity because it involves reporting knowledge of some incidents/transgressions and keeping 
some secret/to oneself.  
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Africa’s economic powerhouse, Johannesburg is caught between two extremely powerful 
discourses. On the one hand is the global city discourse which is comprised of extreme socio-
politico-economic inequalities, urban poverty (hidden from the sight of international investors in 
the quest for world-class city status), and privatisation of services. On the other hand is the 
developmental city discourse/vision which comprises a place for the informal and recognition of 
the centrality of the urban poor – it comprises an upward trend/thriving entrepreneurship even in 
the context of poverty, and includes multiple livelihoods/ways of making do. This suggests that in 
so far as Johannesburg is Africa’s commercial nerve centre and a ‘City of Gold and (Aspiration 
to) Prosperity’; the dream of prosperity still remains elusive for many citizens/residents, most of 
whom are concentrated in the city’s urban neighbourhoods. Such neighbourhoods represent 
the paradox of ‘planning for economic prosperity’ for some reasons. The chief of the reasons is 
that although the neighbourhoods are derelict and marred by poverty; they are increasingly 
perceived by city managers as an innovative strategy on the road to global city status and 
prosperity/growth (cf. the UDZ – Figure 1B); which has prompted the approval of urban renewal 
initiatives such as RCIDs. RCIDs like eKhaya appear to be a manifestation of both the global city 
vision and the developmental city vision. By virtue of the fact that eKhaya is a form of voluntary 
urban management ‘thriving’ even in the absence of a well capacitated local state, appears 
somewhat responsive to Hillbrow’s context of poverty and informality (perhaps via some of its 
building managers’ practices) and is an example of a ‘creolised’ international model aimed at 
ensuring socio-economic prosperity; it may be argued to form part of the developmental city 
vision. Yet, the fact that eKhaya conforms to the neoliberal city government’s aspirations of 
outsourcing and privatisation of urban management - thus producing paying citizens whose 
identities are framed along a market logic – ‘civilization’ of political society, ‘purification’ of 
urban space, and creation of high property values; may lead us to the realisation that eKhaya is 
also part of the Global City discourse.    
A look into how eKhaya fits into the City agenda enables us to decipher eKhaya 
Neighbourhood Association’s real – rather than the boasted about - relationship with the City. It 
offers us a glimpse of the extent to which seemingly “grassroots regimes of government” (Ellis 
2012) such as eKhaya allow various groups constituting them – for example the housing 
manager forum – to “use their knowledge of [their building residents and activities] to resist state 
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power, [while simultaneously] function[ing] to ‘recalibrate’ the state’s governing strategies, [thus] 
weav[ing] these strategies into the policy-making apparatus, so that they become entwined 
with forms of governmentality ‘from above’” (ibid.). By so doing, we are somewhat able to note 
that in so far as eKhaya appears to have strong ties with the local state, it has a limited ability to 
keep the City accountable. We also note that even though eKhaya’s relationship with the City 
appears to have been made strong by the formalised invited spaces such as the VSD meetings 
– attended by the eKhaya organiser – it is still mostly ad hoc, personalised and very much based 
on mediation; a fact made especially apparent by the City institutions’ representatives’ failure 
to attend eKhaya meetings such as the building managers’ meetings. That stated, how then do 
we understand eKhaya caretakers in the broader shift of the City? The lane story recounted by 
Adler (2013) above shows us that the informal, negotiated and personalised association 
between the City and the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association filters down to City officials’ 
involvement in informal business activities with, among other stakeholders, the eKhaya building 
managers. This story – coupled with the materialisation of informal practices on eKhaya turf even 
against the backdrop of the City’s intolerance of informal business activities – may show us that 
although some norms and/or rules may be respected, the eKhaya building managers’ everyday 
practices inevitably involve “negotiat[ing] [CoJ] bylaw violations” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 
359). On the part of the City official, it becomes apparent that although state actors are 
governed by City bylaws, they can still either negotiate these bylaws “to cope with the fluidity 
and contradictions of [Hillbrow and] the city” (ibid.) or they can still engage in informal practices 
themselves for personal interests (Kihato 2011). This may then justify Kihato’s (2011: 359) assertion 
that in Johannesburg: 
[t]here are other social norms, values and codes that determine acceptable and reprehensible 
behaviour, and these compete alongside the codes of the official city […] By looking from the 
ground up, yet another reality and perspective of the city emerges drawing our attention to the 
complexity of urban relationships. (Kihato 2011: 359) 
Having been alerted thus, we can but wonder whether state actors are ‘invisibly involved’ in the 
informal practices constituting some eKhaya buildings, some of which are under study.   
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: 
 EKHAYA CARETAKERS AS STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS, MANAGERS OF A 
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY, AND ENFORCERS OF PRACTICAL NORMS? 
6.1 Introduction 
This closing chapter is based on a theoretical reflection and/or an operationalization of the main 
concepts uncovered in the second chapter and which run through the whole study. Using 
among others the Foucauldian, Lipskian and Olivier de Sardan notions of ‘Neoliberal 
Governmentality’, ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy’ and ‘Practical Norms’ respectively, the chapter 
aspires to make the research findings talk to these main concepts. As well, the chapter offers 
commendations relating to how to conceive of the eKhaya RCID building managers and their 
daily activities.   
6.2 Usefulness of Neoliberal Governmentality for Building Management in eKhaya 
The Foucauldian notion of ‘Governmentality’ (conduct of conducts) stipulates that our daily 
practices – while shaped by administrative powers and knowledges/truths - involve self-
governance and government of others via constructed norms. Since governmentality is 
concerned with “the ways in which populations are governed through institutional intervention, 
the production of discourses and norms, and by inculcating practices of self-discipline” (Ellis 
2012: 1142); it is an important lens for understanding the emerging forms of governance in inner 
city Johannesburg, the extent of their involvement in the [re]shaping of societal norms, as well as 
how this impacts on the different urban actors involved. One of the diverse forms of 
governmentality - neoliberal governmentality - refers to “a particular form of post-war state 
politics in which the state essentially outsources the responsibility for ensuring the ‘well-being’ of 
the population [to market logics/to the private sector]… the new subjectivities [consequently 
being] expected to look after themselves” (Berry 2012). Because what matters most in a 
neoliberal context is money and/or market logics, neoliberal governmentality is thus a form of 
governmentality which implies that “new governing arrangements [such as eKhaya] serve the 
dual purpose of privatizing and outsourcing many formerly state functions, and of producing 
disciplined, self-reliant, ‘responsibilized’ [economic] citizen subjects” (Burchell 1996 as discussed 
in Ellis 2012) whose behaviours, being, identity, citizenship is framed in market terms. Effecting 
change in urban neighbourhoods characterised by “chronic violence” (Gossman and Premo 
2012: 1) – for instance Hillbrow - shows us that violent contexts call for specific ‘conducts of 
conducts’ if positive urban neighbourhood change is to be effected in them. A focus on eKhaya 
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South via neoliberal governmentality offers us “important insights into what is at stake when 
various subjects get enlisted in the polycentric terrain of urban governance” (Ellis 2012: 1142); 
and how different dispositifs – technologies and rationalities - converge to bring about urban 
neighbourhood change in urban Johannesburg. Although eKhaya appears to have a people-
centred/bottom up approach with multiple management arrangements; it still remains obvious 
that the RCID is driven by property owners who are driven more than anything by the aspiration 
to maximise their economic capital. Neoliberal governmentality in the context of Hillbrow’s 
eKhaya South may be about educating of the tenant/building resident on other ways of solving 
issues rather than violence. Neoliberal governmentality in Hillbrow’s eKhaya may be about 
taming Hillbrow residents into being ‘good tenants/payers’ and/or ‘consumers’. Facilitating this 
‘edification’ of the Hillbrow/eKhaya tenant is arguably the eKhaya building manager, who 
interacts with the tenant on a day-to-day basis and who seems to have internalised the 
(property owners’) primary objective of profit maximisation. The interaction with the caretaker – 
particularly the process/task of interviewing and shadowing them – suggests that the attitudes of 
some, if not most of, eKhaya building managers are motivated by money. This was made 
somewhat manifest by the willingness of most building managers to partake in the interview and 
shadowing process with the researcher only after being offered a monetary incentive. It is also 
illuminated by the eKhaya building managers’ leniency towards negotiating/breaking some 
property owners’ official rules – and their response to bribes – in an attempt to supplement 
and/or maximise their income; thus the notion of multiple livelihood strategies in a low income 
area. This governmentality is also centered on the payment of rents (including when/if it implies 
having more tenants than formally recommended in the CID and/or property management 
company); and different supplementary income for being lenient with ‘house rules’ and RCID 
policies. Nevertheless, by the same token, the actions of the eKhaya building manager in this 
regard may be argued to be compassion-driven. Shadowing the eKhaya caretaker 
respondents, and observing them as they listened to their respective tenants’ personal problems 
– among them their reasons for late rent payment - and gave advice, not only pointed to the 
multiplicity of roles that the caretakers take on; it also revealed their humanity, empathy and 
understanding of their tenants’ circumstances. This gave the researcher the impression that 
whilst the actions of the eKhaya caretaker may be driven by profit, they may also be driven by 
heart and devotion for their respective tenants. 
An investigation of the daily practices of building management in eKhaya shows that what often 
passes unnoticed in eKhaya building managers’ activities is in fact very important in the 
production of norms, truth and authority in/for eKhaya and perhaps for the whole of Hillbrow. For 
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one, it shows the eKhaya building manager to be a very important stakeholder in the 
improvement district because it alerts us the cruciality of building managers in the internal 
governance of buildings comprising eKhaya and in their external management; as well as how 
they are influenced by eKhaya. By virtue of the fact that building management in eKhaya 
involves the relaying of messages and norms constructed in eKhaya, building managers’ 
meetings to tenants – and the transmission of messages about incidents and/or tenant 
complaints to the eKhaya organiser - the eKhaya building manager can be seen as a conduit 
between the eKhaya Neighbourhood Association and the inhabitants of the building s/he 
governs. Perhaps one of the most important eKhaya (constructed) norms that eKhaya building 
managers transmit pertains to tenants’ taking of responsibility for the buildings’ internal and 
external environments by, for instance, not throwing dirt out through flat windows, not hanging 
their washing on flat balconies. In ensuring that such rules are adhered to, the eKhaya 
caretakers may impose fines on transgressor tenants, and thus shape tenants’ behaviour around 
fines, hence the neoliberal governmentality/economic governmental rationality of the eKhaya 
property caretaker.   
The case of building managers in eKhaya also signifies that the eKhaya building managers do 
not only “facilitate the flow of individuals and materials in and out” (Simone 2010: 10) of the 
buildings they manage but they are also responsible for “managing social relations” (ibid.) both 
within and outside of their buildings. They play an active role in mediating tensions arising 
between tenants as well as regulating relations/behaviour around their respective buildings. By 
virtue of their residence in the buildings they manage - and their pro-activeness in eKhaya 
neighbourhood activities that they do with the eKhaya organiser - for instance neighbourhood 
walkabouts, functions/events - the eKhaya building managers are very conscious of their 
buildings’ internal areas as well as their buildings’ wider environs. In controlling entry, exit and 
monitoring conduct in and just outside of their buildings, eKhaya building managers are aided 
by disciplinary technologies and mechanisms of surveillance – video cameras, biometric system 
and ‘eyes on the street’ (eKhaya security guards and building guards). This goes a long way in 
the reduction of criminality in and outside of the buildings – thus ensuing in safety, “coherence or 
an ordered [and violence-free] environment” (Simone 2010: 10). The building managers’ curbing 
of violence might be a way to collect rents, impose compliance (thus shape behaviour) and be 
able to get the rents or evict bad payers without risking their lives (thus use of economic logic to 
conduct the tenants). The building managers’ guarding of public and private space also shows 
us that the interplay between public space and private space in eKhaya largely lies in the 
commonality they share: they are both surveilled spaces. What is also interesting in this discussion 
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of space and the eKhaya building manager is the extent of the eKhaya building managers’ buy-
in in the discourse against informal activities – at a certain level – but how they do not embrace 
it sometimes. Not only that, the somewhat active role of the eKhaya building managers in the 
surveiling of these spaces may solicit our understanding of them as ‘informal panopticons’. By 
virtue of their everyday administration and registration of different populations [with]in their 
buildings – residents, visitors - eKhaya building managers may be argued to be 
assuming/becoming the (neoliberal) state; an important role to take in given the local state 
institutions’ ephemeral presence on eKhaya turf as well as their perceived incapacity to carry 
out their eKhaya functions. Looking at the eKhaya building manager this way may, to a certain 
extent, evoke Foucault’s concept of governmentalization of the state, which “involves the 
processes through which power [at the most local levels] has been intertwined with the state, 
tying various power relations to a central body that makes it look as if power is coming from a 
centre… something that we experience when we are being governed” (Nohr 2012). 
Yet what power do eKhaya caretakers really have? If tenants decide to be violent, the eKhaya 
building manager may have limited (exercise of) power. It is through this neoliberal 
governmentality – when it becomes normal to ask for favours (permission to host guests, parties 
and other events) to the caretaker - that the eKhaya caretaker’s discretionary power is built and 
the eKhaya caretaker becomes someone that tenants do not really want to make an enemy of. 
Spurred by the Foucauldian conception of power as “a dense net of omnipresent relations… 
[which] comes from below and everywhere” (Nohr 2012) – and the realisation that our mundane 
daily practices are important sources for the production of truth/authority/norms – we may turn 
to neoliberal governmentality for an ‘acceptable’ explanation of how “the discursive micro-
production of truth and authority” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 356) comes about in the 
context of eKhaya. Moreover, for the reason that“[t]his form of governmentality has an 
extremely diffuse form of rule whereby strategies and imperatives of control are distributed 
through a variety of media but are implicated in even the most mundane practice of everyday 
life” (Berry 2012); it not only widens our conception of governing beyond state institutional 
management; it offers us an 'accurate' lens for analysing the mundane, taken-for-granted 
practices closely tied to neighbourhood working. This then means that it calls our attention to 
micro-institutions and/or individuals actively involved in the management of urban 
neighbourhood change but who are more-often-than-not ignored in conventional political 
economy and/or in urban renewal efforts such as improvement districts. In the context of 
eKhaya, such individuals are arguably very much inclusive of eKhaya building managers. 
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6.3 eKhaya building managers as ‘State-like’ Actors: the Practicality of ‘Street-Level 
Bureaucracy’ and ‘Practical Norms’ 
Neoliberal governmentality not only enables us to zoom into the daily activities of the eKhaya 
building manager; it also helps us to sneakily peek into the norms, rules and discourses which 
they may have [at once] embraced and contested, resisted and negotiated. This then makes it 
possible for us to interpret the official/professional discourses that caretakers have internalised in 
the “inside and outside management” (Johansson 1994: 235) of the respective buildings they 
govern.  
An analysis of the daily practices of the eKhaya building managers suggests that their actions 
are in large part influenced by and/or derived from complaints and appeals by tenants, mostly 
about maintenance issues, noise levels and payments of rent. Interviews with the eKhaya 
building managers brought to light the fact that upon getting these complaints, they must 
quickly attend to them24. Yet the researcher noted a certain ‘leisureliness’ in the way most of the 
building managers attended to these demands because the managers appeared to be taking 
their time to attend to complaints, even turning some tenants away and telling them to come 
back later. This gave the researcher the impression that “[i]n a sense, the [eKhaya] caretakers 
manage themselves. No one gives them orders or tells them what to do and when” (Johansson 
1994: 233). It somewhat dawned on the researcher that whilst what the eKhaya building 
managers judge[d] to be proper conduct on their part is underpinned by official norms and/or 
professional norms from eKhaya, CoJ and their respective property management companies; 
their actions are not necessarily in accordance with the official and/or professional norms as 
spelt out by them. The researcher thus realised that whilst the caretakers’ actions and restrictions 
“can be seen as involving a governance through internalized [official] norms” (Johansson 1994: 
239); their actions on the ground can be seen as initiation and management of urban physical 
and sociospatial change via an interlacing of official discourses with an informal and/or 
personalised set of discourses. The actions of the eKhaya building manager in this regard may 
be viewed as involving simultaneously professional and humanistic.   
Interviews with the four eKhaya building manager respondents appear to suggest that they hold 
more or less similar sets of formal/professional/official discourses – physical orderliness/cleanliness; 
                                                          
24 One CoJ article about eKhaya argues that eKhaya tenants are empowered by their building managers, an issue 
which the researcher tried to get to the bottom of by asking the building manager respondents themselves how they see 
themselves as empowering their tenants. Upon being asked this, some – if not most – of the respondents interpreted their 
rmpowerment of tenants as treating them with respect and reporting tenants’ maintenance issues swiftly.  
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safety; livability25; responsiveness to tenants’ professional needs; collection and maximisation of 
rents; “bureaucratic control” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 352); to mention but a notable few. 
The caretakers then interweave these with somewhat ‘informal’ discourses – social norms like 
community; family; sensitivity to context and/or tenants’ personal problems; humility; 
hybridization; social order – to make sense of the everyday problematic situations they 
encounter in their practices. Through everyday face to face contact with different tenants - and 
possibly the homeless, panhandlers, informal traders outside their building – property caretakers 
learn to “act selectively” (ibid: 350) by treating each and every daily situation differently; and 
they may do this via negotiating, bending, stretching and even appropriating 
official/professional rules that constrain their practise of freedom to decide, so as to suit daily 
contexts. For instance, whereas Morrison’s property management company discourages the 
letting of flats/units to certain foreign nationals, Morrison – for the sake of filling her building units 
and thus collecting full rents at the end of each month - has somehow still found a way to give 
such foreign nationals housing units. Whereas informality appears not tolerated by eKhaya and 
the CoJ, building managers such as Mkhwanazi – mainly for the reason that the traders help him 
find clientele/tenants – negotiates City rules by allowing informal traders to operate just outside 
his building. Whilst undocumented populations do not obtain biometrics that allow them to stay 
in housing units, Letswalo may show a certain leniency towards some of his building tenants’ 
undocumented relatives by organizing them biometric access regardless. The materialisation of 
informal traders outside Christianson’s building may suggest that although he appears intolerant 
of informal practices, he may in daily practice be accommodative for reasons unknown to the 
researcher, possibly for socio-economic reasons. As well, Christianson may also appear to be 
empathetic towards the homeless that eKhaya seemingly disapproves of, by virtue of the fact 
that he – as brought about by the informal conversations with his building guards – may be 
allowing them into his building and giving them shelter for the night (see Chapter Four). When 
we look at it this way, we may safely conclude that the case of eKhaya building managers’ 
daily practices shows us that “it is neither desirable nor possible for [housing supervisors] to 
enforce all [rules] all the times… [especially since] by-the-book enforcement [of norms/rules] 
benefits no one” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008: 356, 361). This may somewhat justify Johansson’s 
(1994: 241) assertion that: 
                                                          
25 According to Mkhize (2013) and the HDA (2012), livability is used as one of the central criteria by the eKhaya Board of 
Directors and/or property owners to determine whether or not the precinct has become  the premier preferred 
desination for paying tenants in Hillbrow.  
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If one acts completely in accordance with some book of rules, it becomes very difficult to do 
everything that is needed. To handle tasks and rules in a freer way, however, demands creativity 
and good judgment, together with a certain knack for planning […] Physical and sociospatial 
changes then are not simply something for the next level of management to take care of. Rather, 
the task of the caretaker becomes one of instigating change, and achieving insight into what is 
needed […] see[ing] what needs to be done and [then] exercise[ing] self-governance (Johansson 
1994: 241, 244, 246) 
Does this then justify Olivier de Sardan’s (2002) claim that social change stems from practical 
norms? In the case of building management, it seemingly does because eKhaya building 
managers appear to be effecting change – in their own little ways - doing this mainly through 
implementing unofficial norms on the ground (norms as practised/practical norms) and 
‘marrying’ them with the professional and official norms supposedly governing their work. 
Analysing the actions/practices/conduct of eKhaya building managers in this regard may give 
us the impression that their behaviour very much resembles that of conventional street-level 
bureaucrats - state actors such as police officers who, while bound by high office rules, still have 
the aptitude to exercise discretion in daily practice. Given that the eKhaya building managers – 
and presumably all building managers in eKhaya South – presumably work for private bodies 
rather than the state; we may conceive of them as ‘the unconventional street-level 
bureaucrats’, or at the very least, the ‘quasi-street-level bureaucrats’.  
6.4 Ending Note… 
Inner city Johannesburg is undergoing a physical and sociospatial metamorphosis. It is 
transitioning from a no-go area to a major investment node; and this is thanks in large part to 
urban renewal initiatives such as improvement districts. In the context of the inner city residential 
areas, Hillbrow’s eKhaya RCID is arguably holding its own as an urban renewal initiative that is 
reconfiguring not just Hillbrow’s physical spaces but people’s perceptions of the neighbourhood. 
The case of eKhaya RCID’s building managers shows us that if we intend to see the role of the 
state in the production of urban space in urban neighbourhoods characterised by a temporary 
presence of ‘conventional’ street-level bureaucrats (state actors) – argued to be the arms and 
legs and/or lower reaches of the local state – we may need to look beyond them. There is a 
need for us to broaden our scope by incorporating and engaging with often overlooked 
stakeholders - quasi-state actors - actively involved in the governance of external and internal 
space of improvement districts, the prime example of such actors being eKhaya building 
managers. The case of eKhaya as an organisation – and its housing managers - helps shed a 
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little light on the actuality that urban space and urban change are not only constructed by 
municipal actors. Rather, private institutions and individuals hold the power to instil urban 
change in their own little ways; even though by so doing they valorise the state’s broad 
agendas of urban renewal. In fact, by virtue of the fact that their actions are intertwined with 
those of the state (governmentalized) – and involve collusion with state actors - eKhaya 
stakeholders such as building managers may be viewed as street-level bureaucrats, or at the 
very least, ‘quasi-street-level bureaucrats’. In a context of the local state’s physical absence, a 
characteristic which is seemingly evident in eKhaya, the eKhaya building manager may be seen 
as the unlikely frontline soldier serving diverse interests of the eKhaya public. By collecting 
monthly rents, the building manager manages change for the property owners and the City, 
aiding in the sustenance of the property business in the inner city. By administering building 
residents and their visitors, the building manager manages tenants’ social relations, and 
facilitates the production of the responsible building resident/citizen on behalf of the City.  
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ADDENDUM A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EKHAYA NEIGHBOURHOOD PROGRAMME’S PROPERTY MANAGERS 
Theme 1 – Getting to know the Property Manager and his/her Neighbourhood (Hillbrow) 
1. May you please tell me a bit about yourself? Where you were born and where you grew 
up. 
2. You are a property manager based in Hillbrow. When did you move (in)to Hillbrow? 
3. Why did you move into Hillbrow? OR Was your move into Hillbrow influenced by your job? 
OR What influenced your move into Hillbrow? 
4. Would you say that Hillbrow has changed since you moved into the neighbourhood? If 
so, in what way? If not, why not? 
Theme 2 – The Practices, Trials and Tribulations of Housing Management 
You manage a building that constitutes eKhaya Neighbourhood CID Hillbrow South 
1. When did you assume your duties as building manager? 
2. May you please describe your normal working day (in terms of your daily chores)? 
3. What would you say you enjoy most about your position? 
4. What don’t you like about your position? 
5. What are the challenges you and other caretakers face in your line of work, on a day-to-
day basis? 
6. How do you try to solve the challenges? May you please tell me about the last time this 
happened and/or give me an example?And how did you say that? What did you think? 
Why did this person react in this way?  
Theme 3 – Relations and Networks with other Stakeholders 
1. How would you describe your relationship with other Ekhaya housing managers? 
2. How would you describe relations with the property owner(s)?  
3. I read up on the internet (City of Johannesburg website) that tenants in Ekhaya are 
empowered by housing managers. How would you describe your relationship with your 
tenants and how would you say you empower tenants in the building you manage? 
4. Hillbrow is a neighbourhood with many foreign nationals, some of whom are 
undocumented and who are constantly being harassed by the police. Have there ever 
been any incidents of police raids in your building? Have there been incidents when you 
have found yourself protecting some tenants from police harassment? 
5. Suppose there is a problem such as water cuts and/or electricity cuts in your building. 
Who do you have to call and/or work with in restoring order and getting systems up and 
running in the building?  
6. Have there ever been conflicts that have cropped up between residents in your 
building? 
7. As housing manager, what would you say is your role in mediating conflicts and making 
people see eye to eye?   
Theme 4 – ‘Official’ VS ‘Practical’ Norms/Codes of Conduct  
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1. Who is your employer? 
2. Is there a company code of conduct that property managers have to abide by and/or 
follow? 
3. Are there rules from eKhaya RCID that you have to follow? 
4. Are there some official codes of conduct that you find hard to implement when dealing 
with everyday challenges in your building as well as in eKhaya? 
5. How do you go about dealing with these challenges practically? 
 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT FOR JOSIE ADLER (INNER CITY ACTIVIST, FOUNDER OF EKHAYA, 
CONSULTANT AT J. H. C.) 
INTERVIEWERS - MIKHAELA SAKH AND THEMBANI MKHIZE 
The framing of this interview is to explore the experiences which have shaped and are 
shaping your involvement with in the city. As such we would ask that you think about 2-3 
things that you achieved in being an activist – or that you are aiming at achieving?  
Better understanding your background 
• Your family context (where and when you were born,where you grew up) 
• Your education 
• When did you start being politically aware, how? Was there any specific turning point, 
moment of social and political awareness? 
• Did you join any civil society or political organization/ where/ when 
• Important steps / phases in your training (political and professional) 
• What motivated you to go into this line of work? 
• Were there any particular influences or people that motivated you toward this line of 
work and activism. 
Unpacking the influences- what have you been involved in? (Which organisations; past and 
present) 
1. A brief chronology of her involvement in ‘activism’ 
• How long have you been involved with the Ekhaya Neighbourhood project (how did you 
get involved, when, why you choose this forum...) 
• Were you involved in other forms of activism before? Discuss.(Chronology of her 
professional/ activist path) 
• Why did you choose activism as a voice for engaging with the issues in the inner city? 
• Are you involved in any other organisations (party, social movement, NGO, 
association…) 
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2. The 2-3 issues that you have achieved/ have been aiming at achieving. An in-depth 
observation 
For each of these issues/ areas/ object, we will spend some time discussing how she 
achieved her objective or is working towards it.  
Have these questions in mind but don’t ask them – rather let her talk and complement 
along these lines  
• How / when you started working on this issue, and what was the context 
• Why it matters/ mattered 
• What were the main steps that you took to address the issue? 
• What were the main challenges/ obstacles/ impediment you identified in this process 
• What were your strengths, powers, supports to make it work 
• What alliances / coalitions/ partnerships you built to achieve this aim (at different scales; 
in and out of government) 
• How you reflect on the process, successes, limitations 
• What worked, what did not work 
• Would you have done things, could you have done things differently? 
• Legacy of this action 
3. Understanding the object of the Ekhaya neighbourhood project.  
• What is it, when and why was it established? 
• Who are the staff members and its partners? 
• Where do you get the resources to do your work? 
• What are the tools of engagement that you use? 
• What have been some of the hurdles is there any particular event which was particularly 
challenging or interesting? 
• What are the implications that it has for people on the ground? 
• What is the future of the Ekhaya neighbourhood project? 
• What changes do you feel need to be seen with the Inner city for change to be 
meaningful? 
•  What is the future for the innercity? 
147 
 
• In reflection what would you have done differently, if at all?  
• What have been the struggles you have faced in reshaping the innercity 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BAFIKILE MKHIZE (EKHAYA CO-ORDINATOR) 
Theme 1: Introducing Bafikile Mkhize’s duties/role in Ekhaya 
1. You are the co-ordinator of Ekhaya. What does your job entail? (ask for a bit of detail, if 
she does not speak at lengh about it. For instance what are the big elements of her 
schedule this week or the next, typically? Are you busy with any buildings at the 
moment? 
2. When did you assume your duties as co-ordinator? What was your training, where did 
you come from? 
3. What are the main challenges of your job? What do you enjoy in your job? 
4. When we spoke on the phone, you told me that you were going to be attending an 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) of property owners, and that it was only open to 
property owners and/or board members. What is your role as co-ordinator in such 
meetings?  
Theme 2: The Trials and Tribulations of (working with) eKhaya Building Managers 
I have gone through newspaper articles that point to the positive impact of Ekhaya building 
caretakers; the articles constantly make mention of how tenants are empowered by building 
managers in decision-making processes. Also, I have talked to your predecessor about her work 
on eKhaya, and she could not stop talking about the positive impact of building managers on 
the management and relations within buildings constituting eKhaya, as well as how closely they 
work together. This gave me the impression that a co-ordinator works very closely with property 
managers. 
1. How closely do you (have to) work with housing managers? 
2. How often do you meet with caretakers (collectively and individually)? 
3. What would you say is the role of property managers in eKhaya? 
4. In your opinion, are property caretakers actively effecting neighbourhood change? Give 
examples 
5. What would you say is the caretakers’ role in settling landlord-tenant-City disputes? 
6. Would you say you play a role in this regard (conflict management)? If so, what role? As 
the co-ordinator of eKhaya, have you ever been involved in settling disputes between 
co-ordinators as well as conflicts between property owners and tenants? 
  
Theme 3: Policies guiding (Building Management in) eKhaya 
I have read newspaper articles that point to the challenges of being a property manager: 
caretakers, according to the articles, get killed and/or injured in their lines of duty in Hillbrow. This 
got me thinking of the vulnerability of being a property manager in the inner city, where there 
are problems such as property hijackings. 
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1. Are there laws and policies guiding Ekhaya? If so, do those policies constitute, make 
mention of and/or protect the discretion of property caretakers/managers? 
2. Would you then say that because of the policies and/or laws, Ekhaya managers are 
‘better off’ than the caretakers in the whole of Hillbrow and/or the inner city? Why? Why 
not? 
I plan to interview 4 caretakers – 1 from a JHC owned building, 1 from a sectional title building, 1 
from a ‘hijacked building, and one from an individually building. Any property caretakers you 
can recommend? Do any buildings come to mind? 
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ADDENDUM B: EKHAYA KIDZ’ DAY BRIEFINGS 
 
150 
 
 
151 
 
 
152 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
154 
 
ADDENDUM C: HOUSE RULES 
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